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ABSTRACT
THE PROGRAM PATHING TRUST MODEL FOR CRITICAL SYSTEM PROCESS
AUTHORIZATION
By Robert A. Dahlberg, MS, MA
A dissertation proposal submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011
Dissertation Director: David Primeaux, PhD. Associate Professor, Computer Science
Since computers are relied upon to run critical infrastructures – from nuclear power plants to
electronic battlefield simulations – the concept of a ―trusted‖ or tamperproof system has
become even more important. Some applications have become so critical that it is imperative
that they run as intended, without interference. The consequences of these systems not
running as intended could be catastrophic. This research offers a solution for a key element
for protecting these critical servers – validating process invocation sequences.
The purpose of this research is to increase operating system security by detecting, validating,
and enforcing process invocation sequences within a critical system. If the processes on a
critical system are not those that are intended to run or support the critical system, or if a
system is able to run processes in an unauthorized sequence, then the system is compromised
and cannot be trusted. This research uses a computational theory approach to create a
framework for a solution for the process invocation sequence problem. Using the Program
Pathing Trust Model, a solution capable of identifying both valid and invalid process
invocation sequences is developed.

x

Chapter 1: Introduction
Computer security emerged as an area of interest around 1967 [SCC70] [CST72] [Schr74-1]
[Schr74-2]. As computers became increasingly utilized in government and private industry,
they became indispensable. The need for computer security has become more evident with the
increased prevalence of malware combined with societal dependence upon computers. As
computers are relied upon more to run critical infrastructures – from nuclear power plants to the
electronic battlefield – the concept of ―trusted‖ or tamperproof systems has become even more
important. Critical applications must run as intended, without interference, or the consequences
could be catastrophic. Power grids could go offline, transportation systems could fail, battlefield
controls could black out or the nation‘s financial transactions could stall, resulting in scenarios
such as loss of human life and financial losses.

1.1 Overview
Early investigators discovered that to be effective security systems must work in a symbiotic
relationship with the operating system (OS). The OS relies upon the security system to ensure
that OS integrity is maintained. And the security system relies upon OS integrity not to let other
facilities interfere with or circumvent it.
The purpose of this research is to develop a security solution model for maintaining system
integrity, meaning that system integrity is maintained by permitting a system to execute only
normal processes in valid process invocation sequences. The terms normal process and valid
process invocation sequence are explained in detail later in section 2.2. OS security is increased
by ensuring that only trusted process invocation sequences are executed within the system. If the
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processes running on the system are not those intended or if the system is able to run processes in
an unacceptable sequence, then the system is compromised and cannot be trusted.

1.2 Contributions
This research takes a unique approach to the problem of insuring the integrity of a critical
system. While other approaches (described in chapter 5) focus upon determining whether a
previously encountered sequence of processes is valid, the approach in this research validates
each process‘s authority to invoke a subsequent process, thereby adding a new dimension to
access control. Prior approaches to access control do not address the validation of a process‘s
authority to invoke other processes.
The program pathing trust (PPT) model developed provides a theoretically sound framework
for assessing the validity of process invocation sequences. While other research has employed
theory-based structures such as automata without explicit discussion of the required
computational power, this research develops a theory-based approach with respect to the security
issue of validating process invocation sequences. This research shows that the computational
power of a Finite State Automaton is sufficient because process invocation sequences have the
structure of a Regular Language.
The PPT model resulting from this research is more compact than several previously
suggested models. In the PPT model each process is represented only once. This is not the case
in other approaches. Furthermore, where other approaches provide only a method determining
whether a previously encountered sequence of processes is valid, the PPT model can be used not
only to similarly assess whether some candidate process invocation sequence is valid, but also to
reject a set of invalid process invocation sequences, whether or not previously encountered, and
also to infer the possible validity of some process invocation sequences that have not been
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previously encountered.
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Chapter 2: Background Terminology and Distinctions
The terminology and distinctions made in this section are used to describe and define the
problem and the proposed solution.

2.1 Processes
The basic function of a computer is to execute programs. A program is a set of machine
instructions that are organized in a logical sequence to perform a task or process [Stall92]. A
process is a program that is loaded into main memory and executed [Silb05]. The operation of a
computer may be modeled as a series of processes invoking other processes [Stall92]. Other
than physical threats to a computer, a process is required in order to pose a threat to a computer.
Therefore, it is a fundamental premise of this research that all threats to a computer that are of
interest are associated with processes and the invocation sequences of processes.
2.1.1 External Processes
External processes are processes that have not been explicitly installed by a system
administrator. These processes might be applets loaded by users visiting a webpage, scripts or
programs written (or downloaded) by users, macros in an application (like Mircosoft Office®),
or malware that has otherwise infiltrated the system. External processes can pose a danger to a
system because they may come from unknown sources. For this reason they are generally not
desirable [CSI03] [Eete08].
External processes tend to be a security concern more for workstations than for critical
servers. However, even critical servers can be susceptible to external processes. Poor access
control can allow a user or a process to install an external process into a restricted directory. Or,
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system vulnerability can be exploited to implant an external process into a directory or into an
execution sequence. External processes pose an obvious threat.
2.1.2 Internal Processes
Internal processes are processes that have been intentionally installed on a computer system
by a system administrator. Internal processes are often part of a vendor-supplied software
package. They are usually purchased from and supported by a commercial vendor but may be
open source software. On a critical server, ideally only software that is critical to the function of
the system should be installed. There may be, however, processes included in the installed
software that are not used as part of the critical function of the system. Many software packages
have features that are not needed by a particular enterprise and are therefore not used. The
processes that support these features may be installed on the computer, but may not be executed.
2.1.2.1 Operating System Processes
Operating system processes are internal processes that are responsible for the management
of computer resources (hardware, memory, I/O and intercommunication), the coordination of
system activities and the sharing of the computer resources. The operating system acts as a host
for all other processes that run on the machine [Stall92]. The OS is composed of a number of
processes (such as services), not all of which are needed by a critical system – although in a full
installation they reside on the system.
2.1.2.1.1 OS Kernel
The OS kernel is a set of core OS processes. They perform the most critical functions of the
OS, and without them no other processes could execute. The OS kernel is made up of those
processes that manage the execution of other processes in the OS. They perform process,
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memory and I/O management and other OS support functions such as interrupt handling,
auditing and monitoring. Kernel processes with the highest authority execute in ―system‖ (or
―kernel‖) mode. System mode allows kernel processes to execute privileged instructions and be
exempt from access controls [Stal92]. Any process that maliciously modifies a kernel process is
referred to as a rootkit. Rootkits are designed to allow another process to gain elevated authority
to circumvent the system‘s data and system security [Hogl05]. If an OS kernel process is
compromised, the entire OS is generally un-useable and has to be reinstalled, unless the
compromised process is identified, and removed (or replaced).
2.1.2.1.2 OS Utilities
OS utilities are also internal processes that are part of the operating system. These processes
are usually invoked by terminal commands or through a user-initiated GUI. The processes are
loaded from the installed operating system directories. These directories usually require elevated
authority to update, and are therefore considered reliable. OS utilities may or may not run with
elevated authority. These processes are also vulnerable to rootkits.
2.1.2.2 Application Processes
Application processes are internal processes that a system administrator has installed on the
system and expects to run as an integral part of the system‘s primary function. These application
processes may or may not run with elevated privileges.
2.1.2.2.1 System Application Processes
System applications (sometimes referred to as middleware) can be defined as application
processes that are installed to support a user application. These applications are neither part of
the OS nor the user applications (described below) that they support. System applications such
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as a database or a data transport system add more sophisticated functions than the OS alone is
designed to provide. These processes, like OS processes, usually require elevated access and the
directories they reside in are restricted. However, as in the case with OS processes, there are
generally unnecessary features, utilities, application program interfaces or sample code that
could be used to interfere with the processes within the application‘s primary function. These
extraneous processes pose a possible threat if run, as they can steal CPU cycles or otherwise
interfere with the application [Bre89] [Gogu82].
2.1.2.2.2 User Application Processes
User applications are application processes that provide the reason why all the other
processes exist. On a critical system, only necessary user applications should be installed.
These processes may or may not need elevated access to execute. The directories in which they
reside must be protected with appropriate access control techniques.
User applications can be vendor supplied or developed in-house. Vendor-supplied user
applications can cause the same concerns as system applications and OS processes with respect
to their including extraneous content. An in-house developed user application, however, is
likely leaner in its deployment and only deploys those processes that are required by users of the
system. Therefore, in-house developed applications would be less likely to contain unnecessary
processes that might be executed and compromise the system. However, in-house user
applications require good version control because poor version control can introduce
vulnerability.
2.1.3 Process Behavior
Each of the preceding process types are classified as either having normal or abnormal
process behavior. In this research, a process’s behavior is defined as the execution of its
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sequence of machine instructions. A process can manipulate memory, invoke OS services or
invoke other processes. The process‘s logic may provide multiple execution paths, not all of
which may be desirable in a particular environment. Desired behavior is that behavior that is
designed into the process to fulfill the mission of the organization. Every process has a function
that an organization intends it to accomplish. In this paper, a normal process is defined as a
desired process running on a critical server.
2.1.3.1 Normal Process Behavior
The problem is broader in scope than previous related security research in intrusion
detection, which focuses only on malware intrusion. This research focuses on the larger problem
of system integrity. What would normally be a false positive for an intrusion detection system
may prove not to be such in this research. The distinction lies in the definition of normal
behavior. Normal behavior for an intrusion detection system generally means the execution of
any software that is intentionally installed by authorized users. The purpose of such an intrusion
detection system is to identify any other software that has infiltrated the system. For a critical
server, however, that definition is insufficient. This research defines normal behavior as
resulting from only those processes that are intended or are necessary to run on a system to
achieve its intended function. Thus, a process that may be considered part of normal behavior in
another system may not be considered normal in a critical system. For example, because only
processes that are necessary for the fulfillment of a critical system‘s function should be allowed
to run, it may not be acceptable for a critical system to allow SMTP (email) traffic processing.
This reduces superfluous processes executing and taking up valuable system resources or
otherwise interfering with critical functions.
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2.1.3.2 Abnormal Process Behavior
Abnormal processes are defined as the complement of the set of normal processes. All
processes are assumed to be abnormal unless they are determined necessary and appropriate to
support the mission for which the server was built. For example, a critical system created to run
a company‘s accounting system probably shouldn‘t be allowed to execute processes to run the
company‘s emails. Even an internal process installed as part of the OS or an application can be
considered abnormal, if it is not a process necessary to achieve the system‘s intended function.
Thus it is not necessary that a process be external in order for it to be labeled abnormal.
Abnormal processes (internal or external) can also be new processes that infiltrate the system,
or ones that masquerade as normal processes. New processes that infiltrate the system would
most likely be external processes. They can be a validly loaded process such as an applet which
might be an unknown process loaded into a JAVA virtual machine from across the network.
When an abnormal process masquerades as a normal process, it is generally malware or possibly
a variant of a normal process. A system does not maintain its integrity if it runs any abnormal
processes.

2.2 Process Invocation Sequences
A computer system executes a sequence of processes. As part of a normal process’s
behavior, it might invoke one or more processes for OS system services or another application
process; at some times, for some processes, this sequence is significant. The execution of some
processes should not occur in an unconstrained order, but rather within a range of acceptable
orders.
The OS provides a process scheduler that manages all process invocation sequences. From
the time the OS is booted, the computer executes a process sequence. The various orderings of
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processes that may be scheduled for execution by the OS scheduler represents a set of process
invocation sequences. Ensuring that some process invocations execute in order is as important
as ensuring that a process executes its machine instructions in the correct order. Determining
whether a process invocation sequence is valid or invalid is the central theme of this research.
2.2.1 Valid Process Invocation Sequences
Valid process invocation sequences are defined as those process invocation sequences that
invoke a set of normal processes in an order that accomplishes or supports the system‘s intended
primary function. In defining normal processes, a server dedicated to running accounting
functions should run only accounting processes and those processes necessary to support those
accounting functions. However, in addition, every normal process supporting this accounting
function should be coded to invoke only certain processes in a limited range of order. A
process‘s logic may support different logic paths, but the number of processes it may invoke is
finite (although, perhaps large), whether these processes include another application process or
an OS process. As the critical server executes its primary function, only a subset of all possible
process invocation sequences supports the intended functions of the system. This subset consists
of exactly the valid process invocation sequences.
2.2.2 Invalid Process Invocation Sequences and System Integrity
System integrity can be compromised by normal processes running in an invalid process
invocation sequence. The set of invalid process invocation sequences is the complement of the
set of valid process invocation sequences. A system is said to maintain its system integrity if it
runs only normal processes in valid process invocation sequences.
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The classic example of a valid and invalid invocation sequences is illustrated in z/OS
MVS1‘s AMASPZAP. AMASPZAP is a program that allows a system program to modify
machine instructions at the binary level. The system program can verify the binary instruction
codes and change them using AMASPZAP. AMASPZAP, which modifies machine instructions,
is a normal maintenance process. If that process is invoked from the SMP/E2 process, the
process invocation sequence is considered valid. The SMP/E process provides restricted access
control that AMASPZAP alone does not provide. Therefore, any invocation of AMASPZAP
that is not made directly from SMP/E is considered a system integrity breach. If the
AMASPZAP process is invoked directly from a TSO/E3 process or some other process, then the
process invocation sequence must be considered invalid.
The normality of a process invocation process can also be dependent on the wall-clock time
at which it is executed. For example, a process invocation sequence may be valid if it runs
during a system maintenance window (say: Saturday evenings 10:00PM to 4:00AM), but
execution at another time should be considered an invalid process invocation sequence.

1

z/OS MVS is IBM‘s MVS operating system which runs on the z10 chip and is the most recent descendent of the
System/390, System/370 and System/360 chip series. z/OS is the most current version of the MVS operating
system that runs on the z10 chip. MVS is the standard operating system used on the IBM mainframe for the last 40
years. [Webb08]
2
SMP/E is IBM‘s System Modification Program/Extended. SMP/E is a tool for installing and maintaining software
and for managing the inventory of software that has been installed on a Z/OS machine. [IBM08]
3
TSO/E is a z/OS Base Time Sharing Option/Extensions (TSO/E) element that provides an interactive terminal
interface. Equivalent to Putty or terminal services in Unix. [IBM09]
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Chapter 3: Problem: Why System Integrity is Important
When addressing the problem of maintaining system integrity, it is important to understand
what might cause a system to become compromised. The OS does provide some system
integrity internally that is effective as long as programmers and administrators create and execute
only internal processes according to some basic security principles [Harr03]. Of course, the only
reasonably sure protection from programmer mistakes is to require stringent reviews of their
code and adequate quality assurance verification to ensure these principles have been followed.
However, even if these basic security principles are followed, system integrity remains
challenged by external processes and users. Exposure to external processes can cause a system
to be infected with malware. System integrity can also be compromised by access from
administrators with privileged access.

3.1 Malware
Nearly all computers have some exposure to the Internet and, as a result, are under constant
threat of attack by viruses, parasites, worms, Trojan horses, adware, bots and other intentionally
designed malware. Symantec, a prominent security company, has tracked and documented the
number of malware incidents per year is growing (see figure 3-1 below) [Syma10]. Almost all
computers encounter outages or suffer poor performance due to malware. Countless time and
money has been spent fixing, reimaging or replacing systems that have been compromised. Even
with a defense-in-depth strategy using anti-virus, anti-spyware, anti-malware, intrusion
detection, vulnerability assessment and access control security tools, new and innovative
malware still penetrates through the defenses. However most users accept the risk, and consider
it part of the cost of doing business [Eete08]. Even application servers buried deep in an
organization‘s infrastructure (such servers which are of most interest to this research) have some
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Figure 3-1 New Malware Code Threats - Symantec

exposure to the constant barrage of malware.
Some critical systems not only have to be concerned with the possibility of random malware
attack, but also with a relatively high likelihood of attacks specifically targeted by cyber
criminals or terrorists. Some systems support critical functions such as providing an electronic
battlefield, balancing power grids, coordinating air traffic or regulating the money supply.
Because of the critical applications they support, these systems cannot afford to be compromised,
and therefore, warrant a stronger defense. Therefore, some defenses that normally would not be
cost-effective on other systems are required on these systems. Fortunately, these critical systems
are more likely to run on dedicated computer systems and can be more tightly controlled.
Malware infects systems by either implementing themselves as a new process within a valid
sequence of process invocations or by masquerading as a known process within an apparently
valid process invocation sequence. Ensuring that all processes and/or sequences of processes are
normal becomes critical to verifying that malware has not infected a system. Preventing
malware contamination is a by-product of ensuring system integrity.
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3.2 Operator Error
Most prior work in OS security has been focused on intrusion detection [Amm98] [Appf04]
[Feng03] [Forr96] [Gho00] [Hof98] [Ko94] [Kos97] [Wag01] [Warr99] and has been a reaction
to the emergence of malware. Malware, although an important aspect of system integrity, is not
the only concern. Operator error or internal threats can also compromise system integrity.

Figure 3-2: IDC’s Survey of External vs. Internal Threats

Computer operators and security practitioners know that external threats are not the only
threats to critical computer systems. In fact malware is not the main reason critical production
systems fail or encounter production outage incidents. Production outage incidents are known to
be caused more frequently by operator error or to occur after system maintenance or other
changes are introduced to a system [Chri08] [CSI03] [Keen05]. Users with elevated privileges
can pose a more serious threat to a system than malware because of their access using
administrative authority. Security professionals know that historically the most dangerous
threats to computer systems are internal, particularly for critical systems located deep in the
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infrastructure [CSI03]. In 2007, International Data Corporation (IDC) research found that most
threat focus was on external threats. A 2008 IDC report [Chri08] (figure 3-2) showed a shift of
focus from external threats to internal threats.
Since it is difficult to predict the variety of things a system administrator might need to do to
a system, they are granted higher privileges to enable them to fix or tune a system, which also
allows them to interfere with a system‘s intended function by mistake. Even the best technicians
make mistakes, sometimes with catastrophic effect [Chri08]. With a lack of understanding of
how exactly the system works, or by simply hitting the ENTER key by mistake, technicians can
unintentionally interfere with a critical system. Or technicians could submit a task that, although
otherwise benign, could consume valuable CPU cycles needed for intended execution of the
critical application.
System changes that may impact a critical system are normally reserved for a maintenance
window, a time when production processes are not executing. At these times, the critical system
is more tolerant of executing non-production associated processes. Administrators, however,
need a security mechanism that would allow them to maintain a system during maintenance
windows or when a system needs their intervention, such as when a system exhibits problems
and needs an emergency fix. The security mechanism must not allow the administrator to run
any process that may deviate from the normal production process during the hours when
production processing is running. Maintenance processes should only run at specific wall-clock
times within specific process invocation sequences and not while production process and process
sequences are running.
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3.3 Research
Other research in this field has taken a purely engineering approach. Researchers define a
solution by focusing upon intrusion detection [Feng03] [Forr96] [Gho00] [Hof98] [Ko98]
[Kos97] [Sek01] [Wag01] [War99] and focus upon resolving the malware problem only. These
approaches are quick to formulate a solution to the problem of indentifying malware in process
invocation sequences. While existing research addresses an important aspect of the problem,
there is far more to this complex problem. ―The engineer's first problem in any design situation
is to discover what the problem really is‖ [Beak69]. This research analyzes the problem from a
different perspective and then defines requirements to solve the problem(s) by developing a
solution model.
There is a need for a security model to enforce system integrity by adding to the defense-indepth arsenal that protects against malware and provides safeguards against technician errors.
The facility must adhere to some basic security principles: it must perform authentication and
authorization, and provide accountability. This research defines a solution model for a facility to
provide system integrity controls, not only to mitigate malware intrusions, but also to provide
control over technicians so that they can only apply changes during maintenance windows or in
emergency situations. This research analyzes the system integrity problem, analyzes which
computational model is necessary and sufficient to address the problem, defines the
requirements, creates a solution model, identifies the kinds of features needed in such a system,
and tests a prototype of the solution.
3.3.1 Requirements
As part of analyzing of the problem of system integrity, the system requirements are
identified. In this research, these requirements are based upon the AAA security principle:
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Authentication, Authorization and Accountability. The AAA principle is an industry-accepted
standard associated with all security solutions. Although the principle became best known
through the AAA protocol RFCs defined by the IETF [Ietf00], it has been a guiding principle
since the first access control systems were developed in the early 1970s. AAA is an accepted
principle in the development of all security controls [Fire03].
3.3.1.1 Authentication
Authenticating the identity of processes is a prerequisite to verifying that a process is normal
and that it belongs to a valid process invocation sequence. Unless a process is authenticated,
another process can masquerade in place of a normal process. This is a requirement overlooked
in other research concerned with mapping invocation sequences. Process authentication is
defined in section 9.3 and a discussion of authentication methods are discussed in more detail in
Appendix D. Although authentication of processes is very important, this component of security
is not the focus of this research. This research assumes all processes presented to the scheduler
are correctly authenticated.
3.3.1.2 Authorization
Process authorization (validating processes and invocation sequences) is a critical element of
this research. An authenticated process is evaluated as to whether it is authorized to be invoked
by the process that invoked it. Each process corresponding to the entire prefix (the portion of the
sequence preceding the process to be authorized) of the process invocation sequence must be
authorized in order for the executing process to be authorized. If the scheduler determines that a
process is not invoked by a process that is authorized to invoke it, then the process is not
scheduled for execution. If the process is abnormal, or any part of the prior process invocation
sequence is invalid, then the invoked process is determined to be unauthorized. This research
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focuses primarily on developing a model for determining the authorization of valid process
invocations. Process authorization has two distinct functions: (1) to learn or define a valid
process invocation sequence and (2) to verify that a current running process is the product of a
valid process invocation sequence.
Determining a valid invocation sequence has been one of the most challenging aspects of this
research. Other projects have used a variety of methods (see chapter 5), resulting in mixed
success. One of the problems with determining the validity of a process invocation sequence is
that today‘s systems are so complex that it seems no individual really knows what a valid
process invocation sequence might be.
3.3.1.2.1 Invocation
To determine a valid process invocation sequence, this research must first define the phrase
invoke process. In this research, the statement, 'P1 invokes P2' means that the CPU has executed
an instruction from P1 and that the executed instruction has the intent of requesting the OS
scheduler to place process P2 on the dispatch queue for CPU execution. An invocation sequence
is an ordered series of process invocations.
3.3.1.2.2 Static Process Invocation
Others have made the distinction between statically and dynamically invoked processes
[Feng03] [Kos97]. Statically invoked processes are those that are linked into an application;
they are part of the same load module as the invoking process [Hof98] [Sek01] [Wag01]. These
systems must have their source code or load module analyzed to determine the valid process
invocation sequences. Static process invocation sequences are not of particular interest to this
research. To modify processes within a load module would require in-depth knowledge of the
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application and probably privileged access to make changes to the load module, so such
processes pose limited risk to a system.
3.3.1.2.3 Dynamic Process Invocation
Dynamically invoked processes are processes not linked into the application‘s load module.
These processes are invoked in a number of ways: explicitly, implicitly and symbolically.
Explicitly invoked processes are invoked using fully qualified directory information. Explicit
process invocations cannot mistakenly invoke a process from the wrong directory. Implicit
process invocations use the ―home‖ directory. However, the ―home‖ directory actually consists
of a number of subdirectories, and the invoked process can be loaded from any one of these. If a
number of processes with the same name reside in multiple directories in the ―home‖ directory,
the first found process with the name of the invoked process is used, regardless of which part of
the ―home‖ directory it resides. Implicit invocation using the ―home‖ directory can be dubious at
best, because the ―home‖ directory can be changed dynamically.
Symbolic invocations appear to invoke a process from one directory when in fact they are
actually invoking a process in another directory. Determining the directory where a symbolically
invoked process actually resides can be accomplished, although it is not as straight-forward as
determining where other external invocation processes resided. Symbolic links are more
confusing than they are problematic because their target process can be uniquely identified.
This research is interested in dynamically invoked processes, because they provide an
opportunity to subtly compromise a system.
3.3.1.3 Accountability
A security system requires a means to enable accountability. When a security-related
incident occurs, administrators must be able to determine its cause. If a process invoking
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sequence has not been granted authority to execute, the security system must be able to identify
the reason for this situation. At a minimum the system should provide the administrator with the
invalid invocation sequence and its point of failure. The process invoking sequence can be
analyzed to determine the cause of the problem or to determine if the incident represented a
false positive result (that is, a result in which a valid process invocation sequence was identified
as invalid.) If a false positive result occurs, the security system should be corrected to allow the
process invoking sequence to be authorized in subsequent occurrences. In other words, the
security system must have the ability to report on the process invoking sequences that it
encounters and report which are valid and which are invalid.
Auditors need to review the security system as well, to verify that it is properly protecting the
rest of the system, and they need to verify what process invocation sequences are authorized.
Assurance that a computer system is adequately protected is essential to meeting government
certifications such as FISMA [FISM02] [FISM08]. FISMA certification is mandatory for U.S.
government computer systems. The capability to report on the process invocation sequences is
an essential function of accountability.
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Chapter 4: Security Background
As stated earlier, the purpose of this research is to increase operating system (OS) security by
detecting and enforcing trusted process invocation sequences within the system. The system
must run as expected before any other security measures can be enforced. Without good
operating system integrity, any other attempt to secure data, resource, users, etc. is a hollow
exercise. If the processes on the system are not those intended to run on the system or if the
system is able to run processes in an unauthorized sequence, then the system is already
compromised and cannot be trusted.
Operating system security has been an issue since the 1970s, [SCC70] [CST72] [Schr74-1]
[Schr74-2] and has become even more so with the increased prevalence of malware and societal
dependence upon computers. When referring to operating systems, often security is an afterthought. Operating system designers have focused on the functionality of the OS, not its
integrity. [Bish03] [Ravi04] [SHA99] [Smal01a] [Spen99] Various projects have undertaken the
challenge of creating an OS with built in integrity [ACM99] [Smal01b]. Commercial OSs has
continued to enhance existing OSs by adding or modifying security features in order to assist in
maintaining system integrity [ACF99] [RACF03]. And there is a plethora of security add-on
tools to further enhance the assurance of system integrity [Appf04] [Ford97] [Mcca05]
[Syma05]. All of these approaches have met with various levels of success. This research
focuses on one neglected aspect of the system integrity problem, the problem of detecting invalid
process invocation sequences and preventing their execution.

4.1 The Program Pathing Problem
Why focus on process invocation sequences? The basic function of a computer is to run
processes and, as the computer continues to operate, to invoke other process. To ensure system
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integrity, it is important to verify that processes run in a valid sequence. When a process runs
out of sequence, the system is no longer operating as expected – and therefore can no longer be
―trusted.‖ A process invocation sequence is the order in which processes are invoked in a
system. When the OS boots up, a single process is loaded and invokes a series of other processes
until the entire OS is loaded. The scheduler, memory manager, I/O subsystem, and all system
services are inter-linked through a series of process invocation sequences. Whenever a user starts
an application, another substring of the process invocation sequence is started. Proper operation
of an OS consists of only certain process invocation sequences being executed. These process
invocation sequences are referred to in this research as program paths. When an OS or
application deviates from a valid program path (PP), the integrity of that system has been
compromised [Schr74-1].
Previous methods to map PP use traces, compiled languages, and even coding PP sequences
into programs [ACF99] [Mcca05]. These approaches soon become too difficult and too tedious
to administer [ACF99] [Mcca05]. Administrators needed in-depth system knowledge and in
some cases had to manually write sophisticated program languages to create new PP mappings.
Such mappings either began to take up too much memory, or took too long to calculate [Schr741]. As some sparser, more manageable, PP maps began to be used on systems, administrators
found deficiencies in their function. These systems could only determine process invocation
sequences that were explicitly learned – they could not deduce implied process invocation
sequences.
Processes have a number of behavioral characteristics that make the mapping of process
invocation sequences particularly difficult. A running process has a unique process identity and
location, and may exhibit a number of behaviors such as accessing resources, running privileged
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instructions, and requesting allocation of executable and data memory. These and other
behavioral characteristics, although important for other considerations, may be added to the PP
model in later research. This research restricts itself to those characteristics that are relevant to
mapping process invocation sequences. The PP model is intended as a fundamental building
block to which other behavioral system characteristics can be attached.
Earlier attempts to map trusted program paths and identify some of the pitfalls encountered
are discussed in chapter 5. It is the not purpose of this research, to come up with a revolutionary
approach, but to keep the solution focused on solving only the process invocation mapping and
validation problem. Particular focus is given to the computational theory behind the program
pathing solution approach presented (see chapter 6). This research focuses upon an approach
that includes the necessary computational power to solve the problem, but no additional
computational power.
Before describing the proposed Program Pathing Trust (PPT) Model, it is important to
understand the arena in which it participates. Without a background in computer security, the
impact of the PPT model may not be obvious. Therefore, this paper first frames the context of
computer security in which the PPT model is relevant. The PPT model is not intended as a
comprehensive approach to computer security, but as an added dimension to existing security
systems. Over the past three decades, the developing discipline of computer security has
matured, but has taken many tangents. What started out as enforcement of access control has
developed into various other disciplines such as threat management, compliance, security policy
and forensics [Harr03]. This research demonstrates that an automaton provides an appropriate
computational model to solve an important system integrity problem in computer security, the
identification of valid process invocation sequences.
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4.2 Security and Program Pathing
4.2.1 Detection and Protection Systems
Computer security approaches can be divided into two distinct categories – detection and
protection. The detection branch of computer security developed as a result of computers
becoming more accessible through the Internet [Harr03]. Public users had direct access to
applications and the computers hosting these applications, making it possible for users to
interfere with normal computer functions. By virtue of being available to users, systems were no
longer isolated and became more vulnerable to a long list of threats: viruses, Trojan horses,
worms, time bombs and other malware. Intrusion detection systems were developed to identify
the infiltration of these threats [Harr03]. Such systems are traditionally signature based. That is,
they can only detect malware intrusions that are known and they are configured to identify
[Appf05] [Syma05]. As malware becomes more polymorphic and adaptable, more research is
being done on developing detection systems that can identify malware that has not been
previously encountered [Kole05]. Research on intrusion detection has relevance to this research
and is reviewed in chapter 5.
The protection branch of computer security, about 20 years older, is concerned with
regulating access to host computers and their applications. Initially the threat population for
computers was limited to the small group of operators and system programmers who had access
to computers, isolated in secured data centers. So, much of the attention to security was based on
limiting and defending computer resources against unauthorized internal access. Such protection
is known as access control and is primarily composed of authentication and authorization.
Access control systems are at the core of a ―trusted‖ system. A trusted system is one that can
be relied upon to maintain its status as an uncompromised and reliable system. The concepts of
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access control and trusted systems have been tightly linked from the beginnings of computer
security in the 1970s. They continue to be issues with the prevalence of malware and society‘s
interdependence upon computer applications. In the 1960‘s and 70‘s the problem was dealt with
by isolating computer systems in secure data centers, and physically restricting access. But even
then, there was concern that these systems might not be defendable against internal threats.
4.2.2 Aspects of Access Control Systems (Protection System)
Information security systems can be categorized into two types: data security and system
security. This is not a distinction that has always been made, because originally all information
security systems either presupposed system security or both data and system security were
integrated into access control systems. As the discipline of information security matured, the
distinction became clearer; government agencies began to define ―trusted‖ systems and the
private sector developed commercial products that aided in implementing ―trusted‖ system
integrity, using techniques such as anti-virus, compliance monitors and intrusion detection
systems.
Data security systems protect vital information stored and processed by the computer from
unauthorized access. System security systems protect the computer‘s resources and processes.
System security is a prerequisite for good data security. An access control security system
requires two preconditions: (1) the operating system must have integrity (initially free from
vulnerabilities), and (2) the operating system must be protected by a security system (to maintain
integrity). The security system and the operating system form a mutually enabling and
dependent relationship. The security system can permit damage to the operating system by
allowing exposures, malware or malicious users into privileged areas of the operating system.
The operating system can circumvent an access control security system by not implementing the
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proper security intercepts, or by not properly enforcing the privileges required by system
programs or personnel, enabling them to disable the security system.
4.2.2.1 Data Security
Data security protects the data being stored and processed by the computer. Data security
protects the integrity of the user‘s data, but can be extended to encompass all kinds of data, files,
directories, user applications and computer resources, such as printers, internet access and
executable programs. Data security is the ultimate goal of any computer security system.
Data security has been implemented in most operating systems in a variety of ways, but
generally as a discretionary access control (DAC) system which allows data owners to grant
access as they see fit. DAC systems traditionally require the defining of subjects (users) and
objects (computer resources). Subjects are granted access to objects through an enforcement
mechanism. Subjects can be granted READ, WRITE, ALLOCATE or EXECUTE privileges to
an object. Subjects can also be designated as owners of objects and possibly grant other subjects
access to objects they own. [ACF99]
Mandatory access control (MAC) also provides data security, although it is enforced by the
operating system using policies and only security administrators have the ability to grant access
to objects. MAC systems traditionally are multi-level security (MLS) systems tightly integrated
into the operating system. The U.S. Department of Defense Trusted Computer Security
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), also referred to as the DoD Orange Book, defines mandatory
security as being associated with security labels (security attributes) associated with objects to
reflect their level of sensitivity; security labels are also assigned to subjects [DoD85]. Under
MAC, subject and object labels must match or the subject label must dominate (be of a higher
authority than) the object‘s security label for the subject to have access to the object.
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4.2.2.2 System Security
System security ensures the integrity of the operating system. Traditionally, the primary
design goal for operating systems is functionality, not security. It is often said that security is an
after-thought in the design of operating systems [AFM99]. As described above, early attempts at
system security consisted of simply removing the entire system to a physical environment where
penetrability was acceptably minimized. In the 1970s, with the arrival of interactive systems
(timesharing, multi-programming, on-line, and multi-processing), securing the operating system
became the primary focus of computer security [Schr74-1]. Physically isolating the computer
and its access was no longer sufficient as a security strategy because the computer was being
accessed by a larger population, sometimes remotely connected by a private network (SNA or
LAN). Access control systems, although primarily data security controls, were modified to
provide some system security controls.
As computer access extended beyond secure data centers across the world through the
internet, maintaining a computer‘s ―trust‖ status became an imperative challenge for computers
running critical applications. In the context of computer systems, ―trust‖ has taken on many
meanings over the past decades [DoD85]. This research focuses on the question: can the
process invocations in ―trusted‖ computer systems be validated? Both discretionary access
control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) contain rudiments of this form of system
security [ACF99] [Clar87]. Both protect the system executable files and directories.
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Chapter 5: Program Pathing Background
5.1 Trusted System
One can easily imagine the failure of a nation‘s financial system, regional power grid or
internet because of cyber terrorism, or accidental interference. A nation‘s central bank‘s
applications, for instance, may run on a collection of servers, any one of which might process
trillions of dollars a day and, if compromised, could cause catastrophic events. Interference to
one of these applications could damage the economy, reduce public confidence in the money
supply and possibly cause the devaluation of the nation‘s currency. Therefore, it is important for
computers running these applications to maintain a ―trusted‖ status. A ―trusted‖ system is not
just free from malware; it also has only prescribed applications running on the system. ―Trusted‖
machines are computers dedicated to run critical applications without interference. Other
applications, authorized to run on other systems, may not be authorized to run on the trusted
system. This restriction is required because untrusted (or unauthorized) process may steal CPU
cycles, reduce performance, or create exposures, causing vulnerabilities and lead to system
compromise. An application may be so critical that it is imperative it run without interference –
and therefore it must run only on trusted computer systems.
5.1.1 What is a Trusted System?
What constitutes a ―trusted‖ system? A ―trusted‖ system is defined by this research as a
dedicated system that is certified to run a critical application and that runs only those processes
necessary to support the critical application. ―Trusted‖ systems are required to be locked down
with the highest security requirements in order to ensure that the operating system, the
applications and the security systems maintain their integrity.
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Critical applications, as defined by this research, are any applications that are essential to an
organization. As a rule, these critical applications are necessary to fulfill the organization‘s
mission; without them the organization would fail. Critical applications have a requirement for
high availability and resilience. Examples of critical applications might be associated with
nuclear power plant operations, military infrastructure support, central financial applications, life
sustaining medical applications, communication systems and navigation systems. The need for a
―trusted‖ system is a function of the organization‘s tolerance for doing without the critical
application(s). If an organization determines that it can do without an application for a period of
time, even when failover systems fail, and are willing to accept the risk, then the application is
probably not critical and a ―trusted‖ system is not necessary.

5.2 Program Pathing as part of a Trusted System
Program Pathing is by no means the whole solution to the system integrity problem and by
itself does not guarantee a system is ―trusted.‖ There are many aspects of a trusted system the
program pathing model does not address. However, it is an essential part of the solution.
5.2.1 Conceptual Security Models Related to Program Pathing
A number of computer security models have been developed over the past 30 years.
Although they are all important, a specific few provide a good background to this research and
have an influence upon it.
5.2.1.1 Goguen-Meseguer Model
Goguen-Meseguer took the military lattice approach to information security and created a
model to define a ―security policy‖. They make a distinction between security policy and
security model. By their definitions a security model is a description of a security system,
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whereas a security policy is the set of requirements for a security system. The approach identifies
the need to administer a security policy that is not static. [Gogu82]
The concept of security policy allowed for the definition of policies such as multi-level
security (MLS), capability passing, confinement, compartmentalization, discretionary access,
authorization chains and downgrading. The existing concept of ―trusted processes‖ was not that
the processes were restricted from running, but that they were restricted from access to sensitive
data. Most operating system processes were considered ―trusted processes‖ because they needed
universal access to all resources. Goguen-Meseguer considered ―trusted processes‖ such as
these to be unnecessarily dangerous, since they could perform any action upon any of the system
resources. Their model intended to define precise security policies for subsystems by creating
domains, and hence restricting the access of processes to resources.
The Goguen-Meseguer model is important because it introduced two concepts. First, it
introduced the use of an automaton to model a security solution. The present research goes
further and actually uses automaton theory to implement a solution. Secondly, the GoguenMeseguer model introduced the concept of compartmentalization to security policy, with regards
to operating system integrity. This concept arises numerous times in solutions proposed for the
system integrity problem. The PPT model restricts valid sequences to only specific authorization
paths.
5.2.1.2 Clark-Wilson Integrity Model
Clark-Wilson recognized that the traditional military model of computer security proposed in
academic circles at the time was not well suited to the commercial realm. In the mid to late
1980s the military was focused upon mandatory access control systems whereas commercial
systems were focused upon discretionary access control systems. The Clark-Wilson model
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noted the fact that the problem of data integrity existed for both military and commercial
environments. The goal of the Clark-Wilson model was to ensure that no user, not even an
authorized one, should be permitted to corrupt data, either by accident or with the intent to
commit fraud or to be malicious. To this end, Clark-Wilson‘s model focused upon two concepts:
(1) the well-formed transaction, and (2) separation of duties. [Clar87]
The well-formed transaction stipulates,
…that a user should not manipulate data arbitrarily, but only in constrained ways that
preserve or ensure the integrity of the data. A very common mechanism in well-formed
transactions is to record all data modification in a log so that actions can be audited later.
[Clar87]
In other words, a user may have access to a resource only indirectly through a particular program
(or set of programs), written specifically for manipulating the data. Giving access only to the
program, without identifying the user would not be sufficient, as ―individual accountability‖
would be lost; it would be known that the program modified the data, but who used the program
to modify the data would not be known.
The Clark-Wilson model sets up a data integrity problem to which the program pathing trust
model is a solution. That is, the Clark-Wilson model presupposes that all application developers
code their applications with this security concept in mind. However, not only do some
application programmers not use the Clark-Wilson model, it has an inherent flaw. It assumes
that if the program that has access to the data and the user is valid, then the transaction is a ―wellformed transaction.‖ It is possible, however, for a malicious user or process to invoke the valid
process out of sequence of the intended application, thereby circumventing the well-formed
transaction.
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5.2.1.3 Brewer-Nash Model (Chinese Wall)
Although Clark-Wilson made mandatory access control more palatable, commercial
mandatory access control gained few footholds in the commercial world except for those
industries required to comply with government contracts. ACF2®4 and RACF®5 both
implemented mandatory access control using the Clark-Wilson model, but the feature was rarely
used [ACF99] [RACF03].
The Brewer-Nash model integrated the concepts of Clark-Wilson by creating another
variation of a mandatory access control. The Brewer-Nash model, commonly known as the
Chinese Wall Security Policy [Bre89], defines a model based upon the concept of ―conflict of
interest classes.‖ The concept is built upon the theory that as a subject gains access rights in one
class of data, it restricts the subject‘s access to other data within the same class. The idea is to
keep commercial subjects from profiting ―inside knowledge‖ of data accessed in one area or
from gaining similar knowledge from another entity within the same class.
The model is best explained using the Brewer-Nash example of 3 companies. Say that a
system stores information on Bank-company-A, Oil-company-B, and Oil-company-C. The
model has three levels of ―significance‖ (1) objects at the lowest level, (2) groups of all objects
that belong to an organization or company, the company dataset, and (3) the group of all the
company datasets whose companies are in competition, the conflict of interest class. [Bre89] In
this example, if a user has access to Oil-company-B, the user can be permitted access to Bankcompany-A, but not Oil-company-C. This is because Oil-company-B and Oil-company-C are in
the same conflict of interest class, whereas Bank-company-A is not in the same conflict of
interest class as the two oil companies.

4
5

ACF2 is an access control product designed for MVS by Computer Associates
RACFis an access control product designed for MVS by IBM
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The Chinese Wall Security Policy model is important to consider when analyzing system
integrity, in that it addresses an important problem in multi-processing computer environments.
PPT uses Chinese Wall concepts to solve a system integrity problem, in a computing
environment where it is not valid to run two different process invocation sequences at the same
time. For instance, it may be valid to execute Application A, except when Application B is
executing. Running both applications simultaneously may create an integrity exposure – as in
the case of running a maintenance process while production processing is running.
5.2.2 Other Implementations of a Trusted System Using Invocation Sequences
The first attempt to define ―trusted‖ system began in December of 1972, at the interim IBM
SHARE [Schr74-1] (user group) meeting in San Diego. The SHARE VS/OS Security and Data
Management Project met in open session to begin its investigation into the lack of system
integrity and computer security in IBM‘s OS/MVT operating system. It was one of the first
known assemblies of computer industry professionals to come together to discuss the topic of
creating a commercial computer security system. A diverse group, representing educational
institutions, service bureaus, the Department of Defense and commercial industry, met to discuss
the requirements for making computer systems secure. Barry Schrager, Data Center Director at
the University of Illinois and SHARE Project Manger, documented the findings and
requirements of the group in a white paper and presented it to IBM [Schr74-2].
The SHARE Security and Data Management Project focused on two basic concepts: (1) a
security system was needed, and (2) as a prerequisite, the operating system had to ensure basic
system integrity. SHARE defined system integrity as ―the ability of the system to protect itself
against unauthorized user access to the extent that the security controls cannot be compromised
[Sch74-1].‖ The group identified that these two issues, system integrity and data security, were
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crucial to a computer security system. The committee‘s white paper highlighted specific
requirements:


The security system should be an integral part of the operating system



Identification and validation of users is the first level of security



The security system should not be able to be turned off



The system should not have to purge all jobs just to run secure jobs



The security system should be able to selectively run high-overhead functions on an
individual basis.



A program interface should be the only way to access specific data [Sch74-1].
The last point defines the need for an access control system where data can only be accessed

through specified program interfaces (this pre-dates the Clark-Wilson model by 12 years). This
requirement was defined by the VS/OS group SHARE requirement #73-86:
Description:
There should be a centralized bank of resource control information and an installation replaceable operating
system provided service for accessing and maintaining it. The resource control information must relate
resources (such as datasets, program paths, etc.), conditions under which they can be made available (such as
levels of validation), and user identifiers must all be installation definable.
All authorization and delegation must flow through the single operating system access and maintenance service,
and this service must be invokable during normal production operation. Invocation for the purpose of
validating access to a resource should return a yes or no answer and optionally a variable length byte string to
be used in corrective action (e.g. an error message, module name, or a limit on a quantitative resource).

[Sch74-1]
Further discussion identified the issue of validation of the program path in accessing data.
Although the technologies have changed since the 1970‘s, the concerns about program structures
providing increased integrity remain valid today. This requirement is at the heart of this research
and was specified in VS/OS group SHARE requirement #73-89:
Description:
There should be the capability of associating with any dataset a single interface program capable of accessing
that dataset. Where the interface program is a subsystem (e.g. IMS) an interface should be provided to other
subsystems (e.g. TSO).
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Incentive:
The need to be able to limit the path to a dataset to one interface program structures the system so as to
provide increased integrity, security and backup capabilities. [Sch74-1]

In the SHARE security white paper, the program pathing requirement expressed not only a
concern for data security but also for data integrity. Data accuracy and completeness, as well as
the protection of the data from unauthorized destruction, modification or disclosure (accidental
or intentional) were a concern. The requirement recognized that granting access permissions to
data was not sufficient for some data, the security system must also identify and validate the
interface program structure by which the data is accessed.
In the final IBM white paper, the user group described program pathing as an integral part of
the security system as follows:
Its interfaces to the system should be modifiable so that, with simulation, its decision making processes could
be more easily tested, understood and verified. With a well planned set of interfaces via the system control
program, it could be easy to use for application programs. Since it would be removed from the application
programs themselves, application programmers need not know the exact decision making process that would be
used. Conversely, the decision process could be easily modified without having to modify each of the
application programs. And finally, since it would easily be removed from the physical resource control, it could
easily control conceptual resource such as program paths.
Program paths are transactions, command sequences, and operating processes such as ―OPEN‖. A program
path can also be defined to include the flow of control within a module. This enables an installation to define
different security levels for different paths within an application program, without having to rewrite different
application programs due to the differing requirements for security. [Sch74-2]

IBM response to the SHARE white paper was mixed. They accepted the basic premises, but
rejected (or ignored) some of its requirements. The OS integrity requirements were accepted and
implemented in OS/MVS. Protection keys and separation of user applications were enforced
using virtual storage address spaces. The data security requirements were responded to by IBM
with the introduction of their access control product RACF. However, IBM did not include all
the security requirements from the white paper in their newly developed security system, RACF
and program pathing was one of those features missing in the new security system. In response
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to IBM‘s rejection of the security model described in the SHARE white paper, a few members of
the SHARE group developed a security system using the SHARE white paper as the conceptual
design. The result was ACF2, IBM‘s primary competitor in computer security [Sch74-2].
ACF2® (Access Control Facility – Second Generation) implemented a version of program
pathing. ACF2® was created by SKK, Inc. (Schrager, Klemens, and Krueger, Inc., 1978-1986)
in Chicago, Illinois after the founders left the University of Illinois Circle Campus, where the
first generation of the ACF security system was developed
The RACF® philosophy of computer security was opposite of that of ACF2®. Whereas
ACF2®‘s view of data security was from the resources point of view (rule based), RACF® took
an end-user‘s point of view (profile based). ACF2® based its philosophy on the notion that
resources (information) were corporate assets. An organizations main goal was to protect those
assets and therefore would want to look at the computer security from that perspective. RACF®,
on the other hand, viewed computer security as a means to control user access to assets. RACF
took a programmer‘s or user‘s point of view. One other primary difference between the two
security systems at the time was that ACF2® enforced security by default – access was denied
unless explicitly granted. RACF® would later adopt the same strategy.
In 1986, ACF2® was purchased by UCCEL and then the following year by Computer
Associates (CA). CA struggled with the program pathing feature in ACF2® as the z/OS
computing environments became more complex. Finally, in 1999 CA removed the original
program pathing feature and now verifies only the program accessing the resource, instead of the
entire program path [ACF99].
The ACF2® version of program pathing is an early version and inspiration of the Program
Pathing Trust Model described in this document. It is the purpose of this research to overcome
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some of the implementation problems that forced CA to remove the feature from ACF2®, and to
show how, by expanding the model, it can be used to deal with trusted computer environment
problems.
5.2.2.1 ACF2®
ACF2®‘s version of program pathing was implemented in 1974, and immediately
experienced problems with properly mapping process invocation sequences. In 1999, ACF2®
disabled the program sequence checking feature of program pathing, due to the complexity of
identifying program paths [ACF99]. The approach of implementing program pathing used by
ACF2® was to take a core dump of a running process. The systems programmer would then read
the core dump, find the Task Control Block (TCB) and follow the Request Block (RB) chain
which represented the program invocation sequence that was recorded by the operating system
scheduler. The program path that was discovered in the operating system‘s TCB/RB chain was
then manually translated into assembler MACROs (created by ACF2 developers for that
purpose) and assembled into the ACF99@RB module (see Appendix C). ACF99@RB was able
to define a number of programming environments using the TCB/RB linkage chains. ACF2
program pathing was not able to use source to develop the mappings in ACF99@RB, due to the
fact that not all vendors supplied the source code to their processes.
Figure 5-1 is a representation of a program path making up application 1 with a process
invocation sequence of Program1, Program2, Program3, OSProgram1, OSProgram2, and
OSProgram3. Program3 requests OS services to OPEN and READ the file. OSProgram3 does
the actual OPEN and READing of the data file. Under the ACF2® model of program pathing,
the operating system is considered trusted and the ACF2® path does not extend into the operating
system program flow. In the ACF2® model only the program state RB chain would have to be
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Figure 5-1 MVS Control Block Structure that ACF2 Program Pathing Maps

defined in ACF99@RB. Therefore, only the ―Program‖ program flow would be relevant in the
program path. ACF2‘s constructs were not always strictly adhered to from release to release.
This was due to the changing architecture of OS/MVS as IBM tightened up system integrity. In
some releases, selected parts of the OS programs were often identified in the program path as
well. Below is how the example in figure 5-1 would have been coded in ACF99@RB [ACF89].
APPL1
@CMD
@TCB #APPL1

,

#PROGRAM1
@RB PROGRAM1,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB,
NEXT=(RB,#PGM##)
#PGM##
@RB PROGRAM**,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB,
NEXT=(RB,#PGM##,#OS##)
#OS##
@RB
PROGRAM**,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),END

[ACF89]
Updating ACF99@RB was a tedious task and took intimate knowledge of the task
scheduling subsystem in the IBM MVS operating system. With the increasing complexity of the
MVS operating system (as IBM updated MVS with new architectures, going from MVS, to XA,
to ESA to z/OS) and fewer and fewer technicians understanding MVS and ACF2 internals,
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Computer Associates was forced to simplify the program pathing feature in CA-ACF2®.
Currently, ACF2® program pathing involves validating only the program that actually issues the
OPEN for a dataset (file), in this case, Program3, not the entire program path RB chain
(programming environment).
In the current implementation of program pathing, the security administrator only needs to
specify the name of the program that issues the OPEN of the file on the ACF2 rule as follows:
MY.DATA

UID(*******userid)

PROGRAM(XYZ)

READ(ALLOW)

The above ACF2® rule line specifies that the userid can only read the MY.DATA file if the user
accesses the file using the XYZ program through the paths defined in ACF99@RB. By dropping
program pathing from ACF2, program XYZ can be validated for accessing the resource
MY.DATA, but the paths in ACF99@RB are no long part of the authorization criteria. This
presents a problem if XYZ is a generic read program that any programmer can invoke from any
program. It may be necessary to validate that a user is attempting access by a program that is
authorized to invoke XYZ. ACF99@RB is no longer used in ACF2.
5.2.2.2 RACF® PADS
RACF®, IBM‘s z/OS (MVS) security system, implemented program control using Program
Access to Data Support (PADS) [RACF03]. PADS performs somewhat like ACF2® in its
current implementation. Trusted programs are registered in PROGRAM profiles, and only
authorized users can execute these programs (although PADS does not validate the entire
program path, it does restrict access to programs). An example of RACF‘s PADS
implementation is as follows:
RDEFINE

PROGRAM

XYZ

ADDMEM(„SYS1.LINKLIB‟)
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In the above example, the XYZ program in the ―SYS1.LINKLIB‖ file is identified as a trusted
program.
PERMIT

XYZ

ID(userid)

ACCESS(EXECUTE)

CLASS(PROGRAM)

In this example, the userid is given execute access to the XYZ program defined in the previous
command.
Data is protected from being accessed by anyone except through a particular program by
specifying the program in the data profile:
PERMIT „MY.DATA‟ ID(userid) WHEN(PROGRAM(XYZ))

ACCESS(READ)

The example above specifies that the userid has read access to the MY.DATA file, but only if
it is accessed by the XYZ program. PADS performs the same functionality as the current
ACF2® implementation.
5.2.2.3 Top Secret®
Computer Associates‘ other z/OS security product, CA-Top Secret®, defines computer
environments with the use of its Facility feature. CA-Top Secret®‘s approach is to define the
initialization program and the program name id. Under z/OS (MVS), the tradition is that the first
3 characters of a program product are unique to the program product – CA-Top Secret® takes
advantage of this to identify a Facility (or programming environment). CA-Top Secret® creates
a facility by grouping a set of program names. Taking advantage of the z/OS programming
convention that all the program names of a function within an application begin with the same 3
characters, facilities can be defined by masking the program names, e.g., ISP***** (which
would define the ISPF programming environment). CA-Top Secret®, however, does not have
the concept of program pathing as referred to in this research – it merely names the programs in
the program path, but does not identify their invocation sequences. Top Secret facilities can
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identify an environment - identify all the programs belonging to an environment, but cannot
identify their invocation sequence.
5.2.3 More Recent Background
5.2.3.1 Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
Niki Rahimi (IBM) has done work in the area of program path validation in Linux, taking
advantage of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) hooks. His work, the "Trusted Path Execution"
(TPE) [Rahi04] although possibly appearing to be similar to the PPT model, takes a different
approach. The trusted path that Rahimi refers to in the TPE is the directory path from which an
executable resides, not the sequence of program flow path. Although TPE‘s intent is partially
the same as that of the PPT model, to prevent the execution of malicious code, it does not
encompass the whole of PPT‘s strengths. TPE only verifies that a program was loaded from a
particular directory.
Rahimi‘s concept is to validate that the directory paths where a system program resides, and
verify that only root has authority to write to that directory. Any program that resides in a
directory that is writeable by any other userid than root is considered untrusted. Rahimi‘s TPE is
based on the premise that a malicious user can overwrite or damage the operating system code if
the directory has the write privilege granted to anyone else but to the root ID. [Rahi04]
Rahimi‘s theory works under the assumption that it is a good thing for root to install all
software. However, this does not promote a Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
implementation of security. Most security professionals would try to limit the use of root to only
the operating system. Most IT shops are trying to restrict the use of root. Root has ―all
powerful‖ authority – the user using root, cannot be identified when s/he performs activities,
making individual accountability difficult. In addition, there is no good way to restrict a user‘s
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use of root to only those tasks s/he needs to perform. SUDO [Mann03] (under UNIX and Linux)
could be used to restrict a user‘s use of root, although SUDO has flaws that enable a
sophisticated user to get around these restrictions.
The goal of a true RBAC implemented system is to (1) restrict all users to only those
functions and data they are required to perform, and (2) to log a user‘s actions on the computer,
so as to ensure individual accountability. If all software had to be installed with root then too
many technicians would have to be granted root authority, because in large shops there are
multiple technical roles. TPE provides a good mechanism to ensure that a program is coming
from a directory in which it was installed, however the theory needs further refinement if it were
to fit an RBAC implementation of security.
The PPT model can be used in tandem with Rahimi‘s TPE; they are not incompatible. PPT
deals only with the progression of the process invocation sequences, not with validating the
directory from which the program resides, so this is an aspect of TPE that would enhance a PPT
implementation (see section 9.3).
5.2.3.2 Symantec’s Critical Program System (CPS)
In Symantec Corporation‘s purchase of Platform Logic, it acquired the Host Intrusion
Prevention product, AppFire® [Appf04]. AppFire®, now enhanced and re-branded Critical
System Protection® (CPS), approaches system integrity using a behavior-based approach.
Symantec‘s approach is based upon the concept that each software program accesses particular
resources and accesses them in a particular way. For example, a program may have to create,
update or read a log file, or access a particular tablespace in a database. Behaviors might be
described as such things as functions of the operating system or application as it accesses files,
registries, devices, network connections or other system services.
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Behaviors are defined in Behavior Control Descriptions (BCD). Each BCD is a set of
behavior definitions defining a set of resource names, access permissions requested and time or
frequency of access. The BCD is in turn associated with a set of processes or a logical group of
processes invoked a Process Set (PSET). The PSET associates a set of resources and
permissions to the set of processes defined in the PSET. The Process Binding Rules (PBR)
assigns a process to a process set (PSET).
BCDs are defined with the product‘s ―profiler tool,‖ which can be set to automatically
generate a BCD. The process of automatically creating the BCD is referred to as ―self-learning‖.
One of the chief advantages of CPS is that the self-learning mode provides a ―crystal box‖
approach, where the administrator can audit the behavior controls generated, and the
administrator can review and modify the generated behavior policy defined in the BCD.
CPS‘s architecture is not concerned with program pathing (program flow control), however it
does offer an interesting self-learning concept using the ―crystal box‖ technique. Unlike many
―self-learning‖ systems, CPS provides the administrator with the ability to review what the
system has learned in human-readable format, providing the administrator the opportunity to
fine-tune and correct the BCD access permissions. The concept used in CPS more closely
resembles the Clark-Wilson model implemented by ACF2‘s program control and RACF‘s
PADS than it resembles PPT.
5.2.3.3 SELINUX
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [NSA01] [Mcca05] [Smal01b] is a National Security
Agency (NSA) project created to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities in Linux.
SELinux is a mandatory access control system developed to secure government systems for
critical applications. SELinux is based on Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) [Spen99], a
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security architecture framework for operating systems. The FLASK architecture is based upon
the Flux OS toolkit [Ford97] and was prototyped in the Fluke OS [AFM99]. SELinux is built
upon a mandatory access control, but it departs from the traditional definition of mandatory
access control. Unlike the more traditional versions of mandatory access control (MAC) as
defined by Bell-LaPadula [Bell76], Biba [Biba77] and the Clark-Wilson [Clar87] models, the
FLASK model is a policy-based model. The basic components of SELinux are a combination of
type enforcement (TE), role-based access control (RBAC), and multi-level security (MLS). The
policy is made up of a reference policy language. It is compiled and loaded into a reference
policy in the Linux kernel.
The reference policy is made up of a policy language that defines computer types. SELinux
defines many kinds of types, but a simplistic example is one which defines types of the attributes
files and processes. Processes are defined in domains. Files are defined as resources. After
defining domains and resources, the reference policy language defines the domains‘ access to the
resources, as shown in figure 5-2.

Figure 5-2 SELinux Domain - Resource Concept

Figure 5-3 is an example of a SELinux policy reference language [Mcca05]. Note that the
reference policy language defines all the computer entities, both files and processes. The first
part of the policy reference language defines the types, then the attributes of
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type
daemon.edit;
type
daemon.d;
type
daemon.log;
type
daemon.conf;
type
port_80;
domain
daemon : { dirFiles piple };
resource
port_80 : { direFiles sockets };
domain
daemon.edit : { dirFiles };
domain
daemon.d : {dirFiles pipes };
resource
daemon.log : { dirFiles };
resource
daemon.conf : { dirFiles };
access
daemon.d
port_80 read { dirFiles:stat
sockets:read };
access
daemon.d
port_80 write { dirFiles:none
sockets: read };

access daemon.editFigure
daemon.conf
read;
5-3 SELinux Policy Reference Language for daemon.te
access
daemon.edit
the types
are assigned.
In thedaemon.conf
second part ofwrite;
the policy the domain type is granted access to each
access
daemon.conf
read;representation of the security policy in figure 5-3.
resource
type.daemon.d
Figure 5-4 illustrates
a graphic
access daemon.d daemon.log

write { dirFiles:append };

Figure 5-4 Conceptual Diagram of Daemon Policy Reference Example

An interesting feature of SELinux is how it maps process invocation sequences. It groups
processes in domains and identifies which processes in the domain can invoke other processes in
the domain using type enforcement. SELinux‘s type enforcement (TE) domain transitions are
based upon the association of programs (or processes) within domains. A domain is a set of likeprograms (or processes) that work together to create a function (domain). A domain of programs
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is a type. Each domain is assigned a set of permissions that allow the domain (the set of
programs) to perform a function. Domains can invoke other programs within the same domain
or in other domains using ―transition‖ rules. SELinux‘s focus, however, is not restricted to the
invoking sequence of one process invocation to another, but on one domain transitioning to
another or other types (files, sockets, etc.) – this is determined by type enforcement (TE), which
is type transition rules.
The reference policy language illustrated in Figure 5-5 [Macc05] modifies the reference
policy in Figure 5-3.
type daemon-init;
type daemon.edit;
type daemon.d
domain_type(daemon-init)
init_daemon_domain(daemon-init,daemon.edit,
daemon.d)
allow
daemon-init
transition;
allow
daemon-init
transition;

daemon.edit:process
daemon.d:process

Figure 5-5 SELinux Process Control

In this new domain, the daemon.init process is added to the daemon domain and becomes the
initialization process that invokes the daemon.edit and daemon.d processes. The daemon domain
is modified as shown in Figure 5-6.
The SELinux reference policy language is not easy to use – and the examples above are very
simple cases, not using all the capabilities of the language. Although the language is very
powerful it requires in-depth knowledge of the processes, files and other resources running on
the Linux system in order to use it well. There are literally hundreds of man-years of
development of the SELinux reference policy. At this time the kernel reference policy has been
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Figure 5-6 SELinux Process Transitions

nearly completed. No application programs have had a reference policy written yet. To write
the reference policy for an application would require someone to have both in-depth knowledge
of the internals of the application and proficiency with the reference policy language.
5.2.4 Current Literature on Program Pathing
The current literature on process invocation sequence validation is not in the realm of access
control, but are approaches intended to solve intrusion detection issues. The literature focuses
upon discovering invalid process invocation sequences, and does not deal with the prevention of
unauthorized processes or processes running out of sequence. Figure 5-7 is a citation map of the
literature showing the evolution of process invocation sequence mapping (see section 2.2) in
intrusion detection. Although the literature does not specifically address all the requirements this
research is investigating, it does deal with the problem of mapping the process invocation
sequences (refer to section 4.1) which is central to solving the system integrity problem.
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Figure 5-7 Literature Mapping

5.2.4.1 Non-Computational Theory Approaches
As stated earlier, one of the premises of this research is to use computational theory as a
basis. A number of approaches in the literature depart from our approach. The next four
approaches are examples of some of these unique approaches.
5.2.4.1.1 Hofmeyr-Forrest – N-Gram Approach
Every program produces a set of process invocation sequences. The sequences are
determined by the execution order of the processes. Each process is dealt with as a black box –
the process invocation sequence does not review the internal workings or role of the process,
outside its invocation of other processes. Hofmeyr-Forrest [Hof98] defines these sets of
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sequences as normal behavior and divides the sequences into pattern lengths of 5, 6, or 11
processes. Patterns allow for a look-ahead expectation of what processes should follow an
executed process. The patterns (n-grams) are stored in a database as normal behavior sequences.
Any behavior not matching one of the n-gram patterns is determined to be abnormal indicating
an anomaly.
The approach is performed in two stages. The first stage scans traces for normal behavior,
where patterns are created and stored in a database. In the second stage new behaviors from
traces are matched to patterns in the database. Anomalies, new behaviors that are found to be
different than those captured in the n-gram patterns, are reported as intrusions. Process
invocation is determined whenever a process is created (or invoked) using a fork or vfork. In
Hofmeyr-Forrest‘s research, only the fork processes were collected as invoked processes. The
vfork is created in the process invocation sequence as a new process ID, and is therefore difficult
to associate in a trace with the process invocation sequence (which has a different process ID).
This difficulty is easily overcome by profiling the invocation sequences by intercepting
processes before they are placed on the dispatch queue.
Collection of normal behaviors can be accomplished by one of two methods. First, the
database can collect learned normal behaviors automatically from traces, through a series of
tests. Or normal activity from a running production system can be monitored and the database
can collect the learned normal behavior. Secondly, the database can be loaded from manually
constructed traces. These are normal variations of possible normal behavior created by the
researchers. This latter is the approach taken by Hofmeyr-Forrest to test their approach. It was
felt that by using these artificial normal behaviors, more variations in behaviors could be
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captured and fewer false positives would be detected (i.e. the system would identify fewer false
intrusion detections).
Hofmeyr-Forrest identifies a number of hurdles that must be dealt with before the theory can
be put into practical use. The hurdles identified involve both operating system issues and
problems with the n-gram theory that still must be resolved. The operating system issue is that
most such systems do not provide the necessary trace facilities with the required detail to collect
the process invocation sequences. Therefore, either a better trace facility would have to be
provided by the operating systems or one would have to be added to the OS. The issue with the
n-gram theory is that there is no ―stopping criteria.‖ That is to say, there is no criterion by mean
of which it can be determined whether the system learned enough different process environments
to fully capture the process invocation sequences in a system.
5.2.4.1.2 Warrender - Forrest – Alternate Data Models
Warrender- Forrest [Warr99] uses the hidden Markov model (HMM) to create a structure to
map process invocation sequences. The hidden Markov model is a Bayesian network where the
state transitions are probabilities. The HMM takes much longer to train than the other
approaches discussed in this paper. Warrender- Forrest stated that HMM took two months to
train as opposed to other methods that were trainable in a matter of hours for their largest
training data.
Another disadvantage of the HMM method is that the researchers had to predict the number
of states needed for the number of system invocations. They used a 40-state HMM in most
cases. In this approach, prior knowledge of the process invocation environment is needed. The
Warrender-Forrest approach is more complicated than needed for detecting invalid process
invocations.
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The HMM is not only more complex than is needed, it also takes more time and effort to
train and more computing power than other methods. Therefore, the HMM is not a good
candidate for our purposes, since predicting probability of new process invocation sequences is
not necessary in validating them.
5.2.4.1.3 Ghosh – ANN Approach
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) is an attractive approach because it‘s a relativity simple
approach to code and calculate. Ghosh‘s [Gho00] approach uses a combination of three
algorithms to create an ANN supported by a finite state automaton (FSA). The ANN algorithm
used is the Elman recurrent neural network [Elm90]. Unlike traditional forward-feed back
propagation neural networks, the Elman neural network has a feedback loop from the hidden
layer to a context layer, which gives the new input another source of input feedback from the
previous input string. In effect, this allows a string to be broken up into smaller substrings.
As an input is fed into the input nodes, they are propagated into the hidden nodes, and the results
are fed into the output nodes and context nodes. The next input data is fed to the hidden nodes,
and the context nodes using the previous input‘s context node results are fed into the hidden
node. The FSA accepts all the sequences from the training data.
The data fed into the Elman ANN is converted into n-gram sequences which are further
divided up into l-gram sequences (l < n) by the string transducer. The l-gram sequences are fed
into the Elman ANN input nodes for training and later for verification. One or more l-grams can
make up an n-gram (see section 5.2.4.1.1). A process invocation sequence can be made up of
multiple n-grams which are recorded into the FSA by the ―state tester.‖ The ―state tester‖ is
responsible for automatically creating a FSA to represent valid process invocation sequences.
The training data is made up only of normal behavior and is used to profile normal behavior.
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The FSA‘s transitions relate to specific l-gram sequences, which in turn make up one or more ngrams mapping normal processes. The n-grams and l-grams are just substrings of the process
invocation sequence. The n-grams serve the same function as those in the Hofmeyr-Forrest
approach. The l-grams are produced from the n-grams so they can be fed into the ANN.
One of the objections to ANNs is that it is difficult to determine what the ANN has learned.
The n-gram and FSA appear to help resolve this issue. The combination usage of the n-gram and
Elman ANN solves the problem of determining how many input nodes to use in the ANN. And
the use of the Elman ANN creates a good decision making engine. Like most ANN systems, it is
difficult to determine accountability. The ANN can identify what process invocation sequences
are valid, or invalid, but cannot determine why, because the ANN cannot identify specifically
what part of the process invocation sequence it found invalid. This is because ANN uses
stochastic gradient decent to determine whether or not a sequence is valid or invalid [Mitc97].
The ANN translates the sequence into statistical relationships and the original input is lost. This
is the major objection to the ANN approach.
5.2.4.1.4 Ammons -Larus – Retrieval Tree Approach
Although Ammons-Larus‘s [Amm98] research is concerned with program execution paths as
opposed to process invocation sequences, it does illustrate other approaches that can be used to
represent process invocation sequences. Mapping program execution paths (internal branches
within a load module) involves different kinds of processes than mapping process invocation
sequences; however, they both have a similar intent. They both map the program paths of an
application or program. Program execution pathing maps the internal processes (see section
2.1.2) whereas process invocation sequences map the external processes (see section 2.1.1) of
one process to another. So their research has some relevance to this research.
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The Ammons-Larus method is an adaptation of the Ball-Larus [Ball96] method. The BallLarus approach maps execution paths to a direct acyclic graph (DAG). Program execution paths
(DAGs) are profiled in a control-flow graph (CFG), where each edge is labeled with the
frequency over a number of dynamic tests. As the test data is run, each execution path is
recorded in the CFG and each edge is updated by one as the program‘s execution path is
recorded. Each subsequent program test is captured into a CFG.
The CFG is converted to use a DAG to model the execution paths. They heuristically
identify all explicit paths; the DAG optimizes the spanning tree so that no edges sprouting from a
node have the same value. This allows the diagram to identify the optimal path. DAGs are
appealing because they are used in system scheduling theory to optimize task scheduling of jobs
to find the longest and shortest paths.
Ammons/Larus uses Ball-Larus‘s techniques, where the path profiles count the number of
times a program executes acyclic paths in a CFG. Ammon-Larus identify the ―hot‖ paths using
the frequency values on the edges. Then using the Aho-Corasick [Aho75] algorithm AmmonsLarus construct a retrieval tree from the hot paths. A single retrieval tree can represent a number
of program flows. Note that unlike Ball-Larus, Ammons-Larus repeats patterns as it progresses
through the program path. Program flows with the same beginning prefixes are organized
together. As paths are validated against the retrieval tree, if a path enters a state where there isn‘t
an edge that matches the path, then a failure function is entered, and the path is reset.
Ammons-Larus claim that if there are no paths that match the substring, then the failure
function resets the automaton. However, Ammons-Larus do not define their automaton. It may
be that they are only referring to their structure loosely as an automaton and do not mean it as a
formal automaton in the theoretical sense. The retrieval tree structure lacks an accepting state.
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The retrieval tree also does not take advantage of the Keene closure, although this is not a
requirement of a deterministic finite state automaton. They divide their paths into partitions,
which has advantages if we want to isolate different invocation sequences that may be mutually
exclusive. A version of this is accomplished in the PPT model. Operations that are mutually
exclusive are defined in separate FSA machines.
5.2.4.2 Computational Theory Approach
This research shows that a finite automata approach is the preferred computational model to
use. Other researchers have had similar hypotheses, and their work is reviewed in this section.
5.2.4.2.1 Ko-Fink – Execution Monitoring
Ko and Fink‘s [Ko94] approach analyzes and maps the behavior of privileged programs as a
comparison reference with actual program behavior recorded in system audit logs. Although
privileged programs can potentially do anything, they tend to perform intended behavior that is
limited and benign. Privileged programs can bypass both mandatory and discretionary access
control mechanisms due to their root privilege. Ko-Fink‘s research developed a language to
monitor these privileged program behaviors. The monitoring language verifies that resources
can only be accessed through invocation of the proper system invocations.
Unlike other approaches, the mapping of invocation sequences in Ko-Fink mainly focused
upon processes executing with privileged access. Unprivileged processes are mapped, but only as
they relate to the privileged processes. Any unprivileged process invocations encountered are
considered part of the privileged process invocation sequence.
Ko-Fink maps the process invocation sequences using a language based upon predicate logic
and regular expressions. It is created manually from system audit logs. The language is made up
of three operands described in the example below which define the following: (1) The name of
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the process executing and the objects it manipulates, (2) the attributes of the processes, or
objects, for example the owner or permissions, and (3) the current operations of the program
execution, for instance what the program can do. An example of the language follows:
#define mailboxdir
“/usr/spool/mail”
#define mailport
25
#define root_mail_handler “/home/root/mail_handler”
PROGRAM sendmail(user)
read(X) :- worldreadable(X);
write(X) :- inside(X, mailboxdir);
bind(mailport);
exec(“bin/mail”);
exec(root_mail_handler) :- user.uid = 0;
END
[Ko94]

The ―#define‖ operand defines the attributes of the objects in the rule. The ―PROGRAM‖
operand defines the beginning of the rule. The ―exec‖ operand identifies the other processes
invoked in the sequence.
Ko-Fink uses a Sendmail example to illustrate how the mapping works. The Sendmail
program performs a number of functions: (1) it runs as a daemon process to accept mail from
mail ports and route the mail to remote systems, (2) it executes mail handlers on the user‘s
behalf and (3) it resends pending mail in the mail queue. Sendmail has a vulnerability that
enables a user to make Sendmail execute a user program with root access. The Ko-Fink
monitoring language restricts Sendmail to executing only processes in the /bin/mail directory
(shown in the example monitor language rule above). The monitoring language is a form of
process invocation sequence verification – Sendmail can only execute processes from a specific
directory and not just any program specified by the user.
The merit of this approach is mentioned by other significant papers that investigate
alternative approaches to the process invocation sequence problem. The Ko-Fink approach,
although not practical from an implementation stand-point, does define some of the issues
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around why mapping and verifying process invocation sequences is important. It shows a
number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by users to compromise security using some
simple techniques, underlying the need for controlling process sequence validation. The problem
with Ko-Fink‘s approach is that mapping the invocation sequences with the language requires it
to be done manually by a knowledgeable technician.
5.2.4.2.2 Kosoresow-Hofmeyr – System Call Traces
Kosoresow-Hofmeyr‘s [Kos97] research is probably one of the most important approaches in
the recent literature as far as mapping process invocation sequences is concerned. In this
approach, process invocation sequences are mapped from system traces using a regular language
and are used to construct a deterministic finite state automaton (DFA). A process invocation
sequence is mapped in the form of a regular language construct called a macro. Macros do not
map an entire process invocation sequence, but are built from repeatable patterns found in the
system calling traces. Macros are created from a three-phase process, (1) a process is executed,
which may or may not generate a process invocation sequence (invoke other processes). A trace
of system invocations is produced, showing the processes invoked from the initial process. (2)
The system call trace is analyzed by a script that identifies the invocation sequences for a
particular execution path; this is done to reduce the size of the invocation sequences and identify
the common invocation sequence patterns characteristic of the process invocation. The script
also identifies only process invocation sequences that are interesting (part of the execution
sequence being mapped), because there is always a number of system and other overhead
processes running that are not part of the process invocation sequence, for instance system
service calls which are not mapped as part of Kowsorsow-Hofmeyr‘s approach. (3) Finally, a set
of macros are created heuristically from the analyzed system calling traces. This is done though
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a combination of scripts and manual coding of the language. The macros are then loaded into a
DFA using another set of scripts.
Each unique invocation sequence is divided into three parts: a prefix, a main body and a
suffix. For each invocation sequence the common prefixes and suffixes are identified. Then the
main body sequences are scanned for common reoccurring strings of two to six invocations.
Each recurring substring of common prefix, shortened main body sequences and suffix become
macros. The macros take advantage of Kleene closure [Hopc01] to reduce the size of the process
invocation sequences captured, for example when process x invokes itself, x* is used where x is
represented 0 or multiple times. The macros are then loaded into a DFA.
By using this method, the researchers found that they could reduce the number of invocation
string instances they had to capture. The technique could take advantage of all the different
reoccurring patterns (macros). In one case, the researchers found that instead of mapping 75
strings they could capture the same representation in 36 macros. The approach drastically
reduced the size of the process invocation sequence map. And the researchers found that their
approach provided ―a reasonably close approximation of normal behavior.‖ Their approach
admittedly used a combination of scripts and manual methods to create the DFA, and the issue of
efficiency was an acknowledged issue by the researchers. They admitted an exact DFA
representation of a process invocation sequence was likely to be problematic, mainly because to
do so the DFA would have to map every possible system invocation sequence, which would
likely cause the DFA to become too large. Secondly, there would be false negatives, because
some process invocation sequence variations would probably be missed. Thirdly, the more
sequences that were mapped into macros, the longer the calculation time would be to determine
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the macros. The program pathing trust model developed in this paper addresses the problems
encountered by the Kosoresow-Hofmeyr model.
5.2.4.2.3 Sekar – Finite State Automata Approach
Sekar [Sek01] also uses a finite state automaton to capture invocation sequences. Unlike
previous approaches, the automaton approach is not limited by the length of the invocation
sequence. Longer, more complicated invocation sequences do not pose a problem and it is
computationally efficient. It easily accommodates program loops and branches. The FSA
approach also uses the program counter (PC) to capture information about process invocation
sequences that would not be possible in the static approaches. The advantages of the FSA
approach over previous approaches entails:


Faster learning – Entire invocation sequences can be learned at once, as opposed to learning
multiple n-grams.

Experimentation shows that convergence occurs quicker in the FSA

model than in the n-gram model.


Improved detection – Using the PC enables the FSA to detect classes of attacks that were not
detected in other approaches. For instance, the n-gram approach can determine that an
invocation sequence has executed valid n-gram sequences, but it cannot determine that it has
missed or skipped a sequence. Also detection takes less computational time and is quicker
than other approaches. The FSA has the advantage of being kernel-based, although this is
also a disadvantage because it entails modifying the kernel.



Fewer false positives – The FSA can generalize learned normal behavior, in essence predict
unlearned behavior, whereas, the previous approaches can only identify those sequences they
have learned.



Simpler and more compact representation – The FSA takes up less memory. For instance,
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where the n-gram approach needs to represent 51 system invocations the FSA only needs 13.
The FSA is trained in real time. Normal behavior is recorded in the FSA in real time,
capturing the system invocation name and the point at which the system invocation was made,
(the value of the PC when the invocation was made). Each value in the PC represents a different
state in the FSA. The system call name (the name of the process being invoked) is represented
by the transitions. Sekar represents the automaton by symbolizing the transitions in pairs
and

where the transition from state Prev PC to PC is labeled by Prev SysCall. Sekar

encountered a problem with dynamically linked programs - because these programs may get
loaded into different locations, they cannot be relied upon to have the same PC location from one
invocation to another. Another problem is that system function invocations may invoke other
processes that cause multiple extensive system invocation sequence branches, which then return
control back to the original invocation process. Figure 5-12 represents three invocation
sequences:

Figure 5-8 Seka's FSAFigure

The invocation sequences in 5-12 are:
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As processes are invoked by the operating system, they are placed in frames on the process
stack. Each process frame represents an invoked process and contains the return address,
parameters passed to the process and local variables defined to the process. This is provided in
all programming languages.
The fork and exec system invocations provide a unique problem for Sekar, as they either
create another copy of the invocation process or create a child process. The fork and exec are
basic system invocations that appear quite often in invocation sequences. For Sekar‘s FSA
approach, he must decide if processes invoked by a fork or exec should be recorded in the current
FSA or a new FSA – this suggests that Sekar is building an FSA for each process invoked by a
command line or deamon.
This model most resembles the PPT model, and chapter 6 shows how they differ. The major
difference between Sekar‘s approach and the Program Pathing Trust Model is that the Sekar
method maps process invocation sequences within a load module, requiring either the source
code, the op codes for the invocations or hooks in the exec and fork intercepts to map the
invocation sequences. Whereas the Sekar model has problems mapping dynamic invocations,
the program pathing model focuses upon the mapping of these invocations.
5.2.4.3 Context Free Grammar or Pushdown Automata
There are a number of process invocation mapping approaches that are based upon
theoretical computational models that are not exclusively finite automaton based. The
approaches described below are a examples of models that have developed more computationally
complex models.
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5.2.4.3.1 Feng - Kolesnikov –Pushdown Automata Approach
The Feng-Kolesnikov approach uses the system call stack to gather information about valid
process invocation sequence behavior, and develops a pushdown automaton. Like Wagner and
Sekar, Feng [Feng03] uses the system call stack and PC (Program Counter), to gain more
information about the nature of invocation sequences. From the PC the current executing
program‘s next instruction can be determined. From the call stack, the process invocation
sequence, its status and the invocation program‘s return address, from which the offset into the
invocating process where the invoked process was invoked, can be determined. Feng‘s approach
is called VtPath, and is unique in that it uses the return addresses recorded in the call stack. The
method abstracts two execution points, one from the invoking process and the other from the
invoked process, and determines if they are valid based upon previously learned normal
behavior.
Training is performed by gathering the process return addresses from the call stack and is
recorded in a hash table called RA (return address) table. If the return address is the last entry in
the virtual stack, then the call number is saved with it. A VP (virtual path) hash table is used to
save the parent invocation sequences for the process. During training all valid process
invocations are added to the hash tables saving their return addresses and virtual paths.
The VtPath approach is able to handle Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs), which the
Sekar approach had difficulty handling. VtPath claims that the Sekar‘s FSA approach was an
―unnecessary simplification.‖ The VtPath uses call stack history, as well as PC information. By
doing so, the VtPath traverses function paths that the FSA method only records the system call
name and the current PC. The VtPath also records the return addresses from the call stack in the
VP stack. The VP stack represents a history of all the unreturned functions.
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The approach introduces a pushdown automaton, mainly because it is dealing with the
program counter and system call stack. The researchers, dealing with a pushdown automaton
implemented in the OS, emulated the same structure to solve their problem of mapping process
invocation sequences. However, the problem of mapping and validating process invocation
sequences is not the same problem as managing process flows. Validating process invocation
sequences does not require the number of times a process is invoked recursively for instance, or
involve the fact that if process A is invoked 4 times, then process B must be invoked 4 times.
Therefore, a pushdown automaton has more computational power than is needed. This is
analyzed in more detail in section 6.2.1.5.
5.2.4.3.2 Wagner- Dean – Pushdown Automata Approach
Wagner-Dean [Wag01] also attempts to solve the problem of detecting system intrusion by
profiling valid process invocation behavior. Wagner-Dean‘s assumption is that formal methods
alone are insufficient to build a system to model valid process invocation behavior. They base
this observation on the fact that formal systems have been used for 25 years, and have yet to
realize this goal. They agree with the basic premise of these systems, however, that a system‘s
behavior can be learned by observing its normal behavior. The assumption is ―a compromised
application cannot cause much harm unless it interacts with the underlying operating system,
and those interactions can be readily monitored‖[Wag01].
The Wagner-Dean approach begins by creating a model of the expected behavior of an
application from program source code. Then, they monitor the program and check the system
call trace for compliance to the model. Although Wagner-Dean uses practical observation, their
models do use formal languages, either regular or context-free languages.
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Wagner-Dean‘s research investigates four approaches to capturing expected process
invocation behavior. The four models used are the trivial, the callgraph, the abstract stack and
the digraph models. Each model refines the normal behavior represented a little more to prevent
false positives. The trivial model is a regular language model that is inferred from a parse tree. It
identifies the set of system invocation from an alphabet S. The model of normal behavior is
defined from a regular language S*. Any invoked process not recognized by the language is an
invalid process invocation. The trivial model identifies all the processes that are valid, although
does not identify the sequence. The model is fed by analyzing source code to determine what
process invocations are performed for an application. Wagner-Dean believe that although the
trivial phase is ―easy to implement, sound and efficient‖, [Wag01] it does not detect attacks that
use valid process invocation sequences. The approach is not granular enough to detect abuses of
the valid process invocation sequences, such as the open( ) system invocation, which can be used
to modify any file – including another file that is an executable in the language S*.
The trivial model just identifies the processes that are allowed to be invoked within an
invocation sequence, but does not identify the ordering of the invocation sequence. Ordering of
the alphabet S is performed by Wagner-Dean using a non-deterministic finite automaton
(NDFA). The NDFA (or callgraph) is built by performing a flow-control analysis upon the
application The NDFA is built assuming that only one invocation can be made from a single
application location. In this NDFA, every correct transition state is considered an accepting
state. However, this approach has the problem of showing how processes return control to the
originating process. Function calls are a particular problem; they are invoked for services and
are not part of a long invocation sequence. They appear to be dead-end nodes on a NDFA. The
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dead-end nodes (impossible paths) result in a larger than needed NDFA. To deal with the
problem of these dead-end nodes, the abstract stack model is introduced.
The abstract stack model is a non-deterministic pushdown automaton (NDPA) which allows
for a context free language. It emulates the program counter and the call stack in the operating
system. The dead-end nodes are not a problem, because they are pushed on the NDPA when
they are invoked, i.e. entry(f), and popped off the NDPA when they return control, i.e. exit(f).
Again the NDPA is created from an analysis of application source code. However, the use of the
NDPA model proves to be a challenge. In monitoring an application‘s invocation behavior the
NDPA has to search for all possibilities, this can be theoretically and computational exhausting.
Another problem that Wagner-Dean discusses is NDPA‘s difficulty in monitoring activity for
intrusions, because of the need for a top-down analysis. A top-down analysis may be needed if
intrusion detection is being done against a system trace log. However, if intrusion detection is
being done against real-time processing, the bottom up approach that the NDPA lends itself to
would be an advantage. If a process is intercepted in the scheduler before it is executed, the
system data area representing the process has pointers back to the process that invoked it. That
process has a data area with pointers to who invoked it, and so on. Therefore, a bottom up
mapping of process invocation sequences would be advantageous.
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Chapter 6: PPT Theoretical Model
By analyzing the problem in the light of Chomsky‘s Hierarchy of Formal Languages (see
figure 6-1), this research identifies an appropriate theoretical model for developing a solution
model. By determining requirements and identifying the most restrictive computational theory
model that sufficiently expresses the problem, the solution avoids being overly complex. The
computational theory model selected is used as the basis for creating a solution model.

Figure 6-1 Chomsky's Hierarchy of Formal Languages

6.1 Criteria for a Computational Model
Bell and LaPadula claim it is important to ―bridge the gap between general system theory and
practical problem solving [Bell73].‖ Their research emphasizes the necessity of using
computational models to guide solutions for IT security issues. A mathematical model allows
researchers to represent system requirements and rigorously analyze them.

Existing research on

Intrusion Detection uses computational theory models associated with regular or context free
65

languages, but does not provide justification with respect to the selection of one theoretical
model over another, nor does it exploit the theoretical characteristics of the selected model
[Ko94] [Kos97] [Warr99]. This research explains its choice for a computational theory model,
and shows how the theoretical characteristics of the model can be used to enforce a policy
permitting only valid process invocations sequences (VPIS). The intent of analyzing
computational models to find an appropriate theoretical framework is to preclude potential
solution-related issues that might not otherwise present themselves prior to implementation of
the solution.
6.1.1 . Necessary & Sufficient
Traditional logic‘s criteria of necessity and sufficiency are used to assist in the selection of an
appropriate computational model to use in this research. If, when some condition occurs, an
event associated with that condition also occurs, the condition is said to be sufficient for that
event. However, the existence of an event does not imply that a specific sufficient condition has
occurred since some sufficient conditions may be replaced by other conditions that are also
sufficient. On the other hand, if a condition is necessary for the occurrence of an event, the
occurrence of the event implies that the condition must have occurred. In other words, the event
occurs if and only if the necessary condition occurs [Bark80] [Copi78].
The computational model selected in this research is sufficient to model the computational
events investigated here. Turing Machines (TM) and their computational equivalents are
sufficient to model any computational event. But TMs are not necessary to model all
computational events. This research finds the computational model with the least computational
power that still provides the computational power required to model the event.
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In an argument, the set of necessary conditions contain only the essential conditions that
support the conclusion. All conditions that are not necessary to support the conclusion may be
removed to simplify the solution. Unnecessary premises can obscure an argument and make it
difficult to follow [Copi78]. Similarly, in designing engineering solutions, unnecessary
requirements can cause an engineer to loose focus on solving the problem. The logical principle
of Ockham‘s razor suggests that the simpler solution is usually the better one. Although more
complex solutions may also solve a problem, a better solution involves only those conditions that
are necessary to realize the solution. Ockham‘s razor can be used general guide in the selection
of the theoretical computational model to avoid unnecessary complexity [Gau03]; this approach
is taken in this research.
6.1.2 Choosing a Computational Model
To identify the simplest computational model necessary to model the problem of validating a
process invocation sequence instances of invocation sequences are represented in symbolic form.
After representing the instances in symbolic form, the validation problem is evaluated using
computational models from the simplest to the most complex, as required, stopping at the
simplest computational model necessary to model the event. By evaluating the simplest
computational models first, and only moving on to more complex models if it is determined that
a simpler model is inadequate, this research can be certain that it bases its solution on the
simplest necessary computational model.
The computational model associated with the theory chosen should have the capacity to
accept or reject a candidate string representing a process invocation sequence. The
computational model must have the ability to recognize the set of strings in a language L in
which each string represents a finite sequential invocation of processes during execution of an
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operating system so long as each process is invoked by a process that is authorized to invoke it.
Any string representing some other process invocation sequence should be rejected as not
belonging to language L.
6.1.2.1 Multitasking Requirement
Within the computational model it is necessary to represent an executing process and the
sequence of process invocations. This is complicated by the fact that multiple invocation
sequences can execute with apparent parallelism. This research makes the simplifying
assumption that a system contains a single CPU. The ability of computers to run multiple
unrelated process sequences, which appear to execute simultaneously, is called multitasking. A
user‘s series of processes, although logically executed in a sequential chain, may not actually be
scheduled in an uninterrupted, temporally contiguous sequence by the operating system‘s
scheduler. Rather, the scheduler may find it necessary to interrupt that process invocation
sequence by starting or resuming one or more other process invocation sequences needing to run
on the single CPU. As a result, a number of unrelated process invocation sequences may be
competing for time on a single CPU processor. Or, a server may process multiple functions
within an application on behalf of multiple users, creating multiple process invocation sequences.
Multitasking presents a challenge requiring a computational model capable of evaluating
multiple simultaneous process invocations sequences.
Take two jobs submitted for execution to a server, job a is represented by the process
invocation sequence abcabc and job x is represented by the process invocation sequence
xwybzw. Assume that job a: abcabc and job x: xwybzw each represent valid process invocations
sequences with each symbol in a string corresponding to the process being invoked. Also
assume that a sequence of processes associated with job a is executing on behalf of user 1 and a
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sequence of processes associated with job x is executing on behalf of user 2. To the scheduler
and CPU, however, the execution of the processes associated with the two strings may actually
occur as shown in figure 6-2:

Figure 6-2: Interleaved Process Execution

This happens because, when a process invokes another process, an interrupt occurs, allowing
the scheduler to dispatch another process sequence or system service. System interrupts cause
interleaving of process sequences, meaning, effectively, that multiple process invocation
sequences must be simultaneously evaluated for authorization.
6.1.2.2 Regular Language
From the perspective of formal language theory, a Finite State Automata (FSA) is the
simplest computational machine. Other researchers have used a FSA in an attempt to map valid
process invocations sequences in different forms. In intrusion detection research, which also
attempts to map valid process invocations sequence, both Kosoresow [Kos97] and Sekar [Sek01]
entertained the use of the FSA approach.
Kosoresow identified a Deterministic Finite State Automata (DFA) as an appropriate
approach to identify patterns with in an invocation sequence [Kos97]. However, Kosoresow also
identified some issues using a DFA. For instance, (1) using a DFA to calculate the minimal
description of a valid process invocation sequence may be time consuming and is potentially NP69

hard [Kos97]. (2) Creating a DFA from valid process invocations sequence has do be done
heuristically, using scripts and manually. Therefore, an exact DFA representation is likely to be
problematic. And (3) creating a DFA from traces would require substantial space (memory)
[Kos97]. A description of Kosoresow‘s approach can be found in section 5.2.4.1.2.
Sekar, on the other hand, embraced the Finite State Automata (FSA) as an approach to solve
the problem of verifying valid process invocation sequences. Sekar‘s approach solved the
problem of manual learning [Sek01], although it can be argued that Sekar did not address the
issues of the computational expense and the excessive space needed to implement this model as
raised by Kosoresow [Kos97]. By way of contrast, the present research uses the concept of
―one state, one process‖ in its implementation to solve these issues (see chapter 7). A
description of Sekar‘s approach can be found in Section 5.2.4.1.3.
Other, more complex, conceptual models have also been used, such as Push Down
Automata (PDA) [Feng03] and the probabilistic Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [Gho00]. For
more information on other research using a FSM and other theoretical computational methods to
map valid process invocation sequences, see section 5.2.4. But recall that a more complex
solution, although sufficient, may not be logically necessary.
A FSA recognizes a regular language.

Therefore, this model is appropriate if the set of

strings representing process invocation sequences form a regular language. Each language
accepted by some FSA has a corresponding representation in a Regular Expression (RE). A RE
is defined [Sips06] [Rich08] as follows:
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Regular Expression Definition
String S is a regular expression over the alphabet , if S is:


a for some a in alphabet 

2.

ε

 
4.

(S) is a regular expression

5.

Union: (S1  S2), where S1 and S2 are regular expressions.

6.

Concatenation: (S1  S2), where S1 and S2 are regular expressions.

7.

Kleene Star: S*

8.

Kleene Plus: S+

Figure 6-3: Definition of Regular Expression

A language L is regular if the set of strings in L corresponds to some regular expression
string as defined by the definitions above. For example, if strings corresponding to regular
expression S1 are in some regular language L1 and strings corresponding to regular expression S2
are in the regular language L2, then a regular expression can be formed corresponding to the
language consisting of exactly the union of the set of strings corresponding to S1 with the set of
strings corresponding to S2. Let one set of strings in the language corresponding to S1 represent
a set of valid process invocation sequences and let another set of strings corresponding to S2
represent another set of valid process invocation sequences. Both sets are part of a regular
language described by the union of their respective corresponding regular expressions. Let one
FSA be constructed to recognize S1, and the other S2. Then, an FSA can be constructed to
recognize the sets of strings corresponding to both S1 and S2, using ε transitions from a new start
state to the original start states of the two FSAs previously used to recognize each set
individually. The resulting non-deterministic FSA now recognizes a new set of valid process
invocations sequences containing all the members of S1 and all the members of S2.
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Figure 6-4: Representation of the FSA Recognizing the Union of Languages S1 and S2

Figure 6-4 illustrates the fact that Regular Languages are closed under union.

6.2 Appropriate Representation of the Problem
Any two FSAs (whether deterministic or non-deterministic) are said to be equivalent if they
recognize exactly the same language [Hopc01] [Rich08] [Sips06]. Furthermore, it is known that
every non-deterministic FSA (NFA) has an equivalent deterministic FSA (DFA). Every NFA
can be algorithmically transformed into its equivalent DFA [Brzo62] [Hopc01] [Rich08]
[Sips06] [Wats95] [Wats00]. The PPT models the process invocation sequence problem using a
DFA.
6.2.1 Finite State Automata Representation
A 5-tuple definition of a FSA (Q, , , P0, F) as shown in figure 6-5 (modified from
[Sips06]) is the starting point for defining the elements required to represent a process invocation
sequence. As detailed below, the DFA is used to accept or reject a process invocations,
represented as a string over  , with the states in Q representing the processes, i.e. Q =
{processes}. This same representation could be used even if a more computationally powerful
machine were required. That is: the processes are represented by the states in Q, and the
invocation sequences are represented by a sequence of symbols over . Therefore both Q and 
are associated with processes, where Q = {processes} and  = {process invocations}.
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Deterministic Finite State Automata Definition
(Q, , , P0, F)
Q is a finite set of states.
 is a finite alphabet.

:Q

  (Q-{P0}) is the transition function.

P0  Q is the unique start state.
F  Q is the set of accepting states.
Figure 6-5: Definition of Deterministic Finite State Automata

Both nondeterministic FSAs (NFA) and deterministic FSAs (DFA) are used throughout this
chapter to describe the program pathing solution. Because an algorithm exists to convert an
arbitrary NFA to an equivalent DFA [Sips06], either one is used as convenient. The primary
difference between the deterministic and nondeterministic definition is step 3 in figure 6-5,
where the transition function  of the deterministic FSA is replaced with the transition relation 
of the nondeterministic FSA, where : Q

(  {}) (Q-{P0}). [Rich08]

6.2.1.1 States Q
In the finite set Q, Pi represents process i executing in the system. More formally, Q = ({P0}
 {Pi : Pi represents a process Pi that has been dispatched to execute by the scheduler}). States
are labeled as P0, P1, P2, … ,Pn, where the symbol Pn represents the name of a real process. |Q| =
n+1, there n is determined by the number of processes represented in Q. If there are five
processes, then there are five states in the DFA, plus one for the start state P0. All states in Q
represent processes that are authorized to execute on the computer. P0 is a start state (described
in section 6.2.1.4) and is not reachable after transition to another state in Q.
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 Alphabet and process invocations
Normal processes are those processes that are allowed to execute on the critical server as
defined in chapter 2 to fulfill its critical function.  is the alphabet of all the transition inputs of
normal process invocations corresponding to the set of process represented in Q and are
represented as lower case p. Every process, whether normal or not, that can be invoked on a
system is associated with a corresponding symbol in a finite, though possibly large, alphabet .
Symbol pi represents the invocation of process Pi. These symbols are used to form strings
representing all possible process invocation sequences in a language L. The alphabet is a finite
set of symbols, therefore, over which all possible process invocation sequences both valid and
invalid are formed. Thus while Pi Q-{P0} represents a process named Pi executing, pi
represents the invocation of process Pi. The language constructed from

is the language

consisting of the set of all possible strings that can form over the alphabet  , that is,  =
, where | | = n.
When process Pi invokes Pk, it causes a transition in the NFA represented as ({Pi},pk). This
transition represents that while executing the process Pi, the system encounters the invocation of
a process Pk as a transition input (or invocation) represented as pk. Because not all possible
process invocations are valid process invocations, it is possible that ({Pi},pk) is not defined for
some pk or for some Pi  Q. For example, some processes should never be allowed to
execute on a critical server, because these processes are not essential to the primary function of
the server. These invalid process invocations are represented by a subset alphabet  . The
set of valid process invocations in  is represented by the subset alphabet , where   , with

 being partitioned by and . That is:
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and

The set of invalid process sequences is of interest. Any process invocation sequence that
contains a non-empty substring from the alphabet  by definition is an invalid process
invocation. It is invalid because it contains at least one symbol corresponding to the invocation
of an abnormal process.

Since  is a set of process invocations, there are two possible subsets

for any sequence in the  set of invalid process invocations sequences.
, where w contains at least one symbol from the alphabet .}, which

 {

represents the set of invalid process invocations made up of normal and abnormal
processes. Any string made up of a symbol not belonging exclusively to the alphabet
is considered invalid.


represents the set of invalid process invocations made up of only abnormal processes.
Any string made up of a symbol not belonging to the alphabet

is considered invalid.

w

The set

contains all the possible strings that can be created from the alphabet . Thus,

contains all possible strings representing valid process invocation sequences over a language
using  as the alphabet, and more generally, .

may also contain some invalid process

invocation sequences. This is because for a process invocation to be valid, it is required that the
order of its symbols appear in an appropriate sequence and that the sequence be profiled. It is
possible that an invalid invocation process sequence could be constructed from the set of valid
process invocations. An invalid process invocation sequences over  represents the case in
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which normal processes are invoked in a sequence that is not appropriate. The language Lx is
the language made up of the subset of
sequences. The set of strings

that makes up the set of invalid process invocation

containing the subset of invalid process invocation sequences

Lx such that:

The strings in the language Lx represent process invocation sequences made up of valid
process invocations from the alphabet

, but there is at least one substring w in each string such

that | w | ≥ 2 and w represents an invalid process invocation.
Consider a system process invocation sequence: PqPr Ps Pt. A normal process can only
execute if it is invoked by another normal process and if that invocation is valid. Thus Ps
executes, because it has been invoked by process Pr. Similarly, process Pt executes because it
was invoked by process Ps. The ordinal execution of these processes is represented as a
sequence over  by the following, pr ps pt. As the OS schedules a finite sequence of processes
for execution, a corresponding finite-length sequence of symbols w over  is formed. At any
invocation index t in the scheduled sequence, the length of w at invocation index t is represented
as |wt|. When the next process is scheduled, a new string wt+1 is created such that |wt+1| = (|wt|+1).
The set of valid process invocations sequences is the language Lv, over the alphabet . In Lv
each symbol in a string represents invocation of a normal process that is authorized to invoke the
subsequent process represented by the subsequent symbol in that string. The set of valid process
invocation sequences is a possibly infinite set of such finite-length strings forming the language
Lv. Recognition of the language Lv is the focus of this research.
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can be divided therefore, into two distinct partitions, Lx and Lv where:

That is: the set of invalid process invocation sequences

, represents the set of

process invocation sequences that are invoked in an invalid order, although made up of only
symbols representing valid process invocations, while the set of possible valid process
invocation sequences

, represents the set of valid process invocation sequences.

Transition Relation 
An invocation of process P2 by process P1 is expressed in the NFA transition relation as
({P1},p2) = {P2}. This representation indicates a transition from the NFA set of states
containing P1 to the set of states containing P2 on the input symbol p2. The inferred substring w
is represented as the sequence w = (p1p2) over v. Let pj represent invocation of process Pj
immediately subsequent to w. Then a new process invocation sequence is formed by the
concatenation wpj.
At invocation index t0 no process has been invoked. P0 is an accepting state. Therefore the
initial language is defined as Lt0 = {}. The NFA recognizing Lt0 is called NFAt0 = (Q={P0},, ,
P0, F={P0}) as shown graphically in figure 6-6.

Figure 6-6 Initial Start State – NFAt0
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Assume for the moment that every process invocation would occur in a valid sequence.
Then for invocation of process P1 we consider NFAt1 formed by replicating NFAt0 and adding a
transition on input p1 to a new accepting state P1. As a result, NFAt1 = (Q={P0,P1},={p1}, P0, ,
F={P0,P1}) as shown in graphically in figure 6-7 recognizes Lt1= {, p1}.

Figure 6-7 NFAt1

As each invocation progresses and adds another process invocation to the string, a new
language is created consisting of the previous language and adding a new string. Assume string
p1 has resulted in the machine NFAt1 being in the state P1 at invocation index t1. Then at index t2
with next process invocation p2, a transition resulting in sting p1p2 is recognized by machine
NFAt2 = (Q={P0,P1,P2}, ={p1,p2},, P0, F={P0,P1,P2}) which recognizes the language Lt2 = {,
p1, p1p2}.

Figure 6-8 NFAt2

Similarly, invocation index t3, where the transition relation ({P2},p3) = {P3}, the transition
represents the addition of p3 process invocation. Machine NFAt2 adds the string (p1p2p3), which
recognizes a new language Lt3 = {, p1, p1p2, p1p2p3} resulting in the machine NFAt3 =
(Q={P0,P1,P2,P3}, ={p1,p2,p3},, P0, F={P0,P1,P2,P3}) The sequence of invocation event indices
occurs until the process sequence terminates and the all process invocation sequences are
mapped.
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Figure 6-9 Building the Valid Process Invocation language

As each new normal process invocation is concatenated to some string present in the current
set of valid process invocation sequences, a new language is created. The building of the sets of
process invocation sequences is symbolized:

Initially,

because,

,

we know that

|

Figure 6-9 illustrates the building of the new language as it grows in graphic form.
Note that the series of machines constructed in this manner do not recognize

, but only

increasingly large subsets of that language. Invocation index based string construction allows
for validating a process invocation sequence as the sequence is processed by the system‘s
scheduler.
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6.2.1.4 Start State P0
An assumption is that only process invocations that occur subsequent to a machine being in
state P0 are of interest. In a computing system this can be any assumed environment. It can be a
user pushing a power start button, issuing a command, clicking on a GUI. Or it can be the state
after a computer‘s OS has been booted. In this research the symbol P0 is used to symbolize any
assumed safe starting condition. P0 is not an executing process.
6.2.1.5 FSA Issues
This research represents a series of process invocations as an FSA. The standard 5-tuple
definition of an FSA can be used with the definitions above to model process invocation
sequences. Let a machine PPTM (Program Pathing Trust Machine) be an FSA with process
states Q= {P0,P1,P2,P3,…,Pn}. P0 is not an executable process and P1 through Pn are executable
processes. The alphabet  corresponds to the set of process invocations (see section 6.2.1.2)
{p1,p1,p3,…pn}. P0 represents the initial start state of the PPTM. The set of final or accepting
states is represented by FQ. Process invocation transitions are defined as relation.
: Q

(

(Q – {P0})

Mapping process invocation sequences (strings) over an alphabet  is clear enough.
However, this mapping does not resolve the issue of which computational model is needed to
solve the problem of determining valid invocation sequences. Validating the authority of a
normal process to invoke another normal process is also a requirement and does not just entail a
strict mapping of each instance of a process invoked by the scheduler. This is a mistake made by
some other solutions proposed to solve the problem [Amm98] [Ball96]. However this research
makes the assumption that once a process is authorized to invoke another process, it is valid for
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the invocation to be repeated, no matter how many times. This assumption is explained in this
section and in section 6.2.2.
Suppose (p1p2p3p3p4) represents a valid process invocation sequence. For the program
pathing problem, the regular expression representing this process invocation sequence is
(p1p2p3+p4). The regular expression does not count the number of times p3 occurs in the
sequence, but does indicate that p3 must occur in the sequence, at least once, subsequent to p2
and prior to p4. Since the regular expression does not have to insure that a sequence be exact in
the number of times a process be invoked, the language is regular. The above regular expression
specifies that p1 precedes p2, p2 precedes p3, and that p3 can precede itself and precedes p4. Once
it is established that P3 may validly invoke P3 then this invocation can occur each time the
machine is in P2 and can occur any number of times.
Validating the authority of a process to invoke another process is not dependent upon the
number of times the process is invoked. Proving the correctness of execution of some portion of
the computation may require counting invocations, but that is a different problem. The program
pathing problem requires validating that a process has the authority to invoke another process
and is different from verifying the correctness of the execution. A process may invoke or fail to
invoke a normal process that it is authorized to invoke, yet the process is still authorized to
perform the invocation. Whether or not the process performs the correct invocation may involve
a program logic error, but is not a question of validating the process‘s authority to perform the
invocation. For instance, a teleprocessing program may invoke a process three times to serve
three different users, but if only two of the processes invoked the ending process and the third
process ends in error, then the third ending process is never invoked. This use case would
constitute a process flow logic error, but not an invalid invocation sequence. A language

81

containing strings that need to represent how many times a normal process has been invoked
would not be a regular language and would require a more complex machine to recognize the
language. If a more complex language were required, a context free language would have to be
considered.
6.2.2 Regular vs. Context Free Language
Without the need for a language to pump a symbol of the alphabet a specific number of
times, it is not necessary to use a machine more powerful than an finite state automata. The
classic example of a language that does not meet the criteria for the regular language pumping
lemma is

. For L it is necessary to count the number of times a process is

called, assuming L is a set of strings representing correct process invocation sequences.
However, the program pathing problem does not involve verifying that the process invocation
sequence is logically correct, but that the process invocation sequence is authorized. Anytime a
symbol occurs consecutively, it can be replaced in the corresponding regular expression by the
Kleene plus. This means that a string of the form AnBn for n>0 in the context of this problem
has the equivalent regular expression A+B+. As a result the language is no more complex
than a regular language [Bar61] [Hopc01] [Rich08] [Sips06].

6.3 Finite State Automata and the Program Path Trust Model
Given that an FSA is a reasonable theoretical foundation upon which to build the Program
Pathing Trust Machine (PPTM) and that it is possible to represent that problem symbolically as
described earlier, it is necessary to show how the PPTM can be constructed. Let M be a
computational model (machine). Let L(M) be the language recognized by machine M.
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Let Lv (M) represent the language recognized by some machine M and containing all the strings
representing the valid process invocation sequences. The symbolic representation for this
machine has been discussed in section 6.2.
A sequence of process invocations is defined as an ordered series observed prior to some
fixed event at invocation index t as a computing system schedules consecutive processes. The
set of all possible invocation sequences forms the set *. This language may be viewed as two
subsets, as described in section 6.2. One subset Lv (M) contains exactly the set of sequences
corresponding to the series of acceptable process invocations of the system. The other subset
contains the set of sequences corresponding to the series of invalid process invocations in
the system that are known to be invalid. The two subsets are disjoint and partition the set of all
possible process invocation sequences (see section 6.2.1.1).
Taking both subsets into account, we can create a corresponding DFA. The FSA solution
model proposed in this research initially assumes that the set of valid invocation sequences is
. As the solution model identifies and adds new valid process invocations sequences to the
set, the set of valid invocation sequences grows. The solution model ensures system integrity by
identifying valid process invocation sequences. Techniques for distinguishing these subsets are
discussed in detail in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. Over time, by building the set L  Lv (M), we
can reduce the occurrences of rejection of valid process invocation sequences, and allow the
system to identify valid sequences that it may not have explicitly recorded. However, this
means there may be some process invocation sequences that are inferred by Mt, but have not
been encountered. These process invocations sequences may or may not be valid, but cannot be
determined, without application of domain knowledge (as discussed in section 6.3.3 and
following).
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6.3.1 Why Finite State Automata is a better Computational Model choice.
One possible concern with the FSA approach is that in a real system many processes are
invoked and the FSA might quickly become very large and complex, especially if it is to be
deterministic. This concern can be addressed to some extent by using minimization algorithms
for DFAs as described by Hopcroft [Hopc01] and Watson [Wats95], or by the minimization
algorithm for non-deterministic FSAs described by Brzozowki [Brzo62]. Application of such
minimization algorithms can yield a simpler equivalent machine with fewer states.
Another concern with the use of FSA, from the machine learning perspective, is that while
learning by rote, it may appear that the FSA cannot abstract or generalize from the data that it
profiles. However, the process of generating equivalent states through application of the DFA
minimization algorithm can be viewed as generalization. This generalization is accomplished in
two ways. (1) The looping structures allow for the machine to recognize process invocation
sequences it has not encountered previously, such as multiple invocations of a process or set of
processes. (2) The FSA can encounter multiple prefix invocation subsequences leading to some
configuration from which machine M transitions to an accepting state, using the remaining
portion of another input process invocation subsequence to represent a novel process invocation
sequence.
6.3.2 Finite State Automaton PPT Representation
The set of abnormal processes is a finite set of processes that should never be permitted to be
invoked in the computer. This set is symbolized as  as the set of abnormal process
invocations.

 =   G
where, G 
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The set  is the set of partially indeterminate processes. It includes the set of abnormal
processes from the alphabet . However, it also includes the set G, which is the set of all
normal process from the alphabet

whose transitions and states have not yet been represented

in the DFA. The set G is important, because it represents those normal processes not considered
valid to be invoked some time. Once a normal process from G is considered authorized to be
invoked, it is removed from the set G, and therefore removed from .
Valid process invocation sequences (VPIS) are the only process invocation sequences that
can execute. The system runs continuously as long as the process invocation sequences are
valid. When a valid process invocation is encountered, the DFA transitions to an accepting state.
When an invalid process invocation is encountered, the DFA enters a trap state from which it
cannot escape. Since this state is not an accepting state, the DFA can not recognize any process
invocation sequence that causes it to enter the trap state, and therefore the sequence is
determined to be invalid. The DFAt, recognizes the subset of the language Lv, i.e., it recognizes
a subset of valid process invocation sequences.

Figure 6-10 DFAt=0 Transition Diagram

DFAt=0 (figure 6-10) initially accepts the empty string,, and rejects invalid process
invocation sequences and L(DFAt=0). In this initial machine no actual process invocation
sequence is valid. Any process invocation sequence that is presented to the DFAt=0 is invalid,
and is not recognized by the DFA. As processes are encountered, they are validated against the
DFA‘s states, and are assumed valid as long the input invocation transition causes a transition to
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an accepting state. If the input invocation causes a transition to H (the trap state), then the
process invocation sequence is determined to be invalid.
6.3.3 PPT Finite-state Automata Learning Mode
It has been established that a DFA can be used to represent a process invocation sequence.
However, the challenge is in populating the PPT DFA with valid process invocation sequences.
The most straight forward approach is to initially train the DFA with valid training data. The
process invocations the DFA profiles by rote represent valid process invocation sequences that
can be audited by a person.
The method used in this research is to provide a profiling mode. An administrator can turn
on profiling while accessing a particular application. When the profiling mode is turned on, the
sequence of application process invocations are introduced to the DFA as training data. New
strings in the language Lv are recognized by the DFA as they are encountered. As a result a new
DFA is created as necessary with appropriate transitions with all other input transitions to the
new state being set to the default of transitioning to the trap state (see figure 6-11). Therefore,
as each normal process is validly invoked, transitions are added to the DFA until the entire valid
process invocation sequence is recognized. Consider a newly initialized PPT DFA before it
encounters any normal process invocations. Its transition table is shown in figure 6-11; here and
afterwards, the start state appears in the first row of the transition table and all accepting states
are shown in boldface and underlined type.
Input

State
s

ts



P0

H

H

H

Figure 6-11: Initial PPT DFA Translation Table

Consider, a DFAt=1 where the valid process invocation sequence (p1 p1 p3) is encountered.
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Remember,
L(DFAt=0) = { }
and, L(DFAt=0)  Lv
As the DFAt=0 encounters p1, symbol p1 representing a previously unseen process is encountered,
that symbol is removed from  creating the set  - {p1}. The encounter of the first process
invocation p1 in the sequence (p1p1p3) causes a new DFA machine to be created:
L(DFAt=1) = L(DFAt=0)  {p1}
As the DFAt=1 encounters p1 again, the second process invocation in the sequence (p1p1p3)
another new DFA machine is created.
L(DFAt=2) = L(DFAt=1)  {p1p1}
Recall that the corresponding regular expression for the substring p1p1 is

. As a result, the

loop back transition is create on the P1 state as shown in figure 6-12. As the DFAt=2 encounters
p3, the third process invocation in the sequence (p1p1p3) another new DFA machine is created, as
shown in figure 6-12.
L(DFAt=3) = L(DFAt=2)  {p1p1p3}

Figure 6-12 Transition Diagram Representing the DFA Recognizing Language DFAt=3.
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The DFA transition table for the machine DFAt=3 is shown in figure 6-13.
.



p1

p3

P0

H

P1

H

H

H

H

H

P1

H

P1

P3

P3

H

H

H

Figure 6-13 DFAt=3 Transition Table Learning

As DFAt=3 is presented a new valid process invocation sequence (p1 p2 p3), and the first
process invocation p1 is encountered, p1 is already accepted by DFAt=3, so no new DFA machine
need be created. As DFAt=3 encounters the second process invocation, p2 in the sequence a new
DFA machine is created.
L(DFAt=4) = L(DFAt=3)  {p1p2}
The result should be recognition of L(DFAt=4) adding the sequence p1 p2 to the language
L(DFAt=3). As the DFAt=4 encounters p3, the third process invocation in the sequence {p1p2p3}
another new DFA machine is created.
L(DFAt=5) = L(DFAt=4)  {p1p2p3}

Figure 6-14 DFAt=5 Transition Diagram
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The resulting DFAt=5 recognizes the language L(DFAt=5) and is shown in the transition diagram
in figure 6-14. The three strings used as input have been used to create the following fully
qualified deterministic finite automaton DFAt=5.
Each state has a transition to the trap state in the instance that an invalid process invocation
sequence is encountered. The resulting machine is a fully qualified DFA with transitions
specified as in figure 6-15.

P0
P1
P2
P3
H

H
H
H
H
H

p1
P1
P1
H
H
H

p3
H
P3
P3
H
H

p2
H
P2
H
H
H

Figure 6-15 DFAt=5 Transition Table

After profiling (p1 p2 p3), DFAt=5 can profile the next valid process invocation sequence. If
DFAt=5 encounters a previously unseen process invocation sequence such as (p1 p1 p2 p3), it can
accept that sequence without the necessity of creating a new machine.
A new DFA is created after each new process invocation sequence is encountered in
―profiling‖ mode. When ―profiling‖ mode is turned off, the DFA has established steady state, no
new processes are added to the PPT DFA. If we examine the DFAt=5 transition table created by
the PPT profiling, we can see that other unseen valid process invocation sequences are accepted
by the DFA, e.g. p1 p1 p1 p1 p3 and p1 p1 p1 p1 p2 p3. This does not present a problem, because the
DFA has established that P1 can invoke P1, P2 and P3, and that P1 can invoke P1 any number of
times. Whether or not P1 should invoke P1 more than once is a matter of program execution
correctness, but is not a matter of authorizing P1 to invoke P1. The validity of the substring p1p1
has been established. An algorithm for building a PPT DFA is given in figure 6-16.
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Algorithm for building a PPT DFA
Set whitelist = { } // set of known valid processes
Set Q = {P0, H} // set of DFA states
Set F = {P0} // set of accepting states
Set  = { } //initialized alphabet
Set tempstring w = 
Get input sting
For (i=1; i n; i++)
Set w = wpi
IF ((w is not in whitelist) and (expert validates w))
Add Pi to Q
Add Pi to F
Add pi to 
Add DFA transition ((Pi-1,pi)Pi)
Add w to whitelist
ENDIF
ENDFOR
Figure 6-16: Algorithm for Building PPT DFA

6.4 Relation Between Lv and L(DFAt)
Because the DFA is built incrementally, it is not known at any value time t whether L(DFAt)
= Lv. However, the strings in the set called the white list are in the non-empty intersection
L(DFAt)  Lv. Because the white list is also built incrementally it cannot be claimed that the set
of strings called the white list is exactly the set of stings L(DFAt). Furthermore, it is not known
whether the set L(DFAt) merely form a non-empty subset of Lv. L(DFAt) could contain a set of
strings that are not a subset of Lv. That is, it is not known whether there exists another nonempty subset of strings both in L(DFAt) and outside Lv. More formally, it is not known whether
(

) = { }. This remains an open theoretical question and a topic for future

research. The PPT model uses domain knowledge both to build DFAt and to determine whether
strings known to be in L(DFAt) are also in Lv. In this way the PPT model incrementally builds
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the non-empty intersection L(DFAt)  Lv called the white list. This open theoretical question is
further discussed in appendix E.
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Chapter 7: Implementation of the PPT Model
In this chapter the PPT DFA theoretical computational model is instantiated into a structure
that can be implemented on a computer system in the form of a Program Pathing Trust Machine
(PPTM). The transition table represented at the end of chapter 6 provides a map for moving the
theoretical computation model to an implementation of the PPT model into a PPTM.
The PPTM will operate in two modes. One mode is the learning mode. Psuedo code for the
learning mode was provided in figure 6-16. Psuedo code for the validation mode is provided in
figure 7-1.
PPT DFA Validate Mode
Use DFA built in Learning mode
Set greylist = { } //holds invocations strings of unknown validity
Set current DFA state to P0
Set tempstings w = 
Get input sting of form p1p2……pi….pn for pi  
FOR (i-1;i n; i++)
Set w = wpi //append pi to w
IF (w is not in whitelist)
IF(transiton ((Pi-1, pi) is valid) and (pi is in F)) THEN
Place w in greylist
ELSE
Reject w and END
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDFOR

Figure 7-1: Algorithm for PPT DFA in Validation Mode

The remaining sections of this chapter describe the issues associated with implementation of
PPTM.
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7.1 Alternatives for Implementing the Program Pathing Trust DFA
Implementing the PPTM using a transition table can be done in a number of ways. The
application of the DFA dictates what implementation strategy should be used. Each application
of the PPT DFA has its own requirements. For instance, in discretionary and mandatory access
control the number of process invocation sequences mapped for access to a particular resource is
small and therefore a small and simple mapping structure is sufficient. For an integrity trusted
model, which is the focus of this research, all the valid process invocation sequences are mapped.
Because a much larger number of processes and process invocation sequences are mapped, a
different structure to implement the PPT DFA model is advisable.
7.1.1 PPT DFA Bit Map Implementation
For discretionary and mandatory access control applications, only a small number of process
invocations need to be mapped. Take for instance the process invocation sequences where only
Process P3 is allowed to access resource X, using the invocation sequences p1 p1 p3, p1 p2 p3, and
p1 p1 p2 p3. The number of normal processes and valid process invocation sequences in the
alphabet are very small in number and can be implemented in a very simple structure such as a
bit map.

Process Invocations
Process

 p1 p2 p3
P0
H
P1
P2
P3

0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0

0
0
1
0
0

0
0
1
1
0

Figure 7-2 Program Pathing Bit Map

Consider a small population of process invocations. For this population, a bit map can be
used effectively for the mapping structure to represent the PPT DFA.
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Consider Figure 6-15, the

DFA transition table in chapter 6. The table is easily represented by the instantiation of the bit
map structure in Figure 7-2.
Initially in the bit map structure all process invocations in the alphabet  are initialized to
binary 0s - meaning all processes invoked end up in the trap state. Any transition that is marked
as binary 0 is defined as a transition to the trap state H. As the DFA learns new processes and
new valid invocations, a binary 1 is placed in the cells where the process in the row is authorized
to invoke the process in the column. A binary 0 in a cell means move to the trap state, from
which there is no escape. A binary 1 means that the process in the row can invoke the process in
the intersecting column.
The Program Pathing bit map implementation uses the adjacency-matrix representation used
in graphic structures [Sedg02]. Using an adjacency-matrix graph of n by n array of Boolean
values, a Program Pathing bit mapping implementation of an DFA can be built using a small
amount of storage, given a small number of processes. The advantage of using a bit map is that
it allows for mapping every combination of invocations of the processes represented in the
matrix. Looking up invocations and adding new invocations to the matrix is relatively simple,
and computationally inexpensive.
Adding an invocation or invocation sequence entails adding new processes to the row and
column and changing the binary 0s to 1s for the cells representing process invocations.

Figure 7-3: Adjacency-matrix
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Figure 7-3 represents the adjacency-matrix for the bit map represented by figure 7-2 and figure
6-15.
Note in figure 7-3 that the first table is an array of process names with pointers to rows in the
bit map. This is done so that the process name can be looked up. The relative offset into the
process name table is the relative position of the process in the bit map, as indicated by the
numbers along the rows and columns.
A disadvantage of using a bit map is that most operating systems are written in the C
language, which has poor bit manipulation, and therefore coding a bit map in the C language is
challenging. Another disadvantage of the adjacency-matrix bit map is that it may result in a
wasting space. Mathematically, the adjacency–matrix is still more efficient with storage than the
retrieval tree approach. For discretionary and mandatory access control applications the
adjacency-matrix is sufficient, since these applications are interested in allowing only a few
process invocation sequences for access to a particular resource.
Access control identifies the program pathing DFA in the access control list for the resource
being restricted. Therefore in an access control system there are multiple program pathing DFAs
identifying process invocation sequences for each resource needing program pathing controls.
Although the adjacency-matrix bit map implementation would be sufficient for access control, it
may not however be sufficient for intrusion detection or ensuring trusted systems where all
process invocation sequences must be mapped. Therefore another implementation approach
must be considered,
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7.1.2 PPT DFA Adjacency-List Implementation
The mapping of all valid process invocation sequences is required for intrusion detection or
to establish a trusted system. The adjacency-matrix bit mapping approach to program pathing
would require too much memory to map all process invocations in a system. In such cases, the
program pathing DFA mapping structure can be implemented in the form of an adjacency-list
[Sedg02]. The adjacency-list approach implementation of the program pathing DFA removes the
empty spaces in the adjacency-matrix by using linked lists. Although this approach uses more
memory for smaller process invocation sequences, it ends up taking less space for larger process
invocation sequences, particularly if the adjacency-matrix is sparsely populated. The benefit of
the adjacency-list approach is that it can map a large diverse set of process invocation sequences
more efficiently if there are a large number of different processes performing the invocations and
little redundancy. Figure 7-4 illustrates the adjacency-list approach mapping the same p1 p1 p3,
p1 p2 p3, and p1 p1 p2 p3 invocation sequences used in Chapter 6, figure 6-15.

Figure 7-4: Adjacency-list

Although the adjacency-list mapping takes more memory per invocation, as the number of
processes increases it takes less space when compared to the adjacency matrix. If p = the
number of processes invocations in a sequence, then the adjacency-matrix uses p2 space to
implement the mappings whereas, the adjacency-index uses p+L (where L = the count of
linkages to invoking processes.)
Using an adjacency-list to implement the program pathing DFA is more efficient than earlier
approaches because it does not have to map a process invocation multiple times if it appears in
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different invocation sequences, thereby saving space. The adjacency-list approach is more
efficient than the adjacency-matrix in situations were the number of unique processes making
process invocations is greater than 110 processes or 1.5K of storage. The adjacency-index
method can represent 192 process invocation relationships in 1.5K, whereas the adjacencymatrix can only represent 110 processes but also represent all the possible process invocation
relationships of those processes. The adjacency-matrix method is much more efficient in
representing all the possible process invocation relationships between the processes in the matrix
– there is no extra cost for representing a process invocation between processes already
represented in the matrix. But adding a new process invocation relationship between a process
already existing in the adjacency-list implementation always has a cost.

7.2 Measuring Implementation Structures
Preliminary results showed that the program pathing approach using an adjacency-matrix or
adjacency-list can provide a more efficient and simpler mapping of process invocation
sequences. Figure 7-5 shows a comparison between the adjacency-matrix, the adjacency-list and
the retrieval tree approaches. The ―Implementation Approaches‖ columns shows the number of
processes each approach can represent give the ―Memory‖ allocation.

Figure 7-5: Memory and Process Representation Comparisons

In 1K of storage, the adjacency-matrix approach can represent close to the same number of
processes as the other two approaches, however its advantage is that it can represent more
process invocations between the processes it represents. Both the retrieval tree and the
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adjacency-list approaches can only represent the same number of process invocations as there are
processes represented and adding new process invocations has a cost. For the retrieval tree
approach, the cost is higher because each process invocation must identify every process that it
invokes, even if it has been mapped before.
The adjacency-matrix approach is also efficient in creating and processing the mapping
structure which allows for easy addition of processes and process invocations. Adding a process
to the matrix can be done by adding a new row and column to the matrix. Validating if a process
invocation is authorized is as easy as verifying that the process is represented in the matrix and
that the cell in the matrix that represents the process invocation is set to a binary 1.
For larger mappings of multiple and more complex process invocation sequences the
adjacency-matrix can become too large. For some applications, this disadvantage can be
overcome by breaking up the program pathing DFA into multiple DFAs, like SELINUX does
with its reference policies [Smal01b]. Each DFA represents a domain of valid process
invocation sequences. The relationship between the DFA domains can be mapped in a higher
level DFA of domain invocations. The SELINUX approach using domains makes the
adjacency-matrix approach an optimal solution, where it can be applied. However, in the case
where all the process invocation sequences must be mapped in a single DFA, the adjacency-list
approach is a better implementation of the program pathing model. The approach allows for the
most efficient use of storage.
The program pathing approach, regardless of the method used to implement it (adjacencymatrix or adjacency-list) provides a good alternative to previously tried methods, i.e. n-gram
[Hof98] or retrieval trees [Amm98]. Even though both methods‘ DFA can recognize process
invocation sequences not previously learned, this is not unlike a machine learning algorithm. If a
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process invocation has been learned and identified as trusted, then it should be trusted in other
process invocation sequences that lead to the same process invocation.

7.3 Coding Structures in PPTM
Instantiation of a PPT DFA entails creating data areas that support the adjacency-matrix.
Developing an implementable PPT DFA using an adjacency-matrix is not just a matter of coding
the structure, the structure has to be designed for maintainability. The design techniques used
must be scalable and allow for ease of diagnostics. The Program Pathing Trust Machine (PPTM)
was written in C language, the language of choice for most operating systems. Ideally, the
PPTM would be integrated as a subsystem in the operating system‘s kernel. However, the
PPTM is only a functional prototype to prove that an instantiation of a PPT DFA is possible and
is capable of solving the problem. Further testing has to be performed in production ready
systems to prove that the prototype is sufficient. The C language also provides the ability to use
and maintain address pointers, which is useful in designing an implementation of the PPT DFA.
The PPTM prototype was not implemented into the system‘s kernel, but as a stand-alone
application that creates the PPT DFA structure, for mapping valid process invocations sequences
and for validating the authority of process invocation s to determine if they are invalid process
invocations. Verification of the prototype was essential before attempting to make any
modifications to the system‘s kernel. Complete exploration of issues concerning the
modification of the system‘s kernel is a topic for future research (see chapter 9).
7.3.1 PPTM Basic Structure
This section describes the data areas created to realize a functioning PPTM. The data areas
support an implementation of the PPT DFA described in chapter 6.
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The main data area for the PPTM is the anchor, as shown in figure 7.6. The anchor data area
is the communication vector that is an anchor point for all the PPTM‘s basic components. The
anchor data area

Figure 7-6: PPTM Anchor Data Area

is made up of a length field, an eye catcher field and a number of address pointers. The fields
are defined as follows:
len

Length of the entire anchor data area. This field is initialized after the data area is
allocated and is used to deallocate the data area when the application ends.

eyecat

The eye catcher field is initialized with the ASCII text of ―ANCHOR.‖ The ASCII
text allows a technician to quickly identify the anchor data area in a core dump of
memory when diagnosing the application.

stkptr

Address pointer to allocated memory data area called stack, which is a block of singly
linked list cells each defined by the scell data area. Scells define the invoked
processes.

sptr

Address pointer of the next available unused scell in the scell stack data area.

snum

Number of the next indexed scell available in the scell stack data area.

autptr

Address pointer to the automata data area, where the names of all the encountered
processes are recorded in an array of data areas called acell.

aptr

Address pointer to the next unused acell available in the acell automata data area.

anum

Number of the next indexed acell available in the acell automata data area.

The PPT DFA is made up of four sets of data areas: automata, stack, acell and scell.
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These four data structures work together to instantiate the PPT DFA. The automata data area is
the main structure of the PPT DFA; it is an array of the states in the DFA or the normal
processes. The elements in the automata data area are acells; each acell represents a state or
normal process with reference to the DFA 5-tuple characteristics of the PPT DFA. Q =
automata data area or Q = (acell[1], acell[2],…acell[n]). The alphabet  is represented by the
elements in the stack data area called scells. They represent transitions or valid process
invocations.  = stack data area or  = (scell[1], scell[2],…scell[n]).

Figure 7-7: Automata Data Structures

7.3.2 How the PPTM works
The prototype is initialized by allocating the anchor, stack and automata data areas. These
blocks of memory all have a length (len) and eye catcher (eyecat) initialized so that the end of
each data area can be determined and so that the data area can be easily found in a memory core
dump. The size of the data area blocks in the prototype is arbitrarily determined by an internally
defined variable, however in a production-quality implementation the data areas can be allocated
dynamically depending upon the size of the stored DFA recorded (for instance the number of
acells allocated in the automata data area are exactly the number of processes recorded). The
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size of the data area is important for the purposes of de-allocating the memory at a later time, and
for reading a memory core dump if necessary.
Once the main data areas are allocated and initialized the PPTM reads the valid process
invocation sequences needed to populate the automata data area. Populating processes into the
cells is a matter of recording processes as they are encountered when the PPTM is in recording
mode – in the case of the prototype, this means reading the ―train‖ file. In recording mode, all
process invocation sequences are assumed to be valid process invocation sequences and are
recorded in the automata.
After all the recorded processes are loaded into the automata data area, the PPTM prints out
the automata structure into an ―autotrace‖ file. This is to allow auditing of the automata data area
created by the PPTM application. Using the example of the valid process invocation sequences

Figure 7-8: “automata” Data Area Containing the Process Invocation Sequences

p1p1p3, p1p2p3, and p1p1p2p3, (described in chapter 6), the automata data area would look as
illustrated in figure 7-8.
The PPTM automata data area is interpreted from the in core memory version and translated
into a text file. The resulting ―automtrace‖ file is a representation of the automata data area in
grammatical form, indicating that the process on the left can call either the processes P1, P2 or
P3.
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Automata Trace
Caller Process -> Called Process | Called Process
S -> ProcessP1
ProcessP1 -> ProcessP1 | ProcessP2 | ProcessP3
ProcessP2 -> ProcessP3
ProcessP3
Figure 7-9: Format of the “automtrace” file

The PPTM then validates any process invocation sequences it encounters against the valid
process invocation sequences it has recorded in the automata data area. The PPTM is now in
validate mode. Any process or process invocation that is encountered but not authorized is
recorded as an error. For the sake of the prototype, all unauthorized processes or process
invocations that are not valid are recorded in the ―auditfile‖ file. In validate mode, if the PPTM
encounters a process that has not been recorded in the automata data area, the PPTM writes an
error message to the ―auditfile‖ file:
Called process [ID2] - [process name] invalid.

If on the other hand the PPTM encounters a process invoking a process that is a normal process,
but is not authorized to invoke, then the PPTM writes another error message to the ―auditfile‖
file:
It is invalid for PID [ID3] - process [process name 1]6 to call
process [process name 2]7.

As a process is validated, the PPTM writes out the process invocation process so that it can be
audited later. If the audited process invocation sequence was validated incorrectly, a technician
can correct the PPTM by submitting the audited process invocation sequence to be recorded in
the automata data area.

6
7

[Process name 1] refers to the process attempting to invoke process 2
[Process name 2] refers to the process being invoked by process 1
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Chapter 8: Development and Test Results
Development and testing of the PPTM prototype was done on a Dell Latitude C640 with an
Intel Pentium 4, 1.80 GHz, 500 MB RAM and 30GB hard drive hardware, running Linux Red
Hat Fedora Core 6. It was also tested on a Dell Latitude D600 with an Intel Pentium M, with 1.6
GHz, 2 GB RAM and 60 GB hard drive hardware. This system ran Windows XP with service
pack 3. The code was additionally tested on a MacBook 5.2 with an Intel Core 2 Duo, 1.23 GHz,
4GB RAM and 160GB hard drive, running OS X 10.6.5. The code was recompiled on each of
these systems and ran without any problems.

8.1 Development
Implementing the PPTM involved making some decisions concerning the operating system
and the programming language to be used. Given that the PPTM would eventually reside in the
OS kernel, it was decided to use C language and given that the PPTM has to be used in multiple
OS environments, this research chose GNU‘s gcc compiler, since it supports multiple OS
environments. The source code was transferred to two other computers running different OS
`systems for testing.
The source code was placed in a development directory. The system path was positioned to
the source code in the development directory using the PATH=$PATH:. command. The gcc
PPTM.c –o PPTM command was used to create an executable program called PPTM. A copy
of the PPTM source code can be found in Appendix A.
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8.2 Unit Testing and Debugging
Testing the PPTM was a challenge because it proved difficult to acquire test data from
production or quality assurance (QA) critical servers that ran processes that needed to be
protected. In order to secure sufficient test data from critical servers, this research would have to
demonstrate that the algorithms perform and function as designed. Initially it was important to
verify that the code performed the functions it was designed to perform properly. A series of
unit tests were conducted to verify each function.
8.2.1 Test Reading Training Data and Building the Automata Structure
Mock training data was used to test the PPTM program‘s ability to read in the data and store
it in the automata. The training data was sparse to make it easy to debug and was crafted to test
the different features of the automata structure. The implemented automaton is made up of acells
and scells. An acell is a data area that represents a process, or in computational theory
vernacular, a state. The scell data area represents a transition to a state. The test training data
verified that both acells and scells were created properly. If an acell for a process already
existed, another acell would not need to be created and the acell for the process would be reused.
As a process invokes other processes, scells representing the invoked processes are linked to
the invoking process‘s acell. The scell also links to the invoked process‘s acell, if it exists,
otherwise an acell is created for the invoked process and the linked scell in the invoking process
acell linklist points to the invoked process‘s scell. If a process‘s scell is already linked to an
invoking processes acell, then a duplicate scell does not need to be linked to the acell. The scell
would be re-used.
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After all the crafted mock training data was read and modeled in the PPTM automaton, the
PPTM code printed out the automaton representation to an ―automtrace‖ file. The ―automtrace‖
file was used to verify that the training data was represented properly in the automaton and could
be used for debugging later.
8.2.2 Verify Data Against the Profiled Training Data in the Automata
Once the automata machine was loaded with the mock test data, and the ―automtrace‖ file
verified that the automata structure was successfully built, the PPTM prototype was then tested
to see if it could be used to verify process invocations. The validation testing determined if the
automata could identify the process invocation sequences that the PPTM loaded into the
automata and determined if it was able to identify invalid process invocation sequences. The
testing was intended to verify that the automaton could identify the following invalid process
invocations:
1.

An abnormal process tries to invoke a process.

2.

A normal process tries to invoke an abnormal process.

3.

A normal process tries to invoke a normal process that it is not authorized to invoke.

8.3 System Testing
In absence of available test data, mock test data was created programmatically. The Tstdata
program was created to generate test data to test the PPTM program. See Appendix A for the
Tstdata souce code. The Tstdata program randomly generates system test data to test the PPTM
program and to find any problems that the simulated hand crafted test data in the functional
testing did not reveal.
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8.3.1 Tstdata – Random Test Data Generator
The Tstdata program randomly generates process names and process invocation sequences.
The Tstdata has three defined constants in the Test.h file which control the volume and
characteristics of the test data.
1. NoProcess

– Defines the number of processes the Tstdata can choose from.

2. NoIDs

– Defines the number of process invocation sequences to generate.

3. NoProString – Defines the maximum number of processes that can be in a process
invocation string.
The Tstdata program generates NoIDs number of process invocation sequences, choosing 1
to NoProString number of processes in a sequence. The number of processes in a sequence is
randomly generated for each sequence, so each may have a different number of processes. Each
process invocation sequence is assigned a UID number 1 through NoIDs, e.g., {UID1, UID2,
…,UIDn}. Each process added to a process invocation sequence is randomly chosen from a
number 1 to NoProcess. The processes are assigned a name based upon the random number
generated with an M preceding it, e.g., {M1, M2, M3, …, Mn}.
The test data generated is in the following format:
UID1
UID1
UID1
UID2
UID2

S M291
M291 M876
M876 M97
S M79
M79 …

Note that every process invocation sequence starts with the start state S, which is equivalent to
the P0 start state described in the theoretical model in chapter 6.
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Each line in the test data represents a process invocation, identifying the process sequence it
belongs to (indicated by the UIDn), the invoking process, immediately after the process sequence
number and the invoked process, right after the invoking process name.
The variables in the Test.h file can be changed to simulate various process invocation
sequence scenarios. The Tstdata.c program must then be re-complied using the GNU gcc
compiler to accept the changes made in the Test.h file. The Tstdata program is then executed to
generate test data that is written to the Train file, so it can be used as training input to the PPTM
program.
8.3.2 Performance Testing the PPTM prototype
System testing focused upon establishing the performance baselines for building the
automata and validating process invocation sequences against training data loaded into the
automata. Unlike the functional tests, this data was larger in volume and more complex. The
test data was generated automatically using the Tstdata program. The table in figure 8-1 shows
the system testing and the parameters used to test the PPTM prototype.
Figure 8-1 is the results from the system test. The table scells and acells represent the
memory allocation of the PPTM data structures to so that the amount of memory necessary to
represent the process invocation sequences using either the adjacency-matrix or the adjacency –
list can be determined. The test provides statistics to verify the amount of memory that PPTM
needs for each approach. It is important to know the memory requirements of PPTM when it
runs on critical servers so as to prevent system resources from being over utilized by PPTM.
Since PPTM is to be implemented into the kernel to intercept processes being scheduled for
dispatching to the CPU, the PPTM structures should not use up too much RAM.
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The result of system testing uncovered some problems not discovered in the functional
testing, such as buffer overflows (which happened when a large volume of test data was
presented to the PPTM). Further, the system test identified the fact that an automaton becomes
denser as the invocation sequences invoke more processes.
System testing demonstrated that the PPTM could handle a large number of processes and
sequences. The tests performed as expected, the PPTM profiled all the test data and identified
the process invocations it should have indentified as invalid. No anomalies were found during
testing of the validation phase of the PPTM
# of
# of
sequences processes
10
10
10
100
100
100
1,000
1000
1000
1000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000

10
100
1,000
10
100
1,000
10
100
1,000
10,000
10
100
1,000
10,000
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000

Max # of
processes
per
sequence
10
50
100
10
100
100
10
100
100
100
10
100
100
100
10
100
100
100
100

acells

scells

Max number of
Memory
Memory
possible
allocation percentage
allocation for
invocation
for link-list density
matrix in MB
combinations
in MB

10
40
121
93
253
10,201
434
567
1,002,001
10
116
121
100
3,979
10,201
997
5,460
1,002,001
10
118
121
100
10,074
10,201
1,000
48,438
1,002,001
9,943
49,569
100,020,001
10
116
121
100
10,170
10,201
1,000
392,882
1,002,001
10,000
494,121
100,020,001
10
117
121
100
10,164
10,201
1,000
994,279
1,002,001
10,000 2,430,739
100,020,001
100,000 5,025,487 10,000,200,001
Figure 8-1 System Test Results

0.000320
0.004054
0.132692
0.000320
0.004268
0.149874
0.000320
0.004268
0.149965
12.226750
0.000320
0.004268
0.149965
12.228489
0.000320
0.004268
0.149965
12.228489
1,195.168495

0.0009
0.0067
0.0219
0.0021
0.0638
0.1137
0.0021
0.1568
0.7696
1.0598
0.0021
0.1582
6.0254
7.8449
0.0021
0.1581
15.2020
37.3953
79.7346

33.06%
2.48%
0.06%
95.87%
39.01%
0.54%
97.52%
98.76%
4.83%
0.05%
95.87%
99.70%
39.21%
0.49%
96.69%
99.64%
99.23%
2.43%
0.05%

The high mark testing was 100,000 processes in 100,000 process invocation sequences
averaging 50 processes in each sequence. All 100,000 processes were used in the invocation
test, and over 5 million process invocations were profiled. Memory utilization for the PPTM
using the adjacency-list and the adjacency matrix were calculated. The amount of allocated
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RAM needed to represent the PPTM adjacency-list structure was about 80MB versus over 1 GB
using the adjacency-matrix. The density of the invocations was measured to determine the point
at which the adjacency-matrix began out performing the adjacency-list structure.
For tests where the number of processes were between 10 and 1000, there was no significant
difference between the two structures. As the number of processes increased, the adjacency-list
began allocating less memory than the adjacency-matrix. This trend continues until the number
of process invocations grows and begins filling the adjacency-list. When the adjacency-list
structure starts to converge to around 40% of the maximum number of possible invocation
combinations, the adjacency-matrix starts to become the more optimal structure for conserving
memory. It is, however, unlikely that process invocations would reach a 40% density. It would
mean that if there were 10,000 processes, there would be 100 million process invocation
possibilities and that the system would have to make 40 million of process invocations for the
adjacency-list to be suboptimal. The tests suggest that the adjacency-list is the preferred
structure to use of system integrity process invocation authorization.
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Chapter 9: Future Research
9.1 Implement PPTM into the Operating System’s Kernel
Implementation of PPTM requires that it be installed in the OS kernel so that it can validate
program path sequence of process invocations. Of course, if the PPT model were to be adopted
as part of an existing access control system, the OS intercept problem would be partially solved,
as most access control systems already have intercepts in the OS.
Once the PPTM system is implanted into the kernel, it can monitor every process that is
loaded for execution in real time. The PPTM system is able to verify all process invocation
sequences. A fully functional PPTM subsystem must be developed with all the user interfaces
and options to enable the PPTM prototype to function in a production environment.

9.2 Testing
The PPTM has been tested with mock data. However additional testing with real data is
necessary once the PPTM has been implemented in a system as described above. All the
features in the PPTM implemented in the kernel described in section 9.1 must be tested and with
a number of application scenarios. A number of known applications have to be tested in
combination and separately to determine if the system can identify and distinguish between valid
and invalid process sequences. To understand how exactly the PPTM system works, the system
must be tested for performance as well as accuracy. Comparing the results of PPTM to other
process invocation sequence models is difficult, due to lack of a standard test bed, but
comparative evaluations should be made so far as possible. A useful extension of this research
may be the development and proposal of a standard test bed made available to other researchers
to facilitate comparisons of approaches.
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9.3 Process Authentication
Process authentication is important for determining that a process is the process it purports to
be. Future research will determine whether the PPT model can en extended to include
authentication. Further discussion on this issue is presented in appendix D.

9.4 The Validity of Inferred Process Invocation Sequences
One may make the assumption that by authorizing individual process invocations the PPT
model can infer valid process invocation sequences it has not yet encountered. This assumption
may allow the PPT DFA to accept sequences that are invalid. Further research should aim at
determining whether some members of L(DFAt) are not in Lv. Further discussion on this issue is
presented in appendix E.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
This research has identified a model to validate process invocations in order to prevent the
execution of unnecessary processes that steal CPU cycles or otherwise interfere with production
processing. Unlike intrusion prevention, the significance of program pathing is to keep normal
processes from being invoked at inappropriate times, as well as to keep malware from running.
The goals of the program pathing model are to be scalable to a production environment, and to
take relatively little time and knowledge to implement and maintain.
The first principle of engineering is to analyze and understand the problem to be solved.
Rigorous analysis of a problem often yields a good solution, and one that is not overly complex.
A simpler solution is easier to manage, thus better positioned to perform optimally. This
research has analyzed the problem of validating process invocation sequences using a
computational theory approach.

10.1 Computational Theory Approach to Validating Process Invocation
Sequences
Bell and LaPadula stated that it was important to ―bridge the gap between general theory and
practical problem solving‖ [Bell73]. And it is important to engage theoretical modeling in the
problem solving process. This research has used computational theory to define and analyze the
problem. Representing the process invocation sequence problem symbolically and examining it
in the context of computational theory has enabled a more precise definition of the problem.
Computational theory has focused the problem, allowing the solution to emerge from problem
analysis.
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10.1.1 Required Computational Power
It was determined that a finite state automaton (FSA) has sufficient computational power to
solve the problem of mapping process invocation sequences. In the DFA model chosen valid
process invocations are mapped to verify the authority of each process to invoke or be invoked
by another process. This technique assumes that all process invocations are invalid unless
registered in the DFA.
To take into account abnormal processes from the alphabet  the automata had to define a
new variable symbol . The symbol  deviates from traditional automata theory. Traditional
automata theory does not use variables in the alphabet. There is literature to suggest that a
variable of indeterminate or unknown inputs in a transition might be acceptable [Buch60a]
[Buch60b] [Elie74]. However, the present research did not further pursue these more
computationally complex approaches because the DFA used here has sufficient computational
power.
10.1.2 Translating Theory into Solutions
When dealing with even simple computational theory it is difficult to translate theory into
implementation. There are some tools that allow researchers to convert regular expressions into
implementation, such as lex and yacc [Levi95], but these are scripting languages and not
applicable to the PPTM. The PPTM must be implemented into the kernel. This research has
identified two possible data structures to implement an DFA – adjacency-matrix and adjacencylist [Sedg02]. Adjacency algorithms are graph algorithms, and the DFA is represented as a
graph.
The adjacency-matrix (or bit map) fulfills all the requirements necessary to implement an
DFA state transition table. The adjacency-matrix algorithm performs well if there are a large
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number of input transitions. For state transition tables that have fewer input transactions, an
adjacency-list (or link-list) is more memory efficient. The optimal implementation of the DFA
depends upon the constraints dictated by the problem and the calculated memory requirements
required to represent the DFA in implementing each of the adjacency algorithms.

10.2 Impact upon the Program Pathing Problem
This research‘s approach to the program pathing problem (process invocation sequence
problem) has been to look for a simple solution. Instead of concentrating on mapping entire
process strings or patterns, focus has been upon a process‘s authority to invoke another process.
This simpler solution enables a DFA to profile invocation sequences more easily, as the
invocation sequences are built from individual mappings of authorized process invocations.
Other solutions have tried to map either the whole invocation sequence or substrings of that
sequence.
Although the program pathing model prototyped has been functionally tested and system
tested, it still needs to be embedded, implemented, and tested in an actual operating system. As
stated in chapter 9, the real test for the model is for PPTM to be implemented without a lot of
effort and to run effectively on a production system. This has to wait for future research and an
institutional partner willing to spend the time testing.
10.2.1 Mapping Process Authority to Invoke Processes
The PPTM maps running process invocations as they are encountered to build the invocation
sequences to be authorized. Instantiating the DFA into a series of linked lists of process
invocations simplifies the mapping of sequences. A process cannot invoke another process
unless the process that invoked it in turn was authorized to be invoked by another invoking
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process. The valid invocation sequences are implied to be authorized, because only valid
process invocations are allowed to be executed.
An advantage of the program pathing model is that it can populate the DFA linked list as
process invocations are encountered and profiled from a running system. There is no need to
edit or write a policy language to map process invocation sequences. If a process invocation
sequence is encountered that has not been profiled by the program pathing DFA, the audit record
identifying the encountered process invocation can be used to update the DFA, and capture that
invocation as valid.
False negatives (i.e., prevention a process from being invoked when it should) can be
prevented by placing the PPTM into Warn mode. Warn mode allows processes that may be
critical to the operation to continue to be invoked, but alerts administrators that there is a
potential false negative and something must be checked.
10.2.2 Mode Characteristics of Some Process Invocations
One characteristic of program pathing is that some process invocation sequences may be
valid at one time but not another. For instance, it is not valid to run maintenance processes
during production times. There may be processes that should run at scheduled times, and only at
those times. The program pathing model must be able to handle cases where a sequence is valid
at one point in time and invalid at another. The program pathing DFA can deal with these cases
by (1) turning off the PPTM to allow the usually invalid processes to be invoked, or (2)
switching the program pathing DFA to another DFA to allow the processes to run PPTM, or (3)
including a time window as part of each process invocation symbol in .
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10.3 Potential Use of the Program Pathing Trust Model
The Program Pathing Trust Model is not intended to be a stand-alone function. It is intended
to be a component of a larger security system as are the original program pathing in ACF2
[ACF99] and the program controls in SELinux [Mcca05]. That is to say, it is not intended to be
used as a stand-alone function such as an intrusion prevention system (like Symantec‘s Critical
System Protection [Suma05]).
10.3.1 Program Pathing in an Access Control System
The original use of program pathing was in a discretionary access control system (ACF2
[ACF99].) Its purpose was to verify that a user‘s access to a resource was granted but only
through particular process invocation sequences. Any access to the resource outside the valid
process invocation sequence was considered inappropriate and was denied. User authentication
and user authorization to the resources is handled by the access control system, and the process
invocation sequence validation could be handled by the Program Pathing Trust Model working
as a component of the access control system.
Using the Program Pathing Trust Model to validate process invocation sequences would
prevent a user from accessing data through any means but an authorized process, thereby adding
a more secure dimension to access control. Restriction of user access to data in this way could
help prevent unauthorized copying or leaking of data.
10.3.2 Program Pathing in a System Integrity System
A form of program pathing has been used in SELinux [Mcca05], and falls into some of the
same pitfalls as the ACF2‘s implementation. It identifies the process invocation sequences
allowed within a domain, and writes these relationships into a security policy using the SELinux
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policy language. SELinux also validates access to other domains, resources, security labels and
levels, etc. SELinux is a mandatory access control and system integrity system that could use the
Program Pathing Trust Model in the same manner as discretionary access control. In the case of
mandatory access control, a user with a security label could access a resource with the same
security label but would only be allowed access it using specific process invocation sequences.
SELinux has redefined mandatory access control to include system integrity [Mcca05].
The Program Pathing Trust Model can be used in the SELinux subsystem to define the
processes within a domain. The Program Pathing Trust Model would remove the need to define
each process manually in a security policy – thereby simplifying SELinux‘s implementation.
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Appendix A: Prototype Source Code
A.1 PPTM Source Code
/***********************************************************************************
/* PPTM - Program Pathing Trust Model
/***********************************************************************************
/*
/* Purpose of this program is to simulate an automata for the purposes of mapping
/* a sequence of process invocation calls. The program will then validate those
/* calls using the built automata.
/*
/* Developer: Robert Dahlberg - PhD candidate
/*
Virginia Commonwealth University
/*
Computer Science Department
/*
School of Engineering
/*
Prototype as partial fulfillment of PhD dissertation
/*
/* Created: Febuarary 7th, 2010
/* Updated: January 23rd, 2011
/*********************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "Automata.h"
#include "print.h"
/***************************************************
/*
define global variables
/***************************************************/
acell * scnatm(anchor * ack, char * pgm);
void traceaut(anchor * ank);
const char blank[] = " ";
char * bid = NULL;
char * bcaller = NULL;
char * bcalled = NULL;
char * vid = NULL;
char * vcaller = NULL;
char * vcalled = NULL;
char * last = NULL;
anchor * achr;
stack * stk;
automata * autom;
char TFile[200] = "train";
char tbuffer[80] = " ";
char VFile[200] = "validate";
char vbuffer[80] = " ";
char AFile[200] = "auditfile";
char abuffer[80] = " ";

main() {
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/*********************************************/
/* allocate storage for anchor data area */
/*********************************************/
achr = (anchor *) malloc(sizeof(anchor));
achr->len = sizeof(anchor);
strcpy (achr->eyecat,"*ANCHOR*");
achr->stkptr = 0;
achr->sptr = 0;
achr->snum = 0;
achr->autptr = 0;
achr->aptr = 0;
achr->anum = 0;
printf (" anchor pointer = %p \n",achr);
/*********************************************/
/* allocate storage for Stack data area */
/*********************************************/
stk = (stack *) malloc(sizeof(stack));
memset(stk,'\0',sizeof(stack));
stk->len = sizeof(stack);
strcpy (stk->eyecat, "**STACK*");
stk->nxtstk = 0;
achr->stkptr = stk;
achr->sptr = & stk->cellstk[0];
achr->snum = 0;
printf (" stack pointer = %p\n", stk);
/***********************************************/
/* allocate storage for Automata data area */
/***********************************************/
autom = (automata *) malloc(sizeof(automata));
memset(autom,'\0',sizeof(automata));
autom->len = sizeof(automata);
strcpy (autom->eyecat, "AUTOMATA");
achr->autptr= autom;
achr->aptr = & autom->autcell[0];
achr->anum = 0;
printf ("automata pointer = %p\n", autom);
/************************************************/
/* Build Automata from recorded system
*/
/************************************************/
/************************************************/
/*
Open Training file
*/
/************************************************/
acell * aelement = NULL;
acell * a3element = NULL;
scell * aselement = NULL;
acell * a2element = NULL;
scell * lselement = NULL;
scell * selement = NULL;
FILE *tfp;
if((tfp = fopen(TFile,"r")) == NULL)
{
printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "train" RESET " file \n");
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exit(1);
}
/*******************************************
/*
read training record
*/
/*******************************************/
while(fgets(tbuffer,sizeof(tbuffer),tfp)!= NULL)
{
bid = strtok(tbuffer,blank);
printf("ID = %s \n",bid);
bcaller = strtok(NULL,blank);
printf("Caller = [%s] \n",bcaller);
bcalled = strtok(NULL,blank);
printf("Called = [%s] \n",bcalled);
/************************************************/
/*
Find caller process in automata
*/
/************************************************/
aelement = scnatm(achr,bcaller);
/* find caller's acell in automata
/***********************************************/
/***********************************************/
/*
"caller" not found in automata
*/
/***********************************************/
/***********************************************/
if (aelement == NULL)
/* caller's acell not found
*/
{

*/

/***********************************************
/*
Add "caller" to Automata
*/
/***********************************************/
aelement = achr->aptr;
/* get new acell
*/
strcpy(aelement->pgm,bcaller);
/* copy caller process into new acell */
achr->anum = achr->anum + 1;
/* update acell number by one
*/
achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* ptr to next available acell */
selement = achr->sptr;
/* get next available unused scell
*/
stk = achr->stkptr;
/* get pointer to stack
*/
achr->snum = achr->snum + 1;
/* update scell number by one
*/
achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* get next available unused scell */
aelement->lnkcell = selement;
/* store 1st available scell in new acell*/
/*********************************************************/
/* printf("Caller = [%s] not found\n",bcaller);
/*********************************************************/
a2element = scnatm(achr,bcalled); /* find calling process acell in automata*/
/**********************************************/
/* "called" process not in automata
*/
/**********************************************/
if (a2element == NULL)
/* if caller process not found
*/
{
a2element = achr->aptr;
/* get an acell for calling process */
strcpy(a2element->pgm,bcalled); /* move calling process into acell */
a2element->lnkcell = NULL;
/* clear acell's link to scell
*/
achr->anum = achr->anum + 1;
/* update scell number by one
*/
achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* point to next free acell */
}
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selement->pgmcell = a2element;
/* move called acell to scell of caller */
selement->lnkcell = NULL;
/* clear scell's next scell pointer */
}
else
{
/***********************************************/
/***********************************************/
/*
"Caller" process found
*/
/***********************************************/
/***********************************************/
a2element = NULL;
/* clear a2element
*/
a2element = scnatm(achr,bcalled); /* find if an acell for called */
/***************************************************************/
/* called process NOT found - make sure called acell in scell */
/***************************************************************/
if (a2element == NULL)
{
selement = aelement->lnkcell; /* get 1st scell out of acell */
if (selement == NULL)
{
stk = achr->stkptr;
/* get stack */
aelement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */
selement = achr->sptr;
/* get next free scell */
achr->snum = achr->snum + 1; /* increment scell number by one */
achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance next free scell ptr*/
a2element = achr->aptr;
/* get next free acell ptr */
achr->anum = achr->anum + 1; /* increment acell number by one */
achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* advance to next acell ptr*/
strcpy(a2element->pgm,bcalled); /* copy called process name to new acell */
selement->pgmcell = a2element; /* point to new acell from new scell */
selement->lnkcell = NULL;
/* init new scell pointer to next scell*/
}
else
{
a3element = selement->pgmcell; /* get acell out of 1st scell */
lselement = selement;
/**********************************************************************/
/* search scells in found "called" acell for "caller" process acell */
/**********************************************************************/
while ((a3element != a2element) && (selement != NULL))
{
lselement = selement;
/* save this scell as last scell */
selement = lselement->lnkcell;
if (selement != NULL)
{
a3element = selement->pgmcell; /* get acell out of next scell */
}
}
/************************************
/*
was NO scell found?
/************************************/
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if (selement == NULL)
{
if (a3element != a2element)
{
stk = achr->stkptr;
/* get stack */
lselement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */
selement = achr->sptr;
/* get next free scell */
achr->snum = achr->snum + 1; /* increment scell number by one */
achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance next scell ptr*/
a2element = achr->aptr;
/* get next free acell ptr */
strcpy(a2element->pgm,bcalled); /* copy called process name to acell */
selement->pgmcell = a2element; /* point to new acell from new scell */
selement->lnkcell = NULL;
/* init new scell ptr to next scell*/
achr->anum = achr->anum + 1; /* increment acell number by one */
achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* advance to next acell*/
}
}
}
}
else
{
/***************************************************************/
/* called process FOUND - make sure called acell in scell */
/***************************************************************/
selement = aelement->lnkcell;
if (selement == NULL)
{
stk = achr->stkptr;
/* get stack */
aelement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */
selement = achr->sptr;
/* get next free scell */
achr->snum = achr->snum + 1; /* increment scell number by one */
achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance next free scell ptr*/
selement->pgmcell = a2element; /* point to new acell from new scell */
selement->lnkcell = NULL;
/* init new scell pointer to next scell*/
}
else
{
while ((a3element != a2element) && (selement != NULL))
{
lselement = selement;
/* save this scell as last scell */
selement = lselement->lnkcell;
if (selement != NULL)
{
a3element = selement->pgmcell; /* get acell out of next scell */
}
}
if (a3element != a2element)
{
stk = achr->stkptr;
/* get stack */
lselement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */
selement = achr->sptr;
/* get next free scell */
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achr->snum = achr->snum + 1; /* increment scell number by one */
achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance to next scell ptr*/
selement->pgmcell = a2element; /* point to new acell from new scell */
selement->lnkcell = NULL;
/* init new scell ptr to next scell*/
}
}
}
}
memset(tbuffer,'\0',sizeof(tbuffer));
}
fclose(tfp);
traceaut(achr);
/************************************************/
/*
Open Validate file
*/
/************************************************/
printf("\nProcessing Validate file \n\n");
FILE *vfp;
if((vfp = fopen(VFile,"r")) == NULL) {
printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "validate" RESET " file \n");
exit(1); }
/************************************************/
/*
Open auditfille file
*/
/************************************************/
printf("\nProcessing auditfile file \n\n");
FILE *afp;
if((afp = fopen(AFile,"w")) == NULL)
{
printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "auditfile" RESET " file \n");
exit(1);
}
/************************************************/
/*
Validate a Process
*/
/************************************************/
while(fgets(vbuffer,sizeof(vbuffer),vfp)!= NULL)
{
vid = strtok(vbuffer,blank);
printf("ID = [%s] \n",vid);
vcaller = strtok(NULL,blank);
printf("Caller = [%s] \n",vcaller);
vcalled = strtok(NULL,blank);
printf("Called = [%s] \n",vcalled);
/**************************************************
/* Validate Process invocation calls
/*************************************************/
memset(abuffer,'\0',sizeof(abuffer));
aelement = scnatm(achr,vcaller);
/* find caller acell in automata
if (aelement == NULL)
{
strcpy(abuffer,"Caller process [");
strcat(abuffer,vid);
strcat(abuffer,"] - [");
strcat(abuffer,vcaller);
strcat(abuffer,"] invalid \n");
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*/

fputs(abuffer,afp);
printf("Caller process %s - [%s] invalid \n",vid,vcaller);
}
else
{
a2element = scnatm(achr,vcalled);
/* find called acell in automata */
if (a2element == NULL)
{
strcpy(abuffer,"Called process [");
strcat(abuffer,vid);
strcat(abuffer,"] - [");
strcat(abuffer,vcalled);
strcat(abuffer,"] invalid \n");
fputs(abuffer,afp);
printf("Called process %s - [%s] invalid \n",vid,vcalled);
}
else
{
selement = aelement->lnkcell;
if (selement != NULL)
{
a3element = selement->pgmcell;
while ((a3element != a2element) && (selement != NULL))
{
lselement = selement;
/* save this scell as last scell */
selement = lselement->lnkcell;
if (selement != NULL)
{
a3element = selement->pgmcell; /* get acell out of next scell */
}
}
if (a3element != a2element)
{
strcpy(abuffer,"It is invalid for PID [");
strcat(abuffer,vid);
strcat(abuffer,"] - process [");
strcat(abuffer,vcaller);
strcat(abuffer,"] to call process [");
strcat(abuffer,vcalled);
strcat(abuffer,"] \n");
fputs(abuffer,afp);
printf("It is invalid for process %s - [%s] to call process [%s] \n",vid,vcaller,vcalled);
}
}
else
{
strcpy(abuffer,"It is invalid for PID [");
strcat(abuffer,vid);
strcat(abuffer,"] - process [");
strcat(abuffer,vcaller);
strcat(abuffer,"] to call process [");
strcat(abuffer,vcalled);
strcat(abuffer,"] \n");
fputs(abuffer,afp);
printf("It is invalid for process %s - [%s] to call process [%s] \n",vid,vcaller,vcalled);
}
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}
}
memset(abuffer,'\0',sizeof(abuffer));
}
fclose(vfp);
fclose(afp);
printf(BOLDBLACK"Exit Program" RESET "\n");
return 0;
}
/******************************************************/
/*****************************************************/
/* Subroutine: scnatm
*/
/*---------------------------------------------------*/
/*
search automata for a program name
*/
/*****************************************************/
/*****************************************************/
acell * scnatm(anchor * ack, char * pgm)
{
automata * atm = ack->autptr;
int xno = ack->anum;
int i = 0;
int finda = 0;
acell * xelement = NULL;
xelement = &atm->autcell[i];
/************************************************************************/
/* Scan Automata until end of automata sting or found the process name */
/************************************************************************/
while ((xno != i) && (finda == 0))
{
/*******************************************/
/** Matching program found in automata **/
/*******************************************/
if (strcmp(xelement->pgm,pgm) == 0) /* compare acell processes */
{
finda = 1;
/* found it - mark flag */
}
/*******************************************/
/** Get next process name in automata **/
/*******************************************/
else
{
i++;
/* advance to next acell in automata */
xelement = &atm->autcell[i];
/* get @ of next acell in automata */
}
}
/********************************************/
/* Was process name not found?
*/
/********************************************/
if (finda == 0)
/* no match found - mark return element */
{
xelement = NULL;
/* mark return element to NULL
*/
}
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return xelement;
}
/********************************************************/
/********************************************************/
/* Subroutine: traceaut
*/
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Trace automata and print out programs
*/
/********************************************************/
/********************************************************/
void traceaut(anchor * ank)
{
char TraceFile[200] = "automtrace";
char Tracebuffer[200] = " ";
scell * scelement = NULL;
acell * aaelement = NULL;
acell * abelement = NULL;
automata * ama = ank->autptr;
int ano = ank->snum;
int sno = ank->anum;
int j = 0;
int x =0;
char cella[24];
char cells[24];
FILE *tracefp;
if((tracefp = fopen(TraceFile,"w")) == NULL)
{
printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "autotrace" RESET " file \n");
exit(1);
}
printf("\n Trace Automata \n");
printf("number of acells: [%d] \n",sno);
strcpy(Tracebuffer,"
Automata Trace \n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
strcpy(Tracebuffer,"----------------------------------------------------------\n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer));
strcpy(Tracebuffer,"Caller Process -> Called Process |Called Process \n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
strcpy(Tracebuffer,"----------------------------------------------------------\n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer));
aaelement = &ama->autcell[j];
/************************************************************************/
/* Scan Automata until end of automata sting or found the process name */
/************************************************************************/
while (j < sno)
{
/*******************************************/
/** Matching program found in automata **/
/*******************************************/
printf("Calling = [%s]",aaelement->pgm);
strcpy(Tracebuffer,aaelement->pgm);
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scelement = aaelement->lnkcell;
/*******************************************/
/** Get next process name in automata **/
/*******************************************/
while ((scelement != NULL))
{
abelement = scelement->pgmcell;
if (x == 0)
{
printf("->[%s]",abelement->pgm);
strcat(Tracebuffer,"->");
x ++;
}
else
{
printf("|[%s]",abelement->pgm);
strcat(Tracebuffer,"|");
if (strlen(Tracebuffer) >= (200-9))
{
printf("\n");
strcat(Tracebuffer,"\n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer));
}
}
strcat(Tracebuffer,abelement->pgm);
scelement = scelement->lnkcell;
}
if (strlen(Tracebuffer) >= 2)
{
printf("\n");
strcat(Tracebuffer,"\n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer));
}
j++;
x = 0;
aaelement = &autom->autcell[j];
}
printf("close auditfile \n");
snprintf(cella, sizeof(cella), "%d", ank->anum - 1);
strcpy(Tracebuffer,"Number of acells =");
strcat(Tracebuffer,cella);
strcat(Tracebuffer,"\n");
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer));
snprintf(cells, sizeof(cells), "%d", ank->snum - 1);
strcpy(Tracebuffer,"Number of scells =");
strcat(Tracebuffer,cells);
fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp);
fclose(tracefp);
return;
}
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A.2 PPTM Automata Header files
#define n 1000000
#define m 100000
/***************************************/
/* link list scells
/***************************************/
struct scell
{
struct acell
*
pgmcell;
struct scell
*
lnkcell;
};
/****************************************
/* Stack of link list scells
*/
/***************************************/
struct stack
{
int
len;
char
eyecat[8];
struct stack
*
nxtstk;
struct scell
cellstk[n];
};
/******************************************
/* Automata acell
*/
/*****************************************/
struct acell
{
char
pgm[24];
void
*
lnkcell;
};
/******************************************
/* Audit pcell
*/
/*****************************************/
struct pcell
{
struct acell * aptr;
short int
acount;
short int
status;
struct pcell * dauptr;
struct pcell * sibprt;
};
/*****************************************/
/* Automata structure
/*****************************************/
struct automata
{
int
len;
char
eyecat[8];
struct acell
autcell[m];
};
/******************************************
/* Process invocation sequence trace
/*****************************************/
struct
IDtrace
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{
int
len;
char
eyecat[8];
struct pstack * pstptr; /* pstack pointer */
struct pcell * pptr;
int
pnum;
struct automata * invptr; /* invalid processes */
struct acell * iaptr;
int
ianum;
struct automata * trctab; /* Trace table */
struct acell * trcptr;
int
trcnum;
};
/******************************************
/* Process stack
/*****************************************/
struct
pstack
{
int
len;
char
eyecat[8];
struct pstack * nxtpstk; /* next pstack pointer */
struct pcell
pcellptr[n];
};
/******************************************
/* typedefs
/*****************************************/
typedef struct acell acell;
typedef struct scell scell;
typedef struct stack stack;
typedef struct automata automata;
typedef struct IDtrace IDtrace;
typedef struct pcell pcell;
typedef struct pstack pstack;
/*******************************************
/* System Anchor - main data area
/******************************************/
typedef struct
{
int
len;
char
eyecat[8];
stack *
stkptr;
scell
*
sptr;
int
snum;
automata *
autptr;
acell * aptr;
int
anum;
IDtrace * IDptr;
} anchor;

A.3 PPTM Print Header file
#define RESET
#define BLACK

"\033[0m"
"\033[30m"

/* Reset Attribute */
/* Black
*/
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#define RED
"\033[31m"
/* Red
*/
#define GREEN
"\033[32m"
/* Green
*/
#define YELLOW
"\033[33m"
/* Yellow
*/
#define BLUE
"\033[34m"
/* Blue
*/
#define MAGENTA "\033[35m"
/* Magenta
*/
#define CYAN
"\033[36m"
/* Cyan
*/
#define WHITE
"\033[37m"
/* White
*/
#define BOLDBLACK "\033[1m\033[30m" /* Bold Black
*/
#define BOLDRED "\033[1m\033[31m" /* Bold Red
*/
#define BOLDGREEN "\033[1m\033[32m" /* Bold Green
*/
#define BOLDYELLOW "\033[1m\033[33m" /* Bold Yellow */
#define BOLDBLUE "\033[1m\033[34m" /* Bold Blue
*/
#define BOLDMAGENTA "\033[1m\033[35m" /* Bold Magenta */
#define BOLDCYAN "\033[1m\033[36m" /* Bold Cyan
*/
#define BOLDWHITE "\033[1m\033[37m" /* Bold White
*/
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A.4 Testdata (automated data creation) Source Code
/***********************************************************************************
/* Tstdata - generate test data for PPT
/***********************************************************************************
/*
/* Purpose of this program is to generate test data to test the PPT program
/*
/* Developer: Robert Dahlberg - PhD candidate
/*
Virginia Commonwealth University
/*
Computer Science Department
/*
School of Engineering
/*
Prototype as partial fulfillment of PhD dissertation
/*
/*
January 2th, 2011
/*
/*********************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "Test.h"
#include "print.h"
/***************************************************/
/*
define global variables
*/
/***************************************************/
const char blank[] = " ";
struct ID
{
char ProID[3];
char Pronum[21];
};
char CallPro[24] = "
";
/********************************************
/* CalledPro of link list scells
*/
/*******************************************/
struct Pro
{
char MID[1];
char MNum[23];
};
char str[23];
char TFile[200] = "train";
char tbuffer[80] = " ";
int StrProc = 0;
int y = 0;
int x = 0;
int Process = 0;
main()
{

140

struct ID UID;
struct Pro CalledPro;
/*********************************************/
/* OPEN Training file "train"
*/
/*********************************************/
printf("Start Tstdata \n");
FILE *tfp;
if((tfp = fopen(TFile,"w")) == NULL)
{
printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "Train" RESET "file \n");
exit(1);
}
printf("OPENed train file \n");
/*************************/
/* Initialize variables */
/*************************/
x = 0;
strcpy(CallPro,"S");
srand(time(NULL));
/************************************************/
/* Dowhile more stings are required
*/
/************************************************/
while (x < NoIDs)
{
x = x + 1;
/* add one to UID count */
strcpy(UID.ProID,"UID");
snprintf(UID.Pronum, sizeof(UID.Pronum), "%d", x);
/***********************************************************/
/* determine random number of processes in the sting */
/***********************************************************/
StrProc = 1 + rand() % NoProString;
y = 0;
/************************************************/
/* Dowile more processes needed in string */
/************************************************/
while(y < StrProc)
{
memset(tbuffer,'\0',sizeof(tbuffer));
/************************************************/
/*
randomly determine a process ID
*/
/************************************************/
Process = 1 + rand() % NoProcess;
/************************************************/
/*sprintf(str, "%d", num);
*/
/* str now contains "3" sprintf() is like printf() but outputs to a string. */
/************************************************/
strcpy(CalledPro.MID,"M");
snprintf(CalledPro.MNum, sizeof(CalledPro.MNum), "%d", Process);
/*****************************************************************/
/* Construct training record and write to training file
*/
/*****************************************************************/
strcpy(tbuffer,UID.ProID);
strcat(tbuffer," ");
strcat(tbuffer,CallPro);
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strcat(tbuffer," ");
strcat(tbuffer,CalledPro.MID);
strcat(tbuffer," \n");
printf("[%s]\n",tbuffer);
fputs(tbuffer,tfp);
y = y + 1;
strcpy(CallPro,CalledPro.MID);
}
strcpy(CallPro,"S");
}
printf("End of Tstdata \n");
fclose(tfp);
return 0;
}

A.5 Test Header file
#define NoProcess 100000 /* Number of processes to chose from */
#define NoIDs 100000
/* Number of Stings in test data
*/
#define NoProString 100 /* Max Number of processes per string */
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Appendix B: Glossary
Abnormal Process
Abnormal Process
Behavior
Invalid Process
Invocation Sequence
Critical Application
Critical System
External Process
Internal Process
Invocation

Normal Process
Normal Process
Behavior
Valid Process
Invocation Sequence
Process
Process Invocation
Sequence

Program
System Integrity

Any process that does not accomplish or support the system‘s intended
function.
The result of executing abnormal processes or executing normal
processes in an invalid invocation sequence. Abnormal behavior is the
complement of normal behavior.
The set of invalid process invocation sequences is defined as the
complement of valid process invocation sequences.
An application that must not be interrupted.
A server dedicated to run a critical application. Interrupting, delaying
or halting these systems can have dire consequences.
Those processes that have not been intentionally installed by a system
administrator.
Those processes that have been intentionally installed on a computer
system by a system administrator.
When it is stated that, 'P1 invokes P2' it means that the CPU has
executed an instruction from P1 and that the executed instruction has the
intent of requesting the scheduler to place process P2 on the dispatch
queue awaiting the CPU to execute P2‘s instructions
An internal or external process that conforms to the intended design
specifications and/or supports the system‘s intended function
Normal system behavior is the result of executing only normal processes
in a valid invocation sequence that supports a system‘s intended
function.
Valid process invocation sequences are exactly those process invocation
sequences that invoke a set of normal processes in a sequence that
accomplishes or supports the system‘s intended primary function.
A process is a program that is loaded into main memory and executed.
A computer system does not just run a single process, but a sequence of
processes. One process will invoke another, and so on. The execution
of these processes should not occur in a random order. These processes
should execute in a predetermined order.
A program is a set of machine instructions that are organized in a
logical sequence to perform a task or process.
An attribute of a system maintained to execute only normal processes in
valid process invocation sequences.
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Appendix C: ACF2 Program Pathing Defintion Module
No longer used by ACF2, ACF99@RB was a compiled program that provided a static
dictionary of process invocation sequences that were authorized to gain access to resources.
[ACF99]

MACRO
ACF 310
ACF99@RB
ACF99@RB TITLE 'ACF2 STRUCTURE MODEL MODULE'
ACF 310
PRINT ON,GEN,DATA
PRINT EVERYTHING
ACF 310
COPY ACFDOC
ACF 22
***********************************************************************
*
*
*
* TS89408
* CHANGE LOG:
* TS89408
*
* TS89408
*
THIS MODULE DEFINES TO ACF2 THE STRUCTURAL
*
*
MODELS OF TSO COMMANDS AND MODULES TO ALLOW
*
*
FOR MACRO DEFINITION OF PATH CONTROL.
*
*
*
* TK52778 05/22/89 REL 5.2
TK52778
*
NEW RELEASE OF MSPF VERSION 2.5
TK52778
*
* TK52021 09/27/89 REL 5.2
TK52021
*
COMMENT CARDS WITHOUT SEQUENCE NUMBERS
TK52021
*
***********************************************************************
EJECT
************************
REL 6.0
************************** TS89408
*
* TS89408
* TS88952 06/26/90
* TS88952
*
INUSRE PROGRAM PATHING GET CORRECT PROGRAM NAME
* TS88952
*
WHEN 'REXX' IS IN CONTROL.
* TS88952
*
* TS88952
* TS89408 06/27/90
* TS89408
*
ALLOW PROGRAM PATHING FOR PROGRAMS CALLED FROM TSO
* TS89408
*
READY MODE.
* TS89408
*
* TS89408
* TS89418 06/27/90
* TS89418
*
FOR ISPTASK IN ISPF, SET THE ACTIVE PROGRAM TO BE
* TS89418
*
EITHER THE CURRENT PROGRAM, OR THE FIRST NON-APF
* TS89418
*
PROGRAM, NOT THE PROGRAM TO WHICH ISPTASK PASSED
* TS89418
*
CONTROL.
* TS89418
*
* TS89418
* TS89429 06/27/90
* TS89429
*
CORRECT IPCS COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR ESA 3.1.
* TS89429
*
ALLOW BLSUINI1 AND BLSQINI2.
* TS89429
*
* TS89429
* TS89439 06/27/90
* TS89439
*
PREVENT INV-CMD EFFECT WITH TSO/E V2 USING CLISTS.
* TS89439
*
V2 BRANCH ENTERS A DEFINED MODULE AND DOESN'T CAUSE * TS89439
*
A PRB TO BE GENERATED.
* TS89439
*
* TS89439
* TS90535 07/12/90
* TS90535
*
ALLOW THE 'EX' FORM OF TSO EXEC COMMAND TO ACCESS
* TS90535
*
CLIST LIBRARIES SET AS 'EXEC' FILES, AND NOT GET A
* TS90535
*
READ VIOLATION.
* TS90535
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00010000
00020000
00030000
00040000
00050000
00060000
00070000
00070100
00070200
00070300
00080000
00090000
00100000
00110000
00115000
00115500
00115600
00115700
00115800
00115900
00120000
00120100
00120200
00120300
00120400
00120500
00120600
00120700
00120800
00120900
00121000
00121100
00121200
00121300
00121400
00121500
00121600
00121700
00121800
00121900
00122000
00122100
00122200
00122300
00122400
00122500
00122600
00122700
00122800
00122900
00123000

*
*
* TS90532 08/14/90
*
*
PREVENT 913 MESSAGES WHEN JCLCHECK IN PROCESS.
*
*
ALLOWS JCLCHECK TO VERIFY LOADLIBS AND NOT BE
*
*
FLAGGED BECAUSE IDCAMS IS CHECKING LOADLIBS.
*
*
*
* TS90878 07/15/91
*
*
VIOLATION OCCURRING AFTER TS91150 APPLIED.
*
*
PROGRAM ISRPCP APPEARS AS PROGRAM FOR VALIDATION
*
*
*
* TS91161 07/16/91
*
*
MODIFIY THE STRUCTURE PROCESSING TO GET THE PREVIOUS *
*
RB IF PL/I PROGRAM.
*
*
*
* TS91189 07/16/91
*
*
DEFINE 'EX' AS AN ALIAS FOR 'EXEC' FOR REXX.
*
*
CHANGE WAS MADE ON THE @CMD FOR EXEC.
*
*
*
* TS90894 07/22/91
*
*
DEFINE 'SASXA1' TCB, RB STRUCTURE FOR NEW SAS
*
*
RELEASE 6.06.
*
*
*
* TS90537 07/22/91
*
*
DEFINE JCLCHECK AND EDCHK TCB AND RB STRUCTURES.
*
*
*
* TS84746 10/11/91
*
*
ADD SUPPORT FOR SISTER TCB'S WHEN USING TO SUPPORT
*
*
APPLICATION MANAGER INTERFACE.
*
*
*
* TS95683 04/03/92
*
*
ADD SUPPORT FOR TSPLUS REL 4. DEFINE NEW STRUCTURE *
*
'TSOSESS#' AND 'TSOSESS@'.
*
*
*
* TS95670 04/03/92
*
*
ADD ENDEVOR COMMAND STRUCTURE SUPPORT.
*
*
*
* TS93164 09/02/92
*
*
DEFINE ISPICP UNDER ISPF.
*
*
*
* TS95935 09/08/92
*
*
ADD SUPPORT FOR TSO/E PLATCMD.
*
*
*
* TS98124 10/01/92
*
*
ADD SAS 6.06 AND 6.07 PGM SASHOST
*
*
*
* TS95948 10/01/92
*
*
ADD SUPPORT FOR SPIFFY PRODUCT
*
*
*
*
*
***************************************************************
EJECT
************************
REL 6.2
**************************
*
*
* TA0378A 12/09/93
*
*
ADD IKJEXC2 AS ALIAS OF EXEC
*
*
*
* TA1028C 06/17/94 Z0006
*
*
ADD DB2'S DSN COMMAND STRUCTURE
*
*
*
* TA0946C 06/20/94 Z0009
*
*
ADD SASXAL7
*
*
*
* TA1389C 06/20/94 Z0009
*
*
REMOVE #PLI,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK FROM 2ND SPF @TCB
*
*
TO REMOVE PGM-PATH INV-CMD VIO FOR JCLCHECK
*
*
*
* TA1792C 11/17/94 Z0008
*
*
FIX TA1389, ADDED BACK #PLI,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK.
*
*
SOURCED FIX: REMOVE #ISRPTC FROM SPF @TCB.
*
*
*
* END OF LOG.
*
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TS90535
TS90532
TS90532
TS90532
TS90532
TS90532
TS90878
TS90878
TS90878
TS90535
TS91161
TS91161
TS91161
TS90535
TS91161
TS91161
TS91161
TS90894
TS90894
TS90894
TS90894
TS90894
TS90537
TS90537
TS90894
TS84746
TS84746
TS84746
TS95683
TS95683
TS95683
TS95683
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS93164
TS93164
TS93164
TS95935
TS95935
TS93164
TS98124
TS98124
TS98124
TS95948
TS95948
TS95948
TS89408

TA0378A
TA0378A
TA1028C
TA1028C
TA0946C
TA0946C
TA1389C
TA1389C
TA1389C
TA1792C
TA1792C
TA1792C

00123100
00123200
00123300
00123400
00123500
00123600
00123800
00123900
00124000
00124100
00124300
00124400
00124500
00124600
00124700
00124800
00124900
00125000
00125100
00125200
00125300
00125500
00125600
00125700
00125800
00125900
00126000
00126100
00126200
00126300
00126400
00126500
00126600
00126700
00126800
00126900
00127000
00127100
00127200
00127301
00127401
00127503
00127603
00127703
00127803
00127903
00128003
00128103
00128200
00129000
00129010
00129012
00129014
00129016
00129018
00129020
00129022
00129024
00129026
00129028
00129030
00129032
00129034
00129036
00129038
00129040
00129042
00129044
00129046
00129048
00129050

***************************************************************
00129052
SPACE 1
00130000
ACF99@RB CSECT
ACF 22 00140000
SPACE 1
ACF 22 00150000
*
ACF 310 00160000
*
ACF 310 00170000
*
SPF COMMAND STRUCTURE
ACF 310 00180000
*
--------------------ACF 310 00190000
*
ACF 310 00200000
SPF
@CMD ISPF,PDF,ISPSTART,MULTISPF,MSPF,ISRPCP,ISPICP
TS90878 00210000
*
TS93164 00211000
@TCB (#SPF,#ISPF,#ISPSTAR,#PDF,#ISPICP,#ISRPCP,
TS74831X00220000
#MSPF,#MULTSP),
TS74831X00221000
(#ISPMAIN,#SPFMAIN)
TS77767 00230000
@TCB (#ISPTASK,#TSOSESS),
TS95683,TS77851X00240000
(#MMAIN,#ISRYXDR,#ISPANRC,#IPNRECV,
TK52794,TA1389CX00251000
#PLI,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK,
TK52794,TA1389CX00251100
#ISPXC,
TS91161,TK52794,TA1389C,TA1792CX00251200
#ISPXP),
TS91161,TK52794,TA1389C,TA1792CX00251300
FLAGS=SISTER
TS74452 00252000
#MSPF
@RB
MSPF,CMD=CMD,
TK52778X00253000
NEXT=(RB,#MISPICP,#MISRPCP,#SPFMAIN,#ISPMAIN)
TK52778 00254000
#MULTSP @RB
MULTISPF,CMD=CMD,
TK52778X00255000
NEXT=(RB,#MISPICP,#MISRPCP,#SPFMAIN,#ISPMAIN)
TK52778 00255100
#MISPICP @RB
ISPICP,CMD=CMD,NEXT=(RB,#ISPMAIN,#SPFMAIN)
TK83561 00256000
#MISRPCP @RB
ISRPCP,CMD=CMD,NEXT=(RB,#ISPMAIN,#SPFMAIN)
TK83561 00257000
#SPF
@RB
SPF,CMD=CMD
TS77851 00260000
#SPFMAIN @RB
SPFMAIN,CMD=CMD
TS77851 00270000
#ISPF
@RB
ISPF,CMD=CMD
TS77851 00280000
#ISPMAIN @RB
ISPMAIN,CMD=CMD
TS77851 00290000
#ISPSTAR @RB
ISPSTART,CMD=CMD
TS77767 00300000
#PDF
@RB
PDF,CMD=CMD
TS77767 00310000
#ISPICP @RB
ISPICP,CMD=CMD
TS77767 00320000
#ISRPCP @RB
ISRPCP,CMD=CMD
TS77767 00330000
#ISRPTC @RB
ISRPTC,CMD=(CDE,NEXTRB),END
TK52794 00330100
*
TS77851 00340000
#ISPTASK @RB
ISPTASK,LASTTCB,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
TS77851 00350000
#TSOSESS @RB
TSOSESS*,LASTTCB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS95683 00351000
#ISRYXDR @RB
ISRYXDR,NEXT=(RB,#ISRYXX),CMD=CMD
TS77851 00360000
#ISRYXX @RB
ISRY**,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC,#ISPXP),
TS77851X00370000
LASTTCB,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
TS77851 00380000
#ISPANRC @RB
ISPANREC,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC)
TS77851 00390000
#IPNRECV @RB
IPNRECV,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC)
TS51563 00391000
#JCLCHK @RB
JCLCHECK,RENT,SYSLIB,END,CMD=CDE
TS90537 00392000
#EDCHK
@RB
EDCHECK,RENT,SYSLIB,END,CMD=CDE
TS90537 00393000
#ISPXC
@RB
********,LASTTCB,RENT,SYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB), TS89418X00400000
NEXT=(RB,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK,#ISPXC,#ISPXP)
TS90537,TS89418 00401000
#ISPXP
@RB
********,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB) TS74452 00410000
*
TS91161 00411000
*
FOR PL/I ASSIGN THE NAME OF THE CALLING PGM
TS91161 00412000
*
TS91161 00413000
#PLI
@RB
IBMBOP**,RENT,SYSLIB,LASTTCB,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC),
TS91161X00414000
CMD=(CDE,PREVRB)
TS91161 00415000
*
ACF 310 00420000
*
TS74452 00430000
*
EXAMINE COMMAND STRUCTURE
TS74452 00440000
*
-------------------TS74452 00450000
*
TS74452 00460000
#MMAIN
@RB
LTDMMAIN,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB,
TS74452X00510000
NEXT=(RB,#M###0)
TS74452 00510100
#M###0
@RB
LTDM###0,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB,
TS74452X00510200
NEXT=(RB,#MS##0)
TS74452 00510300
#MS##0
@RB
LTDM*##0,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),END
TS74452 00510400
*
ACF 310 00560000
*
ACF 310 00561000
*
XC COMMAND STRUCTURE
ACF 310 00570000
*
-------------------ACF 310 00580000
*
ACF 310 00590000
XC
@CMD ,
R41P166 00600000
@TCB #XC
00610000
#XC
@RB
********,NORENT,END,CMD=CDE
00620000
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*
*
*
*
*
NDVRC1

ENDEVOR COMMAND STRUCTURE
------------------------@CMD
@TCB
@RB

,
#NDVRC1
NDVRC1,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB

#NDVRC1
*
BC1PSRVL @CMD ,
@TCB #BC1PSRV,(#ISPXC,#ISPXP)
#BC1PSRV @RB
BC1PSRVL,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB
*
BC1PSATT @CMD ,
@TCB #BC1PSAT,(#ISPXC,#ISPXP)
#BC1PSAT @RB
BC1PSATT,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB
*
*
*
'PARALLEL TMP CALL' COMMAND STRUCTURE
*
------------------------------------*
PTMPCALL @CMD ,
@TCB (#EFF76,#PTCALL),NEXT=END
#EFF76
@RB
IKJEFF76,NEXT=(TCB,#FIBCMDS)
#PTCALL @RB
********,CALL,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CDE
*
*
*
PARALLEL TMP FIB COMMANDS STRUCTURE
*
----------------------------------*
#FIBCMDS @TCB #EFF04
#EFF04
@RB
IKJEFF04,END,CMD='SUBMIT'
*
*
*
QED COMMAND STRUCTURE
*
--------------------*
QED
@CMD Q
@TCB (#QED,#Q)
#QED
@RB
QED,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
#Q
@RB
Q,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
*
*
*
EDIT COMMAND STRUCTURE
*
---------------------*
EDIT
@CMD E,IKJEBEMA,IKJEBECO
@TCB (#EDIT,#E1,#E2)
#EDIT
@RB
IKJEBE**,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
#E1
@RB
EDIT,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
#E2
@RB
E,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
*
*
*
CALL COMMAND STRUCTURE
*
---------------------*
CALL
@CMD SPFCALCP,IKJEFG00
@TCB (#CALL,#SPFCALL,#KJEFG00,#TSOCALL,$TSOCALL),
FLAGS=SISTER
#CALL
@RB
CALL,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
#KJEFG00 @RB
IKJEFG00,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
#SPFCALL @RB
SPFCALCP,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
*
CALLED PGM FROM TSO READY MODE
#TSOCALL @RB
********,END,CMD=CDE
$TSOCALL @RB
********,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CDE
*
*
*
ISPCALL COMMAND STRUCTURE
*
------------------------*
ISPCALL @CMD ,

147

TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
TS95670
ACF 310
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
ACF 310
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
TK86602
ACF 310
ACF 310
ACF 310

00622000
00623000
00624000
00625000
00626000
00627000
00628000
00629000
00629100
00629200
00629300
00629400
00629500
00629600
00629700
00629800
00630000
00631000
00632000
00633000
00634000
00635000
00636000
00637000
00638000
00639000
00640000
00641000
00642000
00643000
00644000
00645000
00646000
00647000
00650000
00660000
00670000
00680000
00690000
00700000
00710000
ACF 310 00720000
ACF 310 00730000
ACF 310 00740000
ACF 310 00750000
ACF 310 00760000
00770000
ACF 310 00780000
00790000
ACF 310 00800000
ACF 310 00810000
ACF 310 00820000
ACF 310 00830000
ACF 310 00840000
ACF 310 00850000
ACF 310 00860000
TK86608 00870000
TS89408X00880000
TS84746 00881000
00890000
TK86608 00890100
00900000
TS89408 00900500
TS89408 00900600
TS89408 00900700
ACF 310 00910000
ACF 310 00920000
ACF 310 00930000
ACF 310 00940000
ACF 310 00950000
TS77106 00960000

TS73712 00970000
TS73712 00980000
ACF 310 00990000
ACF 310 01000000
VSAPL COMMAND STRUCTURE
ACF 310 01010000
----------------------ACF 310 01020000
ACF 310 01030000
@CMD ,
R41P166 01040000
@TCB #VSAPL
ACF 22 01050000
@TCB #VSTAR,FLAGS=SISTER
ACF 22 01060000
@RB
VSAPL,CMD=CMD
ACF 22 01070000
@RB
ASVPSTAR,NOSYSLIB,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
ACF 22 01080000
ACF 310 01090000
ACF 310 01100000
LIST COMMAND STRUCTURE
ACF 310 01110000
---------------------ACF 310 01120000
ACF 310 01130000
@CMD L,IKJEBLI1,IKJEBLI2,IKJEBLP1,IKJEBLM1 XL,XLIST
ACF 22 01140000
@TCB (#LIST,#L1,#L2)
ACF 310 01150000
#LIST
@RB
IKJEBL**,END,CMD=CMD
ACF 22 01160000
#L1
@RB
L,END,CMD=CMD
ACF 310 01170000
#L2
@RB
LIST,END,CMD=CMD
ACF 310 01180000
*--------------------------------------------------------------*TS77534 01190000
* IPCS COMMAND STRUCTURE
TS77534 01200000
*--------------------------------------------------------------*TS77534 01210000
IPCS
@CMD ,
R41P166 01220000
@TCB #IPCS,#IPCSSUB
TS77534 01230000
#IPCSALL @TCB #IPCSTSO
TS89429 01240000
#IPCS
@RB
IPCS,CMD=CMD
TS77534 01250000
#IPCSSUB @RB
BLS*****,CMD=CMD,NEXT=(TCB,#IPCSALL)
TS89429 01260000
#IPCSTSO @RB
BLS*****,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),END
TS89429 01270000
*
TS89429 01270100
*
TS79065 01271000
*
TS79065 01271100
*
SAS COMMAND STRUCTURE
TS79065 01271200
*
--------------------TS79065 01271300
*
TS79065 01271400
SASCP
@CMD
TS79065 01271500
@TCB #SASCP
TS79065 01271600
@TCB (#SASLPA,#SAS,
TS98124,TS90894,TS79065,TA0946CX01271702
#SASXA1,
TS98124,TS90894,TS79065,TA0946CX01271704
#SASHOST,#SASXAL7)
TS98124,TS90894,TS79065,TA0946C 01271706
@TCB (#SASCALL,#SASLIB)
TS79065 01271800
#SASCP
@RB
SASCP,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CMD
TS98124,TS79065 01271902
#SASLPA @RB
SASLPA,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CMD
TS79065 01272000
#SAS
@RB
SAS,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS79065 01272100
#SASCALL @RB
SASCALL,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS79065 01272200
#SASHOST @RB
SASHOST,END,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS98124 01272302
#SASLIB @RB
SASLIB,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS79065 01272400
#SASXA1 @RB
SASXA1,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS90894 01272500
#SASXAL7 @RB
SASXAL7,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TA0946C 01272530
*
TA1028C 01273000
*
TA1028C 01273010
*
DB2'S DSN COMMAND STRUCTURE
TA1028C 01273020
*
--------------------------TA1028C 01273030
*
TA1028C 01273040
DSN
@CMD ,
TA1028C 01273050
@TCB #DSN
TA1028C 01273060
@TCB #ECP10,#DB2MASK
TA1028C 01273070
#DSN
@RB
DSN,CMD=CMD
TA1028C 01273080
#ECP10
@RB
DSNECP10,CMD=CMD
TA1028C 01273090
#DB2MASK @RB
********,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TA1028C 01273100
*
TS88952 01275000
*
TS88952 01275100
*
REXX COMMAND STRUCTURE
TS88952 01275200
*
--------------------TS88952 01275300
*
TS88952 01275400
EXEC
@CMD EX,IKJEXC2
TA0378A TS91189 01275500
@TCB
(#EXEC,#EX,#EXC2),FLAGS=SISTER
TA0378A TS89439 01275600
#EXEC
@RB
EXEC,END,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS90535 01275700
#EX
@RB
EX,END,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS90535 01275800
#ISPCALL
*
*
*
*
*
*VSAPL
*
*
*#VSAPL
*#VSTAR
*
*
*
*
*
LIST

@TCB
@RB

#ISPCALL
ISPCALL,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)
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#EXC2
*
*
*
*
*
SPIFFY

@RB

IKJEXC2,END,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)

TA0378A TS90535 01275810
LINE DELETED BY TS89439 01275900
TS95948 01276003
SPIFFY CMD
TS95948 01276103
---------TS95948 01276203
TS95948 01276303
@CMD ,
TS95948 01276403
@TCB (#SPIFFY)
TS95948 01276503
#SPIFFY @RB
SPIFFY,LASTTCB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)
TS95948 01276603
*
TS95935 01276701
*
TS95935 01277001
*
SUPPORT FOR TSO/E PLATCMD
TS95935 01278001
*
------------------------TS95935 01279001
*
TS95935 01279101
IKJFCP03 @CMD ,
TS95935 01279201
@TCB #KJFCP03,FLAGS=SISTER
TS95935 01279301
#KJFCP03 @RB
IKJFCP03,LASTTCB,RENT,SYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB), TS95935X01279401
NEXT=(RB,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK,#PLI,#ISPXC,#ISPXP)
TS95935 01279501
EJECT
ACF 310 01280000
*
ACF 310 01290000
*
COMMAND CROSS REFERENCE TABLE.
ACF 310 01300000
*
ACF 310 01310000
@CXREF
01320000
SPACE 2
01330000
@ID ,
01340000
SPACE 1
01350000
MEND
ACF 310 01360000
ACF99@RB
ACF 310 01370000
END
,
01380000

149

Appendix D: Process Authentication
A method for authenticating that some other process is not masquerading as a process
previously authorized to invoke another process, is essential to PPTM. This section outlines
some possible to explore in future research for adding process authentication to the resulting
PPTM solution model. This present research assumes all processes presented to the scheduler
have been correctly authenticated.
An authentication verifies identity. Traditional authentication methods determine whether a
user or resource is what it claims to be. Authentication of a user is traditionally determined by
one or more factors such as ownership, knowledge or inheritance [Harr03]. Ownership usually
translates into ―something you have‖ such as a certificate, token, key or some such object that is
uniquely issued to the user. Knowledge usually translates into ―something you know‖ such as a
password, the answers to a series of personal questions or an answer to a challenge. Inheritance
usually translates into ―something you are‖ such as a fingerprint or some other biometric
signature; something that is physically unique the user. These factors were intended for user
authentication and are not all appropriate to authenticate a process. For example, a process
cannot ―know‖ something and therefore cannot be authenticated by this factor.
Processes can be authenticated by inheritance and ownership factors. For instance, a process
can have a certificate, thereby authenticated by ―what it has.‖ A process can also be
authenticated by ―what it is‖ using process characteristics, such as size, number of invocations or
an associated hash value.
Additional authentication factors have emerged and are occasionally applied to users: social
networking, web-trust, location-based and time-based [Harr03]. The authentication of processes
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can use some of these factors, especially location-based and time-based factors as good
indicators in authenticating processes.
In a process invocation sequence, each process must be authenticated to verify that the
process is assigned the appropriate symbol from the alphabet . The process name alone is not
sufficient for authentication, since a process can masquerade as another process by using the
same name. This is an area of the research that has not been addressed by other researchers. The
three factors that would most likely best serve process authentication would be ownership,
inheritance and location-based.

D.1 Ownership Authentication Factor
Process authentication could be effected using the ownership factor, if all processes had
certificates as do some JAVA processes using JARS. However, this entails that all software
development be required to start using digital certificates whenever a module is created, and this
would be difficult to do.

D.2 Inheritance Authentication Factor
Using the inheritance factor in process authentication has potential. A digital hash such as
SHA2, SHA1 or MD5 could be taken of a process at the time it is identified as a process and first
scheduled for execution in a process invocation sequence. Then, whenever a process using the
same name is encountered subsequently, a digital hash can be taken and compared to the hash
taken when that named process was initially determined to be a normal process in a valid
invocation sequence. If these two hashes match, then there is a very high likelihood that it is the
same process. The only problem with this approach is that hash is CPU intensive and could
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cause performance problems, although in some applications system criticality might justify the
cost of additional hardware for this purpose.
The inheritance method can be found as a feature in Computer Associates CA Access
Control® software. CA Access Control® [CAA08] creates hashes of all executables in the
system and authenticates them before they execute. As maintenance is applied to these
processes, new hashes are taken. Using CA Access Control® with the solution model described
in this research could satisfy the authentication requirement.

D.3 Location-based Authentication Factor
The third method usable for process authentication is location-based. Identifying the
directory from which a process is loaded is a good authentication method, if good access control
is followed. If directories are well managed, then a directory from which a process is loaded is a
good indication that the process being executed is the process intended. A process loaded from
another directory would suggest that the process differs from the one intended to run.

This is a

preferred method, as it would not take much additional processing time to determine.
Unfortunately, the Linux and UNIX OS do not save the name of the directory structure from
which a process was loaded. The OS loader is independent of the OS scheduler. At the time the
OS loads a file (for execution or otherwise) it does not know if the file is a data file or one that is
used by the scheduler for execution. In the scheduler, the directory from which the process was
loaded is not available in any of the data areas. Therefore, to authenticate a process with this
method in these OS would require a modification of the OS kernel.
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Appendix E: Is

= { }?

Because the DFA is built incrementally, it is not known at any time t whether L(DFAt) = Lv.
However, the strings in the set called the white list are in the non-empty intersection L(DFAt) 
Lv. Because the white list is also built incrementally it cannot be claimed that the set of strings
called the white list is the set of stings L(DFAt). Furthermore, it is not known whether the set
L(DFAt) merely forms a non-empty subset of Lv. L(DFAt) could contain a set of strings that are
not a subset of Lv. That is, it is not known whether there exists another non-empty subset of
strings both in L(DFAt=5) and outside Lv. More formally, it is not known whether
= { }. This remains an open theoretical question and a topic for future research, as
described in chapter 9.
The PPT model uses domain knowledge both to build DFAt and to determine whether strings
known to be in L(DFAt) are also in Lv. In this way the PPT model incrementally builds the nonempty intersection of L(DFAt) and Lv called the white list. However, the PPT DFA may also
accept sequences that are invalid.

10.4 Other Approaches Making Assumptions similar to Is

={}

Hofmeyr-Forrest [Hof98] and Ball-Larus [Ball92] assume that inferred strings are valid and
recognizes this as an unproven assumption in later research [Ball96] [Laru99]. HofmeyrForrest‘s n-gram approach used substrings of process invocation sequences to create patterns.
Empirically they discovered that an n-gram of eleven processes was sufficient to discover
anomalies in process invocation sequences. However, they did not validate whether the prefix ngram preceding or the suffix n-gram following an n-gram were authorized.
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Ball-Larus make the same assumption [Ball92]. They do not entertain the notion that the
structure might infer paths that have not have been encountered. Ball-Larus use edge profiling to
count the number of times a process path has been used. They hadn‘t identified 1) that they‘ve
made an assumption or 2) that once path between two processes is valid it is always valid
regardless of whether or not there are prefix paths or suffix paths that were ever encountered.
Larus discovers this assumption in later research [Laur99] and suggests that the whole process
invocation sequence be validated. Over a series of articles he offers a number of solutions, such
as process sequence probability and edge profiling.

E.2 Impact of the Assumption
One of the reasons why mapping valid process invocation sequences are so difficult to
profile is due to all the possible invocation sequences that must be generated by a running a
critical system as if it were in production. Each invocation sequence can have any number of
variations, such as invoking processes for system or application services. These all produce
multiple variations of an invocation sequence and must all be profiled.
It is almost impossible to profile all the possible valid invocation sequences due the
complexity of all the various code paths in an application. Take for example an application that
has error recovery processes that only gets invoked if an error occurs, or a process that only gets
invoked if specific data is presented to the invoking process. These are process invocation
sequences that are valid, but are not be profile-able in every case.
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Figure E-1: Process Invocation Example

Using the potential DFA shown in figure E-1, assume that sequences p1p2p3 and p1p2p5 are
valid process invocation sequences and that P2 invokes P5 only in rare occasions when an error
occurs. The string p1p2p3 and p1p2p5 are both profiled by the PPT model because P2 was caused
to fail. Also consider that p4p2p3 is profiled, but forcing p4p2 to fail so it profiles the valid
process invocation sequence p1p2p5 is difficult and therefore was not profiled because P2 could
not be forced to fail when invoked by P4. Using domain knowledge, it is known that p1p2p5 is a
valid process invocation sequence, but it was unsuccessfully profiled. In the PPT model
assumption, this sequence is accepted by the language and considered a valid process invocation
sequence because p4p2p5 is inferred. In this case the inferred process sequences, using domain
knowledge, are valid. It is accepted by figure E-1, and if

proves true, all process

invocation sequences accepted by PPTM are valid whether or not the sequences was previously
encountered or inferred. But what if domain knowledge were to decide that p4p2p5 is not valid?
Because the answer to this question requires domain knowledge, it is unlikely a purely
theoretical solution to the question would be satisfactory.
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